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PLATO'S POLITICAL THOUGHT AND ITS VALUE TO-DAY[1]

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I MUST begin by apologizing for taking a somewhat well-worn subject for my theme. My reason is that I have not yet found a recent treatment of it which is altogether to my satisfaction. Most of them seem to me too often to approach the subject from a point of view which, in a way, expects too much from the study of Plato or any other ancient author, and consequently either makes exaggerated claims for it or fails to do justice to what we really can learn.

What can we learn about our present problems from Plato or any author of another age? In studying any such author there are, it seems to me, two opposite dangers which we have to avoid. Few people, perhaps, are likely to fall into either of these dangers in its extreme form, but there is a constant tendency to deflect our course too much in one direction or the other.

On the one hand, we may fall into the error of regarding our author merely historically, as an event in the past, a product of circumstances which in the nature of things cannot be repeated and therefore of interest, if at all, only for the understanding of a past age. It is obvious that if all he says or thinks is merely the product of the circumstances of his own time, there can be nothing in it of direct bearing on our own very different circumstances.

On the other hand, in opposition to this, there is a tendency to treat our author as if he were writing directly for our own age and

[1] NOTE.—This paper was originally delivered as a lecture to the Classical Association some time before the outbreak of war. I have not thought it necessary to make any alteration, except a few verbal ones, in the original form.

circumstances and to discuss whether he is right or wrong from this point of view. The late Paul Shorey was referring to this attitude when, in his last work, he protested against "the assumption that the legislation of the *Republic* or the *Laws* is designed to be put into operation in modern England." I have certainly heard people, even learned historians, discuss it as if they were debating a bill before the House of Commons.

I regard this last attitude as fundamentally nearer the truth than the other. But none the less it leads to serious errors. We certainly miss a great deal of the value of Plato's writings if we reduce them to a series of statements or proposals and ask of each whether it is right or wrong in the light of our present knowledge or ideas. Very naturally, if we go to Plato as a hand-book of instruction for immediate practical action, we shall find little to help us now. Some of the claims made by enthusiasts for Greek thought from this point of view, will hardly survive serious examination. There is an inclination to great exaggeration in this respect. We sometimes find people taking the simplest and most obvious statements from Greek authors and pointing to them as something that we can learn from the Greeks. For instance, when Plato says that good rulers must think of the interests of the whole city in preference to their own, we might well find people who would say, How wonderful the Greeks were! If we could only learn the lessons of Greece, how much better our public life would be! and so on. The suggestion seems to be sometimes implied that unless we can read Plato,—in the original too,—we should never have thought of this for ourselves. It is just as important to beware of exaggerated claims as of too hasty rejection.

It is my belief that in the proper study of the great thinkers of any age we shall find little that we can simply and literally dismiss as wrong and equally little that we can simply and literally accept as right in preference to our present ideas. But it would be the height of superficiality to suppose that we can get no value from the study of them unless we find definite points on which they held the right views, which we must adopt instead of the wrong views which we held previously. I suggest that what we read them for primarily should be to provide a challenge or stimulus to our own thought. We should look for suggestions of ideas, problems, difficulties, methods, etc., which when we have absorbed we shall develop for ourselves, in our own way. We get this equally well if we finally accept or reject the line of thought suggested. Indeed, if we disagree, we can often learn more about our own point of view by being forced to ask ourselves why we disagree, than if we accept it. A special value of the study of thinkers of a past age is that they generally start from somewhat different assumptions,

or background which they take for granted, from ourselves, and therefore force us to examine our own assumptions in order to understand where we differ and where we agree. There is a special value, as it seems to me, in the study of Greek thought in this connection, because the general circumstances in which it arose were different enough from our own to stimulate us to this examination and yet not so different that they produce merely bewilderment.

To come to more specific applications of this point of view, I would suggest that a good deal too much attention has been paid in many recent discussions to the question whether Plato would have approved of Fascism, Nazism, or Communism. This question is really unanswerable, partly for general reasons and partly for special reasons arising out of Plato's methods of political thinking.

A man's judgements about any actual situation or institution are not determined simply by a set of general principles, which can be applied with certainty to any individual case. They depend also on his judgements about the facts of the actual situation and on his emotional reaction to a number of particular features in it. We could say with reasonable certainty of almost any actual constitution that Plato would have disliked some things about it and liked others. But what the relative strength of his likes and dislikes and the final balance between them would be is a question about which we can say nothing.

There is a particular difficulty in the case of Plato because of his general method about which I shall speak more in detail later. His method is not to classify possible constitutions into good or bad types, but to construct an ideal which he does not expect ever to be realized completely, and to judge actual or possible constitutions as more or less good or bad according to their nearness to or remoteness from the ideal. Such quantitative judgements are particularly affected by the consideration of numerous imponderabilia and depend to a special degree on a nice balance of different considerations. And it is therefore particularly difficult to prophesy what the results would be of the impact of a mind working on these lines, on any particular situation.

What I suggest we can do is to analyse the elements in actual constitutions and to say which of them seem to us—not to Plato—to resemble elements in Plato's ideal constitution and which seem to resemble elements in his account of the various imperfect or bad constitutions. Thus in many modern dictatorships we may find elements that might claim to be at least an attempt to establish something like the body of guardians in the *Republic*. But we could equally point to others which remind us strongly of the kind of tyranny which Plato regarded as the worst constitution of all.

Or, to take a more detailed point, Plato's use of myths or "noble

lies" has been compared to the modern technique of propaganda. We can doubtless see resemblances. But we can equally see many resemblances between modern propaganda and the tricks of the popular orators which Plato so constantly denounced as the most evil influence in public life. We can make up our own minds as to the side on which the resemblances seem greater. But it would be very dangerous to ascribe our own conclusions to Plato.

All this would be valuable training in the practice of the analysis of political ideas and institutions. But we have not yet got to the positive suggestions that we can derive from the study of Plato, suggestions of certain lines of political thought which we can profitably develop for ourselves in application to our own situation. I will try to put before you certain instances of this. And if you will pardon a somewhat egotistic approach, I will indicate some of the ways in which I believe my own ideas to have been influenced by the study of Plato. I cannot, of course, say that these ideas would not have occurred to anyone without the study of Plato. But I can at least say, that the study of Plato is one very good way of introducing people to them.

I. The criticism of democracy, particularly in the *Republic*, is probably the point which excites most interest at the present day. We should learn early not to approach this with the rather crude question in mind. Was Plato right and therefore democracy wrong, or is democracy right and Plato wrong? We have got first to face Plato's arguments and to understand them. And I suggest that when we have done this, we may still continue to believe in some form of democracy or we may condemn it altogether. But in the former case both the grounds on which we uphold our belief and the form which we shall wish to give to our own democracy will have been noticeably influenced by the study of Plato and perhaps modified from what they were before. In the latter case, we shall see that the criticism of democracy necessarily points to some particular kind of alternative and that other possible alternatives sometimes upheld will be condemned by Plato's arguments as decisively as democracy.

If we finally adopt the first attitude we shall, at any rate, not take the facile way out of saying that Plato's criticisms were levelled against direct democracy as practised in Athens, that we have a different kind of democracy and that therefore his arguments do not apply. Plato's arguments, at any rate in the *Republic*, apply against any form of democracy just in so far as it is democratic. The fundamental argument,—and it is this argument on which all rational criticism of democracy is based,—is that democracy infringes the principle of division of labour, which we recognize in everything else to be a necessary condition of efficiency. For it hands over decisions on matters of state to a vote of all or a majority

of the citizens irrespective of their qualifications to pronounce judgement. Our own system, doubtless, does not leave nearly as many decisions on policy to the general vote as the Athenian democracy did. But if it does not at some point leave some decisions to be settled thus, it would not be a democracy at all, and just so far as any decisions are taken thus, Plato's criticisms apply and have to be met.

In the days when I began to study Plato, democracy was much more readily taken for granted as the ideal system than it is now, in theory at any rate. And not the least of the services which I believe the study of Plato did for me was the understanding it gave me of the case against democracy and the consequent increase of understanding of the reaction against democracy when it actually came. I do not think anyone who had mastered the argument of the *Republic* can have been quite so unprepared for the shock of this reaction and so intellectually helpless in the face of it, as some of our contemporaries seem to have been.

If we do not finally accept the argument of the *Republic* as a whole, one condition of meeting it must be to recognize how much there is in it which is plainly right. There does seem no escape from the conclusion that, as far as we regard Government as a special function or business which in everyone's interest is to be done as efficiently as possible, we cannot defend democratic control of it except perhaps in certain circumstances as a necessary evil, or a temporary expedient for the moment. We cannot get away from the contradiction on which Plato is always insisting, between the general recognition of the need for specialization for all other functions in society and the denial of this implied by the application of the democratic principle, even over a very limited field.

When I considered this I found further that a great many conventional defences in current textbooks or lectures of our democratic system against Plato's criticisms really amounted to arguing that our system was not democratic at all. At any rate, they laid stress on the elements in our system which were certainly not democratic and so far as they defended it by dwelling on this, they made it difficult to see why they were not prepared to carry the argument further and advocate a reduction of the democratic element to the very minimum possible or even to zero.

Two convictions which I still hold then emerged in my mind. They were due largely, of course, to the study of the politics of our own time, but the form which this study took was very largely determined by the influence of Plato. One conviction was that, if we are going to defend democracy or the desirability of a considerable element of democracy, we must base our defence on the belief that there is a great deal more in government than just doing a

series of jobs as efficiently as possible. I believe that there is this "great deal more" and that we can defend democracy on the basis of this. But it would be out of place to attempt to explain my views on this point now. For I could not suggest that I owe them directly to the influence of Plato, though they have certainly been formed very largely under the influence of the study of Greek thought and life in general.

The other conviction was that, though government is more than this, yet it does include the task of doing particular jobs efficiently, as an essential part of it. And there is therefore always the necessity for an expert element to balance the democratic or popular element. It is interesting to see that Plato himself, in his later years, believed in the necessity of both these elements and regarded the best practicable constitution as a compromise or balance between them. I do not know whether this means that by the end of his life he had come to see advantages in democracy, which he had not seen before. It may be that the difference is due to the fact that in the *Republic* he was sketching an absolute ideal, while in the *Laws* he was trying to lay down the best practicable arrangement for fallible human beings. But the fact remains that in his later work he did admit an element of democracy as desirable, though I do not believe that he does full justice to the considerations that make it desirable.

Of course, in practice, in modern states we have been driven to this ourselves by the necessities of the situation. It might well be said that we do not need Plato to tell us that we must have an expert element in government. We have, of course, long boasted of our own mixed constitution, though with our penchant for legal fictions we have been in the habit of looking for the elements of the mixture in the old Estates of the realm—King, Lords, and Commons. These are, of course, of very minor importance in reality. The really significant elements in any rational analysis would be the Civil Service on the one side, and the electorate on the other, with a series of links between them in the form of elected representatives and Cabinet Ministers. But though it is practical experience and thought about our own times which has forced us to this rather than the study of Plato, we cannot say that we have yet solved all the problems about the proper relation of the expert element to the democratic element in a modern state. And if we want to solve that, we can hardly doubt that an essential prerequisite of this is clear thinking about what we require or hope for, from each element. A careful consideration of the challenge presented to us by Plato is certainly one of the most valuable methods of arriving at this.

There may be those, on the other hand, who accept Plato's fundamental criticism of democracy, and believe it to be a system

or tendency which should be abolished or reduced to a minimum. For them, too, an equally valuable challenge to think out their position may be found in the study of Plato. For his argument makes it clear that this criticism of democracy points necessarily to its replacement by a certain kind of alternative. Other possible alternatives, which are, or have been, sometimes put forward, can find no basis from Plato's arguments. They condemn, for instance, oligarchy, in the sense of special political power for wealth, as decisively as democracy. It is interesting to note that, though in the *Republic*, oligarchy is regarded as a stage less bad than democracy, Plato's opinion of it seems to have become less favourable as time went on. In his later writings he pronounces a bad oligarchy to be worse than the worst democracy. It is important for the critics of democracy to be brought to see that their criticisms are only valid if they are going to accept the logical conclusions about the kind of government that they wish to substitute for it.

It is fairly clear that the only form of government for which Plato would think it worth while upsetting existing constitutions would be a government by expert rulers whose sole interest and work was ruling. I would suggest, as a possible speculation, the question whether he would not have found the closest modern approximation to his ideal rulers, not so much in the Fascist, Nazi, or Communist parties, as in our own Civil Service. Perhaps he might have regarded the gradual growth of Lord Hewart's "New Despotism" as a much more satisfactory type of revolution than the sensational achievements of the totalitarian states.

II. I turn now to a less obviously topical, but to my mind, much more profound, lesson that Plato can teach us. That is his general conception of the proper method of political thinking. We see this exemplified most fully in the *Republic*, though his reliance on it is fairly obvious in later dialogues. I am referring in particular to his use of what we may call the method of ideals. This is fundamental for Plato's thinking and links up with his general theory of knowledge and reality.

Everyone, of course, recognizes that the *Republic* is a sketch of an ideal state, but it is extraordinary how many people still talk and write about this in a way which entirely ignores Plato's express statements on the significance of this method of approach. We still find people who talk of Plato as a cloistered philosopher spinning theoretically perfect plans in the seclusion of his study and prepared to apply them wholesale, if he got a chance, to any actual state without regard to practical difficulties or the weakness of human nature.

Nothing could be more absurd. Of course, Plato was very far from being the cloistered scholar, at any rate for the first half of his life. He was a man of the world, with a wide and varied experience

of his fellow men. But what is more important is the essential feature of this method. That is, the belief that the perfect form of society is not, and, in the very nature of things cannot be, completely realized in any actual society, any more than the mathematically straight line can be drawn or constructed in the sensible material world. At the very best we can only expect to arrive at a reasonable approximation to it. This, of course, is part of the general theory of Ideas or Forms, and the *Republic* is to be understood as an exercise in the application of this theory to political thought.

I would express Plato's theory and method in very general terms, thus: The first requisite of political thinking is to get our ideals clear and to have a definite conception of the state of things at which we are aiming. In the *Republic*, he shows how he thinks this should be done with reference to the state or society. He begins by an analysis of society in order to see what its essential function is, what it does for human beings. And he finds that its essential function and reason for existence is the mutual satisfaction of human needs by co-operation based on the division of labour. He then asks what form the organization of society would have to take if this function is to be performed with a hundred per cent efficiency. And as an answer to this question he goes on to develop the scheme as we know it.

But he makes it abundantly clear, both in the *Republic* and elsewhere, that for the practical statesman or reformer this would only be the first step. He would have to go on to see what was the closest approximation to this ideal which could be obtained in his own society and for this he would need, of course, practical experience and a knowledge of actual conditions and in addition, as Plato hints more than once, knowledge of past experience as found in history. His aim would always be to do the best he could with the actual human material that he had at hand. But he could not ever tell whether he was doing the best unless he had a clear notion of the ideal towards which he was working.

This, like many profound and far-reaching ideas, may seem so simple or even obvious when set out in general terms that we may doubt its importance. We can only begin to realize how important it is when we try it out by applying it as a general principle and method of thinking about particular problems. When we do that we soon begin to see that its consistent application would make an immense difference to our thinking. It suggests possible lines of approach to many difficult problems. And it saves us from what are, if it is correct, numerous possible errors and fallacies, or, at any rate, one-sided exaggerations of other tendencies, in our thinking. Even if we decide finally that the method is not really applicable, we should have to go through a very salutary amount of hard

thinking about methods before we could come to this conclusion. That is to say that Plato's suggestion would at least provide a challenge which would stimulate us to considerable effort to define our own position and, in doing that, it would certainly not leave it precisely where it was before.

But let us look a little further into what is involved in the application of this method. It involves, of course, a good deal more than simply asserting that if you want to get anywhere you must know where you want to get, though that may be included in it. For it is not concerned with mere personal tastes and ambitions, like a man's determination to get rich or to become a plus-four golfer. Even in such matters Plato would regard a man with a definite aim in life, however petty, as a stage in advance of the aimless drifter or the man with so many ill-co-ordinated aims that he can never attain any of them. But it is a primary principle of Plato that the ideal is not something which we are free to make up as we like, but something that is there to be discovered, involved in the very nature of things.

That is of course a necessary assumption or ὑπόθεσις of all serious thought and discussion about moral or social questions. We necessarily assume that some states of things are better than others, and that this is not a mere matter of personal taste but holds for other people as well as for ourselves. Plato sees that the only "proof" we can offer of this, is that we cannot consistently think and act on a contradictory assumption. Even a tough-minded thinker like Callicles, in the *Gorgias*, is eventually reduced to self-contradiction when he tries to do so, and is revealed in the end as a moralist *malgré lui*, with standards of conduct that go beyond the mere personal tastes on which he tries to base them.

But a further point of the greatest importance is Plato's view that, in all thinking of this kind, there is an implied reference to an ideal of perfection beyond the reach of any particular human being or human society. To anyone who asks, What is the use of bothering about an ideal which we cannot possibly reach? he would reply that we can only pass judgement upon what is actually practicable by reference to such an ideal. We do, in fact, imply this reference in making such judgements, even if we do not explicitly realize it. And we shall make judgements about the actual alternatives open to us with much greater clearness and certainty if we make explicit to ourselves the ideal that we are implying in them.

If that is true it would save us from the great error of suggesting that an ideal is not worth pursuing if it cannot be completely realized. Perhaps few people would suggest this when thus put in general terms. But it is astonishing how often in serious discussions

we hear it put forward as a valid criticism of a suggested ideal, that it cannot be completely realized in practice. Only a little while ago in a meeting of sociologists, which was discussing the ideal of equality of opportunity, I heard a distinguished economist objecting, at great length, that such an ideal could never be completely attained. Equally, of course, Plato's standpoint would prevent us being too complacent about our actual achievements. In fact, it seems to me, an excellent intellectual foundation for what I regard as the proper attitude of the social or political reformer, that is, never to be satisfied short of the ideal but never to be too disappointed at the failure to attain it completely.

Another suggestion that this point of view might bring to the mind would be the possible danger of exaggerating the importance of factual knowledge in the equipment of the statesman. Not that we must think for a moment that Plato would deny the value of a knowledge of facts. The suggestion that he would is one of the grossest misrepresentations to which he has been subjected, too often, unfortunately, by people who ought to know better. I may add also that, as we can infer with certainty from passages in the *Republic* and the *Philebus*, he would have particularly valued the presentation of facts in the form of statistics. Our modern developments of statistical technique would, I am certain, have met with his warmest approval. But what he would have objected to would be the supposition that any practical policy could arise from the study of facts by themselves. Only if they were used in the service of a clearly conceived ideal would they be of real value. And he would probably add that the conception of the ideal was a primary duty of the statesman and one which demanded much higher qualities than the mere accumulation of facts. He would certainly demur, and as I think rightly, to some current ways of talking about the superiority of practical men who deal in facts. It is, indeed, clear that the man who is solely interested in the knowledge of facts about what is the case is not a practical man but a mere theorist, pursuing knowledge for its own sake. The practical man, the man who does things, must begin by thinking not only of what is, but, before all, of what ought to be.

It will perhaps be evident that I think this method of Plato's to be capable of far-reaching and manifold application. But that is not to say that, when thinking for ourselves, we can take over this method in exactly the form in which Plato used it and apply it mechanically to all political problems. We have to think out for ourselves how we can apply these general suggestions that we have got from Plato. Personally, for instance, I am dubious about the value of casting our ideal model in the form of an organized state or society, at any rate, in the detail in which Plato and other writers

of Utopias have done. I think it might be more profitable to start with the attempt to conceive an ideal of individual character and individual lives. That, indeed, would not be alien to the spirit of Plato or of Greek thought in general. We may remember a passage in the *Gorgias* in which we are warned that the final test of the work of a statesman is not the public works he built or the successful wars he waged, but whether he left the citizens better men than he found them. It is an idea that is by no means so generally accepted in practice that we can afford to dismiss it as obvious, that in the last resort all measures or institutions are to be judged by the kind of characters they tend to produce and the kind of lives they make it possible for the citizens to lead.

The general point remains. We may take over a greater or lesser degree of Plato's suggestions. How much, and in what form we have to decide for ourselves. But the effort of deciding this is in itself an exercise in political thinking which cannot but have a good effect on our own thinking about our own problems.

III. There are two further points on which I shall touch more briefly. I owe them to the *Politicus*, a dialogue which has been unduly neglected. Though not as complete and systematic as the *Republic*, it seems to me on some points to display a riper wisdom and at the same time is free from the occasional traces of senility which undoubtedly show themselves in the *Laws*.

The first of these points is a discussion of the nature of the special knowledge appropriate to the statesmen, the royal or political art, *βασιλικὴ τέχνη*, as Plato calls it. And the particular point to which I wish to draw attention is Plato's careful distinction of this from the other kinds of special knowledge which are also of service in the work of government. The distinction corresponds very closely to that drawn in modern times by Bernard Bosanquet, himself a profound student of Plato, between the specialist and the expert.

We have talked about the expert element in government and Plato's insistence on the claims of this element to supreme power. But when we put forward the claims of the expert the picture it calls up to many people's minds is of a society run by departmental experts, what Bosanquet calls specialists, with no control from outside,—the doctors managing the health questions, soldiers military questions, architects and town planners the housing and so on. But in the *Politicus*, Plato makes a distinction of fundamental importance when he asserts that none of these special kinds of knowledge are themselves the art of ruling. They are necessary as instruments in the control of expert rulers but they must necessarily remain subordinate to these.

He puts the point with his usual directness and simplicity. He says that there is, for instance, a military science or art of con-

ducting wars, and if a war is once started that is the kind of special knowledge that tells us how it could be waged most successfully. But that knowledge does not tell us whether the war ought to be started or not. For that decision we have to look to the kingly or political art which is the highest of all.

Plato warns us of the ever-present danger that one or other of these groups of specialists may attempt to arrogate to itself the direction of the whole state, for which their specialized knowledge gives them no qualification. The real art of ruling, Plato says, is not to take action oneself, but to control the active or executive powers (*ἀρχεῖν τῶν δυναμένων πράττειν*) and to know when and in what circumstances to set them in motion and when to stop them. He hints that every special function may tend to carry its own activities too far if left without control. The true statesman will supervise them all, *τὴν τῆς ἐπιστατίκης δυνάμιν ἐχοῦσα*, and, in Plato's metaphor, should weave them all together into a whole, to the perfect state.

The supreme ruler, then, must not be a specialist in any particular direction. He must know how to use all these specialisms. And the principle on which he decides how to use them will be his conception of the ideal state or the ideal life for the citizens. That is why, as we have already seen, the true knowledge of the statesman is, firstly, a clear conception of the ideal. And we have here a further development of this in the suggestion that an essential part of this knowledge is the understanding of how to use the different special kinds of knowledge. The statesman does not have to possess these himself, but he must understand what they can contribute to the fulfilment of the ideal.

All this seems to me admirable. The only criticism I have to make is that what Plato says is so clearly and simply put that there is a danger of missing its profound significance. But it clearly refers to problems that go to the root of the proper organization of government. And when these problems are seriously faced experience has forced us to adopt systems very much on Plato's lines. But we do not always face these problems seriously and the organization of administration has suffered in consequence, both here and in other countries. Even for those who believe in democracy there is much worth consideration in Plato's views. They suggest that the expert element, which we have recognized to be necessary, should include not only specialists in different departments, but also some person or persons whose special function it is to think and plan for the whole. In our own constitution the needs of practice have forced us to develop something of the kind. We have the Cabinet so much at the centre of the machine that we have come to speak of it as the Government. But we may well ask whether the demands of administration have not resulted in turning the individual

ministers more and more into departmental specialists until we are left, I suppose, with the Prime Minister as the only person in a position to practise the kingly art.

If we follow up Plato's suggestion we might ask ourselves whether this is enough. In trying to think along these lines I find myself wondering whether reform of the machinery of government should not be considered in two directions. On the one hand, there is the suggestion of the revival of something like the War Cabinet, consisting not of the administrative heads but of a group of men with no function except central control and supervision. On the other, there is a suggestion of the creation of an administrative department of the Civil Service concerned with this, something much more than either the Treasury or the Cabinet secretariat.

Other interesting and suggestive ideas on administration are to be found in the *Politicus*. There is, for instance, the suggestion that in appointing a committee or a Board to run anything, we should be careful to choose members of opposite temperaments to balance each other. Those full of energy, enterprise, and initiative should be joined with cautious and critical colleagues, while the chairman or president should be chosen for his combination of both qualities. But these are details, and in the time that remains I want to deal with one more point of general interest on which the discussion in the *Politicus* seems to me of particular value.

IV. That is the nature and function of law in the state. One incidental point of interest in this connection is Plato's insistence that the work of a judge is the work of a specialist with strictly limited functions. His business is to know and administer the law as it is. And he is not to concern himself with what ought to be. The judicial function is, therefore, clearly distinguished from the function of government and subordinate to it. We have, of course, evolved this conception for ourselves and we do not need to go to Plato for it. But perhaps if some of our eminent judges studied the *Politicus*, it might discourage them from making *ex-cathedra* pronouncements on moral or social questions on which they have no special qualifications to speak.

But the important point is Plato's discussion of the general nature and limitations of law as a guide to action. What he has to say has application not merely to the narrowly political field, but to all questions of conduct. It is the earliest and one of the clearest treatments of the much discussed question of the value of general rules as a guide to action.

The argument is in the first place that law cannot attain perfect justice or righteousness in every individual case just because it is a system of general rules. It necessarily implies treating a number of cases as the same by ignoring their differences. In actual

fact no two cases are exactly alike and we cannot tell beforehand what differences are relevant. A perfectly wise and good man, therefore, would not act by general rules, but would think out every case as it arises and treat it on its merits. Such an attitude naturally appeals to thinkers who see the inadequacy of general rules in dealing with any concrete situation, and to practical men, anxious to get things done, who feel their cramping effect.

But—and this I think is a good sign of Plato's practical knowledge of the world—the application of this point of view may easily lead us to forget that, in fact, the actual people who will be called on to adopt it in practice are in general very far from being perfectly wise and good. The claim to be free from the guidance of laws or general rules does really mean the claim to something approaching perfect knowledge and wisdom, at any rate in reference to that particular point. And this is a claim not to be lightly made or lightly accepted. For the ordinary person in political authority or private life it is wiser and safer to accept strictly the guidance of the laws and not to try to correct their application in particular cases by executive action. The laws, which are only established or altered after careful thought and discussion, represent much more the considered opinion of the people in question than immediate action which may be influenced by all sorts of irrelevant emotional prejudices. And therefore, unless we are perfectly sure that we have, or our rulers have, perfect scientific knowledge of right or wrong, we shall do more for the wise government of the state if we strictly follow the laws, once they have been laid down, than if we try to deal with each case on its merits. "Salus populi suprema lex," as an abstract general principle seems unassailable. But in practice there are so few people really capable of applying it that attempts to do so would be likely to injure the welfare of the people rather than to advance it.

In his exposition of this point of view, Plato concentrates entirely on the question of law in the strict sense. This would be natural for any Greek writer. In the first place, the Greek, if he wanted to know how he ought to behave, looked to positive law enforceable in the courts for his general standard of right and wrong conduct much more than we tend to do. There was a general tendency to take it for granted that a code of laws should naturally and properly be a complete code of morality. And secondly, in Athens at any rate, they were more familiar than we are with the experience of seeing excellent laws, which had been drawn up for the conduct of the state with general approval, being disregarded in the name of justice by the sovereign assembly under the influence of some momentary excitement.

We are not so familiar with this latter danger as Plato was, at

any rate in parliamentary governments, though it looks as if something like it might be accepted as a regular thing in dictatorial states. On the other hand, we do not naturally look on the law as the authority to which we should turn for our standards of right and wrong. But that does not mean that we think out for ourselves every case, afresh, on its merits. We rely for the most part rather on what is sometimes called unwritten law, that is, the customary and conventional codes of conduct and the accepted ideas about right and wrong current in our own particular society. This always of necessity tends to take the form of a code of laws or general rules, though it remains more flexible and less definite than a real legal code. And we understand best the significance of the discussions about the nature of law in Plato and other Greek writers if we try applying them with the necessary modifications to the accepted codes of morality in our own society. We must remember that this applies not only to private conduct but also to political ideals. Our ideas of what is the proper aim of the statesman or what is the ideal of political action are largely determined for us by these.

Now if we apply Plato's discussion of the place of law to these codes of conduct we get interesting results. It suggests that, in the first place, every accepted code of conduct must necessarily fall short of the highest morality, and every code is therefore capable of improvement. But to say that therefore everyone should be free to break the code of his particular society whenever he thinks it right would be extremely dangerous. For the person who claims this is really thereby claiming an extreme degree of moral insight, a claim which we know with most people is very rarely justified. Moral codes are not established as consciously and deliberately as legal codes nor are they altered or modified in the same definite way. But none the less we can see that they represent a consensus of thought and experience arrived at gradually and cautiously. It is reasonable, therefore, to take them more seriously than an independent judgement of any particular individual unless he happens to be a saint or a moral reformer of outstanding wisdom and insight.

That is not to say that the conventional moral code, at any moment, is to be accepted without question. On the contrary, we know that it is imperfect and can be improved. And it is therefore a healthy thing that it should be subjected to continual questioning and discussion and criticism: *ὁ ἀνεξαταστὸς βιὸς οἰ βιωτὸς ἄνθρώπῳ.* If this criticism is carried on wisely and honestly, it will result in continual modification of the code for the better. But as long as the code remains as it is, as long as our accepted ideas definitely condemn this or approve that, we are taking an immense responsibility on ourselves if we break it or try to induce others to break it. That applies equally to private individuals or to powerful statesmen.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE WAR

Professor W. T. STACE

We are familiar with the statement that the present world-conflagration is, or involves, a struggle between two different philosophies. Obviously the statement is very vague, and it is exceedingly difficult to say exactly what it means. But if it has any meaning at all, a professional philosopher ought to be supremely interested in it. Philosophers are too apt to sit in their ivory towers, weaving curious distinctions and debating strange intellectual puzzles, without any consideration of their implications for humanity. For even the most abstract questions invariably have, in the end, important practical bearings. And we are apt to forget that, in the last analysis, philosophers are the uncrowned rulers of the world. For their ideas, secretly infiltrating among the masses, are among the forces which drive civilizations. Plato has had more influence on the destiny of man than the inventor of the steam engine. And so I make no apology for attempting to discuss here the question whether the two great nations now engaged in war, Germany and Britain, represent any philosophical ideas, what the philosophical issues of the war are, and where, in those issues, the truth, or the greater degree of truth, lies. And the paper will have two parts. In the first I shall try briefly to state what I believe the issues to be. In the second I shall attempt to discover whether there is any rational ground for preferring the philosophy of the one side to that of the other.

1*a*

Of course, it is possible to doubt whether any philosophical issues at all are involved. The war, it may be thought, is exclusively a struggle between nations for material advantages. This is what is apparently meant by calling it an "imperialist" war. The grounds on which this opinion is urged are, as a rule, extremely shallow. Germany, it is pointed out, is fighting for territorial expansion. Britain, on her side, is fighting for the defence of her islands, the retention of her huge empire, and the balance of power in Europe. This means that she is fighting for the retention of the power, prestige, territory, trade, wealth, which she has acquired in the world, mostly by the exercise of force in the past. Thus the struggle between Germany and Britain is, in essence, a struggle for wealth and power.

In my opinion the facts here stated are not to be denied. Britain *is* fighting for her empire, for the balance of power, for the territory, possessions, trade, wealth which she has won for herself. Germany *is* fighting for the same kind of material ends. But it does not follow, and it is not true, that these are the sole issues, or even the main issues, involved in the war. Britain is *also* fighting for a certain philosophy which is the life-blood of her civilization and her way of life. And Germany is also fighting for an opposed philosophy which is implicated in *her* civilization and *her* way of life. Hitler, in his book *Mein Kampf*, constantly reiterates the remark that in the long run no people will fight, or at least no people will fight to the death, for purely materialistic ends. They will only fight, he says, for a *welt-aunschauung* in which they fervently believe. This is true, in spite of the fact that it is Hitler who said it.

But before proceeding with the attempt to disentangle the opposing philosophies for which the combatants stand, there is an elementary piece of philosophical analysis (of a rather mild kind) which ought to be performed. What is the meaning of the phrase "fighting for" when it is said that a nation is fighting for a philosophy, a civilization, a set of values, a way of life? There is a serious ambiguity to be cleared up. I believe that a great deal of confusion is caused by supposing that the question, whether a people is "fighting for" this or that, is essentially a question about men's inward motives, feelings, or ideas. It is supposed that we should settle the question what England is fighting for by inquiring into the motives and other conscious psychological processes of Mr. Churchill, or perhaps of the average British artisan or labourer. I do not deny that this is a possible meaning of the question, and that this mode of inquiry has some relevance to our problem. But I suggest that we should do much better if we gave a more behaviouristic meaning to the question and adopted a more behaviouristic standpoint in general. How is this to be done?

The answer can be given in terms of an historical example. I think we should be correct in saying that at the battle of Marathon there was decided the question whether the Western world was to be ruled by Greek ideas, by a Greek set of values, by a Greek attitude to life, or by what we regard (rightly or wrongly) as an inferior Oriental set of values. And I think we should be justified in asserting the proposition that the Greeks at Marathon were "fighting for" the values of Greek civilization, and that they won this fight. But I suggest that it would be absurd to take this as fundamentally a statement about the inward motives of Greek statesmen or soldiers. These motives may have been what you will. Probably most of those involved were chiefly concerned to save their skins, and to retain their possessions. But this does not alter the fact that they were fighting for

the ideals of Greek civilization in the sense that the preservation of these ideals actually depended on the outcome of the fight. Incidentally this shows how shallow it is to argue that, because people's motives are at least in part materialistic, their protestations that they are fighting for justice, for morality, for religion, or what not, are necessarily false or hypocritical.

Now when it is said that Britain or Germany is fighting for a certain philosophy, I think the statement ought to be understood mainly in the sort of behaviouristic sense which I have indicated. I do not know whether Mr. Churchill's motives are mainly imperialistic or mainly idealistic. I think they are probably an inextricable jumble of both. The same is probably true of the average Briton, although the man in the street is perhaps apt to be more idealistic than the statesman who officially represents him. But we cannot examine the inward psychological processes of some forty-five million people. And if we could, it is doubtful if the results would be enlightening. I believe that Englishmen are dimly conscious of the fact that their civilization is the outward expression of a certain philosophy, and that they are more or less consciously and deliberately fighting to preserve it. And I believe that the Germans are, much less dimly and more self-consciously, aware of their philosophy. The English are an intuitive, rather than an intellectual people. They keep their philosophy, not in their brains, but in their bones. But how far it is true that the British or Germans respectively are conscious of, and motivated by, their philosophies, it is hopeless to try to determine. And when one speaks of Germany or Britain "fighting for" a certain set of ideal ends, it is better to mean this mainly in the behaviouristic sense that the preservation and advancement of these sets of moral ends seems to depend on the actual outcome of the fight. There is no objection to meaning and believing *also* that the participants are more or less conscious of their ideal ends, and more or less motivated by them, as well as by their material or "imperialistic" ends. But the former meaning is in the first place by far the more intrinsically important, and in the second place it is the more easy to put to the test of truth. And so I pass now to the question what the respective philosophies of the belligerents actually are.

1*b*

Nazi philosophy is the joint product of two intellectual forces, the so-called "idealistic" theory of the State, and the type of ethics represented by Nietzsche. These two philosophical creeds spring, of course, from entirely diverse, and even incompatible intellectual premisses. The idealist theory of the State descends from Hegel,

for whom *reason* was the essence both of the world and of man. It is a doctrine originally based upon belief in the primacy of reason. The ethics of Nietzsche, on the other hand, is an off-shoot of the philosophy of Schopenhauer, and is governed by the diametrically opposite idea of the primacy of the will. But if the rationalism which originally inspired the Hegelian theory of the State is left out or forgotten, that theory can be combined very harmoniously with the Nietzschean ethics. And when this is done, the result of the combination is Nazi philosophy.

The essence of the idealist theory of the State is that the State is a super-being, having a life and purposes of its own, which are distinct from, and far superior to, the lives and purposes of the individual citizens who compose it. What exactly this formula means, we need not, from our point of view, inquire too curiously. My own view is that it has no precise meaning at all, though it is capable of engendering powerful emotions. But however that may be, the main importance of it for us is that it has been made the ground of the pernicious view that the State has no moral duties outside its own borders. This is very surprising. It does not seem at all to follow from the idea that the State is a super-being. One would naturally suppose that if the State is a being superior to all individuals, it would therefore be *more* moral than they are. But actually the opposite conclusion has been drawn. The State is "above" morality. And the phrase "above morality" is interpreted as meaning what most people would call "below morality," that is, having no morality at all.

The other source of Nazi philosophy, the ethics of Nietzsche, derives from Schopenhauer's doctrine that will, not reason, is the essence of man (as indeed of the whole universe), and that reason is merely the instrument of the will, its sole function being to find the means by which the will can achieve its ends. This may be called the doctrine of the primacy of the will. To this doctrine Nietzsche added two ideas of his own. The first was that what the will wills is always power. The second was that the struggle for power has been the mainspring of evolution. And as Nietzsche uncritically identified evolution with progress towards the good, it followed for him that the struggle for power is good, and that any morality which tends to soften or mitigate it is bad. This is what the Christian ethic does, for it preaches sympathy and help for the weak. Hence Nietzsche's moral ideal is that of the strong, hard, ruthless man, who in his struggle for power uses without conscience any and every means to crush his weaker competitors. This is Nietzsche's idea of the "good" man, and it is, of course, the exact opposite of the Christian ideal.

It takes both the idealist theory of the State and the Nietzschean

ethics to produce the peculiar mentality of Nazism. It is mainly from the former that it derives its internal political theory, that is, its view of the State's relations to its own citizens. The State is a super-being whose ends reduce to a nullity the ends of the individual citizens. Hence the individual is in essence merely a means to the ends of the State. Therefore the view which Kant crystallized in his statement that the individual is an end in himself, and which—as I shall show later—is one of the basic beliefs on which our Western or Christian civilization has been built, is in effect denied by the Nazi theory. From this root spring the wholesale suppression of liberty of thought, of speech, of Press, of assemblage, which is characteristic of totalitarian States. For the philosophic basis of these various liberties is the idea of the infinite or absolute value of the individual, which is the same thing as Kant's idea of the individual as an end in himself. Since the individual is now merely a means to the State's superior ends, his liberties, his rights, even his life, are nothing which the State need regard as sacred.

On the other hand, the Nazi theory of foreign relations is derived both from the idealist theory of the State and from the Nietschean ethics. From the first comes the view that the State has no moral duties to other States. But this alone is not enough to lead to an aggressive and war-like attitude. A State which recognizes no international duties might yet prefer, in its own interests, a policy of peace. It might perfectly well make, not power, but a life devoted to the arts and sciences, or even to the Christian virtues, its chief end. To complete the attitude of Nazism there is necessary also the Nietzschean doctrine that the sole preoccupation of the State, as of the individual, ought to be the acquisition of power, and that the means to be adopted to this end should be completely ruthless and without conscience.

Hitler is a more or less uneducated man. I do not know whether he has ever read either Nietzsche or the exponents of the idealist theory of the State. But it makes no difference. Indirectly, through one source or another, the whole *welt-anschauung* which he represents has been moulded by these influences. His career is the living embodiment of them. I sometimes think that, instead of holding up our hands in horror at his bombings of civilians, his cruel treatment of the Jews, his lying propaganda, his brutal aggressions, his shameless breach of his pledges, we ought rather to admire the amazing consistency with which he applies to life the theoretical doctrines of a philosophy. I know of only one other person who so consistently lived the philosophy which he preached—Socrates. And we ought not to forget that the abominations which Hitler puts upon the world are, *if* his philosophy be accepted, good, right, noble, heroic.

1c

Turning now to the philosophy which is represented by Britain and the other democratic peoples, the first and most obvious characterization of it is that it accepts the Christian rather than the Nietzschean ethical ideals. Of course it is not suggested that our democratic civilization is Christian in the sense that it has ever lived up to the precepts of Christianity. But it is Christian in the sense that, however much it may have fallen short, yet the ethical ideals which have inspired the finest products of its culture are of Christian origin. The common ideas of good behaviour which circulate among us, and which to some extent at least mould our conduct, are Christian moral ideas. For instance, our civilization does not accept the strong, aggressive, brutal man, or the strong, aggressive, brutal nation, as its exemplar. It condemns such men and such nations. It believes in charity towards the weak, in mutual help, co-operation, and sympathy.

But the philosophy for which the Western democracies stand has, like the Nazi philosophy, two sources. The first, as just stated, is the Christian ethic. The second is the Greek, and especially the Platonic, attitude to life. The civilization which they are seeking to preserve is a Greco-Christian civilization. The philosophical principle on which Greek ethics was based was the principle of the primacy of the reason over the will, or over the appetites as Plato would have phrased it. The philosophical principle on which Christian ethics is based is not so clear, but is perhaps emphasis on the principle of sympathy as a fact of human nature Emphasis on the rationality of man and emphasis on the sympathetic nature of man are, on this view, the two main sources of our ideals. And these two streams of ethical philosophy have coalesced in the modern world. They are the philosophical bases on which our Western civilization has rested.

The key-idea, which is the central substance of this civilization, is that of the infinite or absolute value of the individual. And this can be based indifferently either on the Christian principle of sympathy or on the Greek principle of reason. It follows, so to speak, from both. And both, I should say, have co-operated in producing it. And it is just because of this fact that the two ethical streams have been enabled to fuse and become one. And we have therefore to establish these two points, first, that the notion of the absolute value of the individual is deducible either from the Christian or the Greek principle, and second, that it is, as just suggested, the key-idea of our civilization.

First, then, this idea flows naturally from the principle of sympathy. For the philosophy of the natural or animal man is that of complete egoism. He is the centre of his universe and all else revolves

round him. This involves two consequences. One is that he himself, his desires, his needs, his personality have an infinite and absolute value. The other is that all other things and beings, including other persons, have no intrinsic value at all, but only a derivative and instrumental value as possible means to the satisfaction of his ends. This would be the philosophy of the tiger, if the tiger could reflect and conceptualize his attitude. The lamb, or the man, whom he eats has no value except as food for him. He himself, therefore, is the sole centre of absolute and intrinsic value.

Now the dialectical impact of the principle of sympathy upon this natural or animal philosophy will be as follows. I start with the position that I alone have absolute value and am an end in myself. But the principle of sympathy means that I discover my own personality in another. I feel his feelings and identify myself with him. I am bound to conclude that since I am of absolute value, and since I now find myself in him, his personality is likewise of infinite value, and that he also is an end in himself. Thus all persons become of absolute value and are ends in themselves.

But the Greek principle of the primacy of reason leads by natural steps to the same idea. We see this in the philosophy of Kant, who explicitly bases his maxim that each man is an end in himself on the essential rationality of man. The Greeks taught that it is by virtue of his reason that man is superior to the animal. Kant accordingly places the centre of intrinsic value in reason, and hence deduces that each man, as a rational being, possesses absolute value and is an end in himself.

In this way the Greek and the Christian principles have fused into a single ethical tradition in which sometimes the Greek, sometimes the Christian side, is emphasized. For both have led to the same conception of the place of the individual man in the universe.

The next point is to see that this conception of the absolute value of the individual is, as I have suggested, the key-idea of Western civilization. To exhibit this in detail would necessitate an elaborate examination of history. I can only give here a few obvious headings. First, upon this conception is based the doctrine of human equality which (in whatever sense it is understood) is the root-idea of democracy and of all democratic institutions. If men had only relative or instrumental value, then this idea of equality could not possibly arise at all. For in that case men would have different values as being more or less instrumental to this or that end. Every person has both intrinsic and instrumental value. For instance, the postman is an end in himself, but he has also instrumental value for various people to whom he brings letters. It is only as being centres of absolute value that all men are equal, and this is the inner meaning of the political and legal doctrine of equality. It is as having instru-

mental value that men are unequal, since, owing to their different capacities, they fulfil their various functions in society with different degrees of efficiency. The senseless dispute which is always going on about the equality of all men, some saying they are equal, some point to their inequalities, is due to failure to make this distinction. Those who say that all men are equal are referring to their intrinsic values which, as each being infinite, are equal. Those who say that men are unequal are referring to their instrumental values. Democracy is based upon the concept of equality, and this in turn upon the concept of the absolute value of the individual. Fascist philosophy denies these fundamental ideas because for it only the super-being of the State has absolute value.

Secondly, the conception of the liberty of the individual, the freedoms of thought, speech, Press, etc., have the same sources. Why should my right to think, speak, and write as I please be respected by the State, and not suppressed for its own purposes? Only, so far as I can see, because my personality and my interests are recognized as having an intrinsic value. Thirdly, individualism, in so far as it is a basic idea of democracy, is an offshoot of our belief in the infinite value of the individual, and can only be justified thereby. It is true that individualism, as frequently understood, can be represented as arising out of mere egoism, the philosophy of the tiger, the battle of all against all. But this is an instance of the wolf masquerading in sheep's clothing. Individualism, in so far as it is mere ruthless disregard of others, is no true part of the philosophy of democracy. Individualism, as the recognition of the absolute value and rights of each individual, is. Fourthly, from the absolute value of each man follows the democratic view that the State is only a means to achieving the ends of individuals; that the State is made for man, not man for the State.

Finally, this key-idea of which I am speaking is not only the inner substance of our purely political institutions, but permeates our attitude to life in matters which have no direct connection with politics. I will mention three instances. First, the value which is attached to human life in the West as compared with its much lesser value elsewhere. Second, the notions of the dignity of man and the dignity of labour. This latter phrase emphasizes that a man, even though he labours with his hands only, so that his instrumental value is not of a very great or wide-reaching kind, has yet the same essential inner value as other men whose achievements may be greater. Lastly, the peculiar attitude of our civilization to slavery is wholly determined by our belief that each man is an end in himself. It is the greatest mistake to suppose that the objection to slavery is based merely upon humanitarian sentiments such as sympathy for suffering. Of course, that has something to do with it. But if that were

all, we should not object to slavery where the slave is well-treated and happy—which has often been the case. Actually, we abhor slavery absolutely and on principle. Why? Because we see in it, even where the slave is well-treated, an infringement of his human position as having absolute and intrinsic value. To make him a slave is to treat him as having no status except that of being a means to the ends of some other human being.

2a

I have now sketched in outline the two philosophies which appear to stand embattled against one another in the present world-conflagration. The other question we were to deal with is the question of truth. Are there any rational grounds for preferring the democratic or Greco-Christian philosophy to that of the Nazis? Or are we in the position of having to admit that we prefer our own philosophy merely on irrational emotional grounds, or because we have been brought up in it and are committed to it?

Even the cursory sketch of the two philosophies which I have given shows that there are a number of distinct philosophical issues involved. The two most important are (1) the issue between the primacy of reason and the primacy of will. The civilization which we represent and are defending in the war is based upon the former, the Nazi philosophy on the latter; (2) the issue whether the Christian ethic of sympathy is capable of rational defence. For the Nazi philosophy repudiates it, together with all that it implies, such as the duty of strong nations to have regard for the interests of weak nations, to be humane even in war, etc. There are certainly other issues which are very important, but it is useless to isolate them, because I have not even time to deal with the two already specified. In fact I shall here consider only the first. I choose this both because it is the most manageable, and because it is actually the most important. On whether the will or the reason is considered prior depends fundamentally whether we are to continue following the Greco-Christian ethical principles of our civilized tradition, or give ourselves over to the admiration and imitation of mere strength, ruthlessly and brutally exercised without regard for the rights of others. Whether reason or will is to rule the world is, I think, the main philosophical issue of the war.

The question reduces itself to the inquiry What is the proper function of reason? (by which is meant here intelligence in general) in the life of man, and how it should be related to the will (by which is meant here the sum of the desires, appetites, interests, and instincts). Is reason merely an instrument of the will, as Schopenhauer taught, or should it on the contrary control the will, as Plato taught?

Is will the master, and reason the servant; or is reason the master, and will the servant?

It is obvious that the question, stated thus, makes certain assumptions. It assumes that we can legitimately talk, as Plato and the Greeks always talked, of the different psychological principles—or "parts of the soul," as Plato would have called them—as having each a "proper" function. And this may be denied, since it will be thought to imply a teleological view of the universe, which is not now in fashion. I cannot stop to consider the objection at length. I will merely remark that the question does not really imply a teleological view of the world at all. It has often been pointed out that it is impossible for the biologists to discuss rationally the organization of the body without employing the idea of function. It is obvious that, in some sense, it is the proper function of the heart to pump blood, of the stomach to digest food, of the liver to secrete bile. This does not imply teleology. It does not mean that God or any other being planned the processes of the body, but simply that, if the organism is to lead a normal and healthy life, the different organs must do these different things. And to discover this requires nothing but simple observation of what these organs actually do in normal and healthy bodies, and how in abnormal cases their failure to do them leads to ill health. And it seems to me perfectly reasonable that the same principle should be applied to the human mind or personality. If we are to lead good, healthy, happy and satisfactory lives, then the impulses, the desires, the intelligence, and the other parts of our personality must be co-ordinated in certain definite ways and fulfil certain definite functions. And to discover the proper functions of reason, will, and the rest will require nothing except simple observation of how these principles are related in normal and healthy-minded people, what functions they actually perform, and how failure to perform them leads to abnormal, mentally unhealthy, and unsatisfactory lives. No metaphysical assumptions whatsoever are involved in this method of procedure.

We may return, therefore, to our question regarding the proper relations between the will and the reason. Was Schopenhauer right or was Plato? The Greek view that reason is the essence of man, that it is reason which raises him above the level of the animal, that it is reason which should control will, has passed into the general stream of Western civilization, and has moulded our ideals, our lives, and our institutions. If it is the true view, then the essence of all that is peculiarly great in man, his morals, his artistic culture, his civilization, his political life, must somehow have reason at its core. This is the tradition which Schopenhauer and Nietzsche sought to overturn. A great deal of modern philosophy has followed in their footsteps, Bergson with his attempt to undermine the intellect in

favour of a so-called "intuition," and American pragmatism, which makes human interests, instead of reason, the arbiter of truth. A great deal of modern art and literature exhibits the same irrationalism. From this point of view it is seen that the war is the final fruit of the modern world's rebellion against the rule of reason which has dominated the West for two thousand years. That is why I think this issue of the reason against the will is the deepest philosophical issue involved in the conflict.

2b

It seems to me that Schopenhauer's view that the proper function of reason is to be the mere instrument of the will is the result of a hasty induction. There are, of course, instances in life in which reason appears in the guise of the mere path-finder of the will. I want to come to New York, and my intelligence sets me to consulting railway time-tables. Man needed protection from wind and weather. His intellect discovered for him the way to build houses. I desire wealth, and intelligence is set to work to discover the means to this end. It is evidently from instances like this that Schopenhauer generalized to the conclusion that reason is only concerned with means, while will sets the ends. There is also no doubt another consideration which has been influential with voluntarists generally. This is the fact that reason appears to be merely formal and barren. In the sphere of knowledge it cannot produce or discover truth, but only consistency. So in the sphere of practice it will be equally barren and empty. It cannot produce or discover value. The will produces or discovers it. Reason merely organizes the means for realizing it.

But there is an obvious fact which philosophers ought to have remembered at this point. The whole elaborate structure of human knowledge, of science, philosophy, history, politics, is the result of intelligence working upon bare sense-experience. There are these two factors only which have been responsible for the whole of knowledge, namely, sense and reason. Now how much has been contributed by sense, how much by reason? To answer this question we have only to look first at the animal mind and then at the human mind. Animals in general have senses at least as acute as ours. Therefore the whole vast difference between blind animal ignorance and the vast elaboration of human knowledge must be in some way due to the other factor, reason. And this in spite of the fact that reason is, in its own nakedness, merely formal and barren. How reason, which is, by itself, concerned only with formal consistency, can yet become the virtual creator of human knowledge, is no doubt a problem. But such, at any rate, is the fact. And it should have given pause to those who urge that because reason is formal, there-

fore its function in our practical lives cannot be creative, but must be merely subsidiary and instrumental.

This analogy between the function of reason in knowledge and its function in practical life gives us, I believe, the clue to the solution of our problem. I propose to suggest that the function of the will in practical life corresponds to the function of sensation in knowledge; that just as reason, working upon the given sense-experience, somehow creates out of this raw material the whole elaborate world of science and knowledge, so reason, working on crude value-experience discovered by the will, somehow creates out of this raw material the whole wealth of our value-lives; and that therefore reason is superior to, and has primacy over will, in the practical life, in exactly the same sense as it is superior to, and has primacy over, bare sensation in the theoretical life.

Corresponding to sense-data we have, I think, what may be called value-data. I call the pleasantness of a taste, a sight, or a sound, a value-datum. I call the beauty of a picture a value-datum, or perhaps rather an organized complex of value-data. These data are the crude objects of the will just as sense-data are the crude objects of the senses. It is not necessary to discuss whether the value-data are objective or subjective, that is, whether they are actually produced by the will, as the interest theory holds, or discovered by it, as the realist theory of value maintains. The same sort of question is raised about sense-data, some saying they are in the object, others that they are at least in part produced by the sense-organs. But the problem of the relative functions of sense and reason, or of will and reason, in our lives, is not affected by these issues. The function of the senses is to present the crude material of sensation to the reason. The function of reason is to organize it into systematic knowledge. From this point of view it does not matter where the sense-data came from, whether the senses made them or merely discovered them. And the function of the will is to present the crude material of our value-data to the reason. The function of the reason is to organize them into the substance of our value-lives. And here again it does not matter whether the will made them or discovered them. So that fortunately we are spared from the business of discussing whether value is subjective or objective. My view of the respective functions of will and reason can be maintained on the basis of either view.

It seems certain that value-data, at least of a primitive kind, are open to the awareness of animals, just as sense-data are. At least the animal is aware of pleasure and pain. And the suggestion I am making entails that just as the enormous distance between the animal's bare perception of sense-fields and the towering heights of human knowledge is solely the work of reason, so the enormous distance between

the bare perception of rudimentary value-data by the animal and the advanced and complex value-life of man is likewise the work of reason. If this is so, it will be understood why I maintain the doctrine of the primacy of reason over will, and not the opposite doctrine.

In the theoretical field the organization of sense-data into science proceeds by way of tracing connections and systematic relationships between sense-data. The essence of the matter is that sense-datum S_1 is found always to lead to sense-datum S_2. This gives the basis for laws of nature. A law of nature is an assertion that a certain complex of sense-data is systematically connected with some other complex of sense-data, and will normally lead to it. All empirical knowledge is ultimately of this kind.

The practical procedure of reason would appear to be in all respects similar. The organization of values proceeds by way of tracing connections and systematic relations between value-data. Value-datum V_1 is connected with, and leads to, value-datum V_2. I may get a great deal of rich immediate value-experience from a drunken bout, but this normally leads to various disvalues, of which the headache next norning is probably the least. This knowledge raises the level of my value-life at once above that of the animal. He seizes greedily upon every immediately offered value-experience. But the exercise of intelligence enables man to pick and choose, to refrain from one in the expectation of a better, and so on. Of course the example of the drunkenness and the headache is infinitely crude and elementary. But it affords an insight into the essence of the procedure of reason in our practical lives. Reason organizes our value-lives by comparing and contrasting value-data, weighing their relative worths, tracing connections between them, and teaching us the laws of their most effective combinations.

There is also some reason to think that the principle of emergence operates here. That is to say, a certain systematic combination of value-data, V_1, V_2, V_3, taken as a whole, creates a new and emergent value-experience V_u not to be found anywhere among the components of the combination taken separately. Esthetic value seems to depend largely on this principle. Moreover, the greatest, best, and noblest human life is probably that one which is not merely the richest in numbers and intensity of separate and disconnected value-experiences, but which organizes, combines, and systematizes them in such a way as to produce the greatest degree of emergent value. System, *qua* system, has sometimes been thought to be the essence of goodness, or at least to be good in itself. This is probably not true. But system is good because of the numberless emergent values which it generates. And system is, *par excellence*, the work of reason. And this goes some way towards explaining how reason, which seems

formal and barren, can yet exercise what amounts to a creative function in the practical as well as in the theoretical life.

I said that Schopenhauer's view is based upon a hasty generalization, for it takes account only of those cases in which intelligence is used to find means to reach our ends. It is, of course, true that this happens. But it is merely an isolated aspect of the operation of reason. This finding of means to ends is based upon the discovery of connections between our experiences. S_1 lead to S_2, or V_1 to V_2. S_1 or V_1 are used as the means to S_2 or V_2. But obviously this is merely a part of the general procedure of reason in organizing experience into systematic wholes. Thus our view of the function of reason includes and transcends Schopenhauer's view.

Plato's reasons for his view also have the character of hasty and imperfect induction. He gives the example of the man whose appetite urges him to drink while his reason urges him to refrain. This again rests upon the discovery of connections between value-experiences. The value-experience of the drinking is likely to be followed by some disvalue-experience such as illness. Plato generalizes on this basis. The induction is defective because it takes as typical of the operation of reason the preference of a greater good which is remote over a lesser which is immediately offered. But this again is only one aspect of the matter. It is one of the results of the systematic organization of our value-experiences into the integrated whole which is a truly valuable life. But though Plato's argument is as logically defective as Schopenhauer's, his conclusion is infinitely nearer the truth. For in effect the creative organization of our value-lives, which is the true practical function of reason, does place it at the head, with the appetites and desires underneath it, as Plato envisaged.

If my analysis is correct, it constitutes, I believe, a general justification of Plato against Schopenhauer, and ultimately a justification of the Greco-Christian ethical tradition for which the democratic world is fighting, as against the Nietzschean ethics of the Nazis. For it shows that reason is not to be assigned the lowly office of the mere handmaid of the will. It shows that practically everything which is great and noble in human life, all that raises man above the brute, is the product, directly or indirectly, of the reason, and not of the will. It re-establishes the doctrine of the primacy of reason.

If you amputate the reason of a man, leaving him nothing but a crude will, what you will have left will be simply an animal. And the life of such a being will be the life of an animal. Is this what Schopenhauer and Nietzsche recommend? No, not quite. For they would still leave man with his reason. But reason is not to control or create, but only to do the behests of the will. It is to be kept strictly in its place as a mere instrument for the satisfaction of desire. And this formula will not lead to the life of the animal, because

reason will still be there. But I suggest that what this formula, if logically applied, will in fact lead to is the life of the criminal. For this is exactly what the criminal in essence is, a man whose ends are dictated by his crude desires, and who uses his intelligence for no purpose but to find the means of their satisfaction. One might say that there are three stages of development of life. The lowest is the animal, who has will and desire, but no reason. Next above this is the criminal, who has both will and reason, but who uses his reason solely as an instrument of his will—which is the Schopenhauerean formula. Lastly, there is the civilized and ethical man in whom reason organizes and systematizes his whole value-life, and so in effect guides and controls him, just as Plato suggested. It is true that neither Schopenhauer, nor even Nietsche, were criminals. They were of course highly civilized men leading more or less moral lives. But that is simply because their actual lives were so much better than their theories. But if we want to see where their theories have led men who have not their high innate esthetic and ethical sensitivity, and who have logically put their formulas into practice, all we have to do is to look at the careers of the present rulers of Germany. And the application to life of the Schopenhauerean doctrine of the primacy of the will is what has led the German State to become a criminal among nations.

KIERKEGAARD AND THE "EXISTENTIAL" PHILOSOPHY

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It is a wise child who knows his own father; and the climate of thought of a generation may be subtly changed without conscious recognition of the formative minds which have been, if not the parents, at least the godparents of that change. That is to say, they have sponsored the baptism of ideas which would only be safe so long as they renounced the world, the flesh, and the devil; but, as is so often the case, when the offspring grow up they form a pact with those very powers. To make Søren Kierkegaard spiritually responsible for the present war would have as little, and perhaps as much, truth in it as the facile explanations which made Hegel responsible for the last one. But it is part of the demonism of policies of power and ambition to be able to pervert to their own ends religious ideas which in their intention are a protest against those very ambitions; and, by so doing, to win a response from people who, in a dim, unconscious way, are feeling after the ideas themselves, but have neither the powers of self-criticism nor of radical thinking to resist travesties of them which appear to justify their own self-assertion. When Hitler informed Sir Nevile Henderson that he was a man of "*ad infinitum* decisions" we may question the extent of his knowledge either of the Latin language or of the existential philosophy; but the phrase awakes an echo of the religious philosophy of circles far removed from National-Socialism. Both Nazi apologists and their Confessional or independent opponents are consciously or unconsciously moved by a way of thinking which puts the *decision* of the individual, made in the concrete moment, above any objective or universal norm of ethics or of reason by which it can be either justified or criticized. It calls to individuals to make decisions, taken in freedom and held on their sole responsibility; and, since few have the necessary courage, it can swing to the opposite pole, and summon men as a single act of pure freedom to surrender their wills to a leader who has this courage, and henceforth to be collectively bound by him in the loyalty of blind obedience. In either case the contrast is drawn between the decisiveness of such a way of life and the talk, the shilly-shallying, the remaining within the world of abstract theories, the shelving of responsibility on to committees representing average mediocrity, which is held to be the liberal or democratic alternative. It is not my purpose here to examine this idea of

democracy, or of the contempt for the ordinary person which it expresses (though I should wish in passing to register my disagreement). I want to try to take some of the ideas, of which Nazi apologists give us a secularized travesty, and look at them as they were struck out of the fire of a religious struggle by that extraordinary poet-prophet Søren Kierkegaard. (Incidentally it is my own conviction that until we have faced those "existential" religious categories and come to terms with them, we shall not know how to speak to that in the German spirit of which Nazism is a perversion. We shall not touch it by our liberal, moral, and political philosophies which move in a different "universe of discourse." Hence this paper has something of the intention of a tract for the times. But it is only thrown out as the writer's own very tentative and preliminary essay towards such understanding.)

We are all aware of the resurgence of the Pauline and Augustinian theologies of the Reformation in continental Barthianism; and we ourselves are beginning to be awakened from our undogmatic slumber. But we are apt to think that these theologies are essentially those of Paul and St. Augustine mediated through Luther and Calvin. We in England have not always realized how far they were given a new cast by Kierkegaard. This is perhaps partly due to the barrier of language. Some of the more heroic have realized this and set out to learn Danish for the purpose. I must confess to being dependent on the available English and German translations, so this claims to be in no way a scholar's essay. (The Oxford University Press had undertaken something of the nature of a five-years' plan in bringing out a complete translation of the works of Kierkegaard. Meanwhile, besides the translations already published, Dr. Lowrie's *Kierkegaard* [O.U.P.] is illustrated by copious extracts from otherwise untranslated works besides being a most valuable study of Kierkegaard's life. The little book by Dr. Bain [S.C.M.] is, I regret to say, not only slight, but does not begin to get to grips with Kierkegaard's thought. The upshot of Dr. Bain's criticism is that if Kierkegaard had been a nice normal man, who had settled down to a nice normal life, he would not have had such queer ideas and given himself so much trouble. But then, neither would he have been Kierkegaard!)

"Anyone who wishes to deal with Søren Kierkegaard's life must take care not to burn his fingers," says a contemporary in his recollections; and the present writer is only too conscious of this. He is one of the most remarkable religious minds of the nineteenth century. Born in 1813, "the year when so many worthless notes were put in circulation" (referring to an inflation of the State Bank), he did his main work between 1830 and 1850, and so was a close contemporary of Newman, with whom he is in some ways a kindred spirit. To both the individual soul alone before God was a reality so exclusively "luminous"

as to give them a tragic separateness from their contemporaries. Both spent their lives asking the question "What is Christianity?", and protesting against its too easy-going identification with the liberal moral philosophies of the age. ("Our times are not satisfied," writes Kierkegaard,[1] "with the miracle of changing water into wine; they go further, they change wine into water.") But whereas Newman found his answer within the Apostolic tradition of the Roman Church, Kierkegaard remained alone, a protest and a "corrective." Some of his critics think that if he had lived he might have found his peace within the Roman Communion; my own belief is that his mind was too many-sided, too dialectical, too much "the individual" to find such a solution. Instead he was able to forge anew the categories of Protestant thinking, in their searching nature and also in their potential antinomianism. He might have found his home in some religious order—he bewails the loss of the spirit of monastic renunciation in Protestantism—more probably he would have been a disruptive "corrective" to any such order. So he lived a *studiosus in perpetuum*, a theological student who never took orders, a poet and satirist, "not a holy man, but a spy in a higher service," "who in his spying, in learning to know all about questionable conduct and illusions and suspicious characters, all the while he is making inspection is himself under the closest inspection."[2] Through the absolute integrity of his self-knowledge he was able to plumb some of the depth of Pascal and St. Augustine. Whether the publishers of the English translation are right in their claim that his *Journals* will command an interest as wide and as lasting as the *Confessions* of St. Augustine, the *Pensées* of Pascal, and the *Apologia* of Newman; or whether they are in the end, as an entry suggests, "a book which ought to be written—the confessions of a poet who wants to be religious and always goes the wrong way about it and remains a poet; consequently he is unhappily in love with God"[3]—at any rate they deserve a unique place among religious autobiographies. They achieve a depth of self-knowledge which enables the writer to forge categories to describe his experience which from being merely psychological take on a theological significance. It is time now to consider one or two of these categories which, as I have said, provide the medium through which the theology of the Reformers has become the " dialectical theology." (We may then ask whether a one-sided and secular perversion of them is part of the pathology of Naziism.) I can only touch here on the conceptions of "dread" (*Angst*), "choice of oneself," and "faith" as concerned not with the universal, but with the "individual." I am acutely conscious of the scrappiness and

[1] *Fear and Trembling*, p. 46. [2] *The Point of View*, p. 87.

[3] *Journals* 521. References to passages in the *Journals* are to the entries in Dru's translation (O.U.P.).

inadequacy of any interpretation which I may attempt; but I can at least call attention to the need for fuller and more thorough elucidation.

We begin with the elusive conception of *Existenz*, personal existence, as "choice of oneself." Kierkegaard describes the aesthetic type of person as one who is able to entertain in imagination different possible ways of looking at life, but is essentially irresponsible; his ideas remain within the category of the "interesting." But this absorption in one view after another hides a fundamental despair. "It is well known that a dying man possesses supernatural strength and so it is with you. If there is an idea to be thought out, a work to be read through, a plan to be put into effect, a little romance to be experienced—yes, if it is even a question of buying a hat—you take the matter up with prodigious energy. You work indefatigably, a day, a month, according to the circumstances . . . but when the month is passed, or the half-year which you regard as the maximum, you break off and exclaim 'here the story ends.' "[1]

The aesthetic life, then, is irresponsible; it evades decision and hovers over an unacknowledged abyss of despair. What then is such a person to do? He is advised to "choose despair"—that is, I take it, deliberately to realize that he hovers over an abyss and yet that he must consciously and decisively become a responsible individual. The state of mind which hovers on this abyss and realizes the horror of nihilistic freedom—that nothing is real and anything is possible —Kierkegaard calls Dread (*Angst*). Dread is a "sympathetic antipathy" or "antipathetic sympathy," such as is the uncanny fascination of evil which draws while it repels. Kierkegaard sees it as bound up with original sin. I do not pretend to have followed him far enough to understand this. I take it that he means something like this. The root of original sin lies in what he calls "the selfish infinity of the possibility"—that is, first the fascination of thinking that anything is possible followed by the terror of such a thought, so that "freedom gazes down into its own possibility and grasps at finite things to hold itself by."[2] When Kierkegaard says that you must then "choose despair," I take him to mean you must dare to let go your grasp of these finite things—"interesting" theories, social recognition, and so forth, by which you try to hide the abyss from yourself, and you must look consciously into it. This at least is the interpretation which has been developed, perhaps not without some distortion, by Heidegger.[3] To Heidegger *Angst*, dread, is the fear of metaphysical insecurity—not fear of anything in particular, but the fear of facing the fact that the individual is poised above absolute

[1] See Lowrie, *Kierkegaard*, p. 88. Cf. *Entweder Oder*, II, p. 164 sq.

[2] Cf. Lowrie, op. cit., p. 129.

[3] See his *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 231 ff., and *Was ist Metaphysik?*

nothingness. This absolute Nothing is of course quite distinct from logical negation, which as every reader of Plato's *Sophist* knows, is a form of determination. For those whose memory of the *Sophist* may be a littly rusty, I offer the following illustration. One day last summer—in the good days before we evacuated our young—I took my small nephew and niece to the Manchester Zoo. It was a hot afternoon, and after we had looked at everything several times and ridden on everything there was to ride, I began to think it was time to go home for tea. I had nearly manœuvred them to the gates, when my small nephew saw a fence we had not investigated, and wanted to know what was behind it. I looked over and said: "Nothing," and was met by the devastating reply, "Oh, but I must see the Nothing!", and when I had lifted him up he indignantly pointed out that there was an old ball and a coil of wire. By "nothing" in this instance I meant a logical distinction, "not anything relevant to our purpose"—not a camel or rhinoceros. "Nothing" in the metaphysical sense cannot be grasped logically since there are no distinctions in it by which we could determine it. To Heidegger, following Kierkegaard's suggestion, it means the ultimate metaphysical insecurity to which "Dread" both draws us and from which it makes us shrink. It is not a fear of anything in particular, but a sense of losing hold of everything and facing the radical insecurity of being, until we are confronted by Nothing. But when we go through this experience, we find that there is something after all which, in its consciousness of the Nothing, transcends it—namely, our own existence. So metaphysics starts, according to Heidegger, from this realization of our existence and asks, why anything should be at all rather than Nothing? For if there were only the infinite possibilities of the Nothing the self could not exist ("in a world where everything were possible nothing would be probable," was, I think, Mr. Joseph's statement for discussion in a Greats paper. And if not probable, *a fortiori* not real). So the despair of nothingness is transcended by the act of consciously choosing it, the solution which Kierkegaard offers to the "aesthetic individual," and which paves the way to the crucial moment of the existential philosophy, the choice of oneself.

The conception of "choice of oneself" is an extremely elusive one, but it is central to the meaning of *Existenz*, the term from which the existential philosophy, following Kierkegaard, has taken its rise. Kierkegaard describes what he means by it in the last part of *Entweder Oder*,[1] and the conception is further developed by Heidegger and Jaspers. It starts from a moment of despair, or the painful break involved in separating oneself as a conscious, responsible individual from the rest of one's world. This means a realization of one's existence over against the crowd—what Heidegger calls *das*

[1] See II, pp. 179 ff.

Man. This sounds snobbish, but *das Man* is probably not meant in any class sense so much as in the sense of the mass man which is in all of us—the desire to evade responsibility and to fall back on second-hand conventional opinions and clichés. To Heidegger it means also the realization of one's existence over against "nothingness." Then the choice means a conscious acceptance of oneself as one really is, in one's historic situation and in continuity with one's past, race, and parentage. (The need for realistic recognition of oneself, as distinct from ideals and phantasies about one's imaginary self, recalls Freudian teaching.) Then the individual turns back to the world living consciously and making responsible decisions in which his whole self is involved.[1] This is described as "choosing himself as freedom." This conscious living, *Existenz*, is realized concretely in the *Grenzsituationen*, the crucial occasions on which a man gathers himself up for a decision in which his whole personality is bound up. Such a decision cannot be justified by an appeal to objective laws and theories ("the universal"). The individual must make it and take the responsibility for it. Heidegger, in fact, writes of objective and universal ethical principles as part of the voice of *das Man*, the crowd mind which would restrain the individual from coming out and realizing his *Existenz*.[2] Heidegger, in my opinion, shirks some of the main ethical problems. What is to happen, for instance, when one person's primary right to realize his *Existenz* through his own absolute decisions clashes with that of others? I cannot find that he is particularly aware of this problem or that he can show any solution beyond conflict. Moveover, his interpretation is one which can be collectivized (whether as a logical outcome or for political reasons) into the call to the sacred nation to realize its existence by its own absolute decision, a right on which no objective criticism can be brought to bear. Also the deep inner impulse which decides this choice can be made to depend on the blood, on realization of one's destiny in race and *Volk*. Heidegger himself is a member of the Nazi party;[3] but it is perhaps more important for us to realize that his philosophy is (or was at any rate till last summer) the fashionable and dominant one in circles in Germany which were by no means National-Socialist—in the universities, for instance, and among Confessional Church people. They also make *Existenz* the realization of an inner impulse beyond objective criticism because it is that on which your life is based, even if the heart of this impulse is not racial consciousness. Jaspers, for instance, who impresses me as a person of much deeper ethical sensibilities than Heidegger, interprets the call to realize *Existenz*, for the philosopher at any rate, as

[1] Cf. *Entweder Oder*, II, pp. 182 sq.

[2] See *Sein und Zeit*, p. 278.

[3] I would not, however, suggest that he necessarily himself approves this extreme Nazi interpretation of his views.

the assertion of his absolute freedom[1]—a path which has led him into opposition to a movement which, surely rightly, he sees as an expression of the crowd mind. Here he is, I should say, a truer interpreter of Kierkegaard. But he sees the realization of *Existenz* as bringing a man to a parting of the ways, the way he decides to follow being itself a crucial "choice of himself." The one way is the way of philosophy, of absolute freedom to think on his own individual responsibility: the other is the way of religion, where sooner or later he has, if he follows it honestly, to make a submission of the mind in faith. I cannot here go fully into the issues raised by this radical and (to use von Hügel's word) "costing choice" between religion and philosophy as Jaspers presents it. I believe that it cuts much deeper than most of our religious philosophies and philosophical religions are apt to recognize. I can only suggest two questions which I do not think Jaspers really answers—first, whether philosophy is in fact a way of absolute freedom or whether the philosopher must not in his own queer way recognize unconditional demands. (But this would take us into a criticism of the central tenet of existential philosophy, that there is no external standard of truth and morality above the individual decision.) Secondly, is the religious submission really a *sacrificium intellectus* to any *doctrines*, or is it a recognition of transcendent demands upon us which may drive us even into criticism of their verbal expression?[2] But to return to Kierkegaard. We have seen that he describes choice of one self in *Entweder Oder* as an attitude of the individual towards himself, in which he gathers himself up to make a decision which will be absolutely binding, but in so doing follows no objective external demand but a deep inner impulse of his own concrete life. From this Heidegger is able to develop the idea of the demand of Conscience as the inner demand to realize one's *Existenz* over against the crowd and against "nothingness," and Jaspers develops the idea of philosophy as the call to realize absolute freedom from all authority beyond this inner demand. But Kierkegaard does not stop at "choice of oneself" as described in *Entweder Oder*. To him this choice is the preliminary to another radical question: "What does it mean to become a Christian?" This means that he completes the dialectic of freedom and authority, the relation of the inner demand of the individual to an absolute over against him, in a way in which Heidegger and Jaspers, who are in the end *Lebensphilosophen*, do not. In other words, Kierkegaard is in the company of religious writers who plumb the Christian

[1] See his *Philosophie*, Bd. II (*Existenzerhellung*), and his more popular *Die Geistige Situation der Zeit*.

[2] For a most valuable discussion of this problem in the relation of philosophy to religion, see an article by Tillich, *Philosophie und Religion grundsätzlich*, in *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Zweite Auflage*, IV, p. 1227.

paradox that "He who would save his life must lose it." This is worked out in *Die Krankheit zum Tode* (1848), which supplies the link between *Entweder Oder* and the later part of the *Journals*. Here he shows that the demand to "choose oneself" leads to fundamental despair, since the individual can neither be himself nor get rid of himself except through that which establishes his existence, and this is not some inner core of his own being, but God. In fact the individual in despair must be broken in his sufficiency before he can "choose himself before God." For one thing, the self-knowledge on which "choice of oneself" depends is only possible before God, because sin only emerges "in the presence of God"; and the consciousness of sin can alone give us a point of radical criticism of that very inner impulse of one's being which one seeks to realize in *Existenz*. This is the tenor of Kierkegaard's criticism of the Socratic teaching that "virtue is knowledge."[1] *Die Krankheit zum Tode* is in my opinion one of Kierkegaard's most beautiful writings, both in its literary form—the patterning of antitheses into one another—and in the psychological penetration with which he describes the different attitudes, for instance, of diffidence and defiance, through which the individual expresses his despair, the despair from which the only escape is "faith before God." In *Purify Your Hearts* (1847) he examines the conditions on which the individual can achieve the possibility of "willing one thing with an undivided heart." In these two books and in the later entries in the *Journals* he would seem to have performed a movement analogous to the Augustinian movement from the *libertas minor* to the *libertas major*. The first freedom is the freedom of choice between alternatives of good and evil; the second freedom is realized when a man has no longer choice between alternatives because he has learned to choose the good with an undivided heart (the motif of *Purify Your Hearts*). There is a very significant entry in the *Journals* in 1850, which puts this distinction of the two kinds of choice. "The most tremendous thing which has been granted to man is: the choice, freedom. And if you desire to save it and preserve it there is only one way: in the very same second, unconditionally and in complete resignation to give it back to God and yourself with it. If the sight of what is granted to you tempts you, and if you give way to the temptation and look with egoistic desire upon the freedom of choice, then you lose your freedom. And your punishment is: to go on in a kind of confusion priding yourself on having—freedom of choice, but woe upon you, that is your judgment: you have freedom of choice, you say, and still you have not chosen God. Then you will grow ill, freedom of choice will become your *idée fixe*, till at last you will be like the rich man who imagines that he is poor, and will die of want: you sigh that you have lost your freedom

[1] See *Die Krankheit zum Tode*, pp. 85 ff.

of choice and your only fault is that you do not grieve deeply enough or you would find it again."[1]

This consideration of the dialectic of freedom and self-renunciation leads up to the question of what Kierkegaard means by *faith*. Here the keynote is his insistence on choice of oneself as an experience of turning "away from speculation" to "decision." This has been understood to mean that he drives a wedge between philosophy and Christianity. Here he has profoundly influenced not only the secular existential philosophy, but even more directly the dialectical theology. His starting-point is the criticism of the contemporary idealist religious philosophy, which held that the essence of Christianity could be satisfactorily expressed within the categories of Hegelianism. On the contrary, he maintained that the essence of Christianity was a paradox which defined not only Hegelianism, but any possible rational system of theology and philosophy, and which could only be grasped in faith "by reason of the absurd."

His criticism of philosophy and theology cuts perhaps deeper than those of us who have a vested interest in them always like to admit. At any rate he makes us acutely aware of the danger of slipping into what one might describe as the philosophical or theological civil service. I quote a few examples of his jibes: "It seems as though the philosophers in their account of modern philosophy since Descartes have modelled themselves on the form sometimes found in fairy stories in which by always repeating everything that had gone before and adding a new bit one finally has an interminable series of things: stick beat dog dog bite cat cat scratch man. . . ."[2] "At every step philosophy sloughs a skin into which creep its worthless hangers on."[3] There is also a delicious imaginary conversation between Socrates and Hegel which is too long to quote.[4] And again, "Fichte threw his empirical ballast overboard and turned turtle."[5] "People hardly ever make use of the freedom which they have, for example, freedom of thought; instead they demand freedom of speech as a compensation."[6] And perhaps the most stinging :of all "The two ways. One is to suffer; the other is to become a professor of the fact that another suffered. The first is the way; the second goes round about (the preposition 'about' is so aptly used for lectures and sermons)."[7]

Yet his gibes at philosophy, particularly at philosophical theology, are perhaps the attacks of a lover, who sees philosophy becoming, on the one hand, pretentious and, on the other, second-hand "viewiness," remaining within the category of the "interesting." "We shall hope," he writes,[8] "for the appearance of strongly armed men who

[1] *Journals* 1051.
[2] *Journals* 260.
[3] *Journals* 99.
[4] *Journals* 552.
[5] *Journals* 84.
[6] *Journals* 200.
[7] *Journals* 1362.
[8] *Journals* 88.

will win back the lost power and meaning of words as Luther won back the concept of faith for his age." And his love of Socrates is perhaps still more significant. From Socrates he learned the possibility of "indirect communication," which is an essential category in his own writing. Socrates never preached his own views with any claim to authority. He comes up, as it were, behind those to whom he is talking, making them critically aware of the opinions they have been expressing uncritically and the contradictions in them, and then bringing them to the point where they have got to make up their minds for themselves (surely the right method in teaching philosophy, but how much easier to see than to practise!).

Here we come once more to the question of "choice of oneself," for which philosophy, practised socratically, can prepare the ground, but for which it can, Kierkegaard thinks, offer neither an explanation nor a substitute. In other words, it is a leap of faith. By faith he says he means "immediacy after reflection."[1] Immediacy may here be taken to mean the individual in his particularity related to something else which is real and individual, as distinct from a relation to a theory mediated through general terms ("faith," he says, "is related not to essence but to being"). So faith in its primary sense is "a relation of mind to the historical."[2] But the immediacy after reflection, which constitutes faith in its secondary and religious sense, is distinguished both from the feeling of certainty and from "aesthetic immediacy." By aesthetic immediacy would be meant, presumably, the relation of mind to a particular as in sense perception, and the way in which a person expresses feeling spontaneously in art, which, as we have seen, Kierkegaard thinks is an attitude in which there is no demand for responsible self-commital. (I do not altogether accept this view of aesthetics, but there is no space to discuss that in this paper.) "Immediacy after reflection"—reflection is here, I take it, the Socratic process of self-examination, the exposure of one's pretensions and secret defences, seeing through the finite things through which "dread" seeks to hide from itself the abyss of freedom. Then we must come to the point of choice, the leap of faith. We have seen that when Heidegger comes to this point he sees the choice as the self-realization of the individual *Existenz* over against the crowd and against the "Nothing." But to Kierkegaard this is not the final step. The individual, "in fear and trembling" in his aloneness, is conscious of a demand to which the choice of oneself is a prelude. This demand is not as with Heidegger "the call of oneself to oneself to be oneself." It is the impingement of something other and absolute. Kierkegaard is conscious that people have hidden this demand from themselves—the absolute, he says, has gone out of modern life. Or else they identify it with some demand the individual makes on

[1] *Journals* 753. [2] *Philosophical Fragments*, p. 69.

himself, or the community makes, losing the sense for "the absolute qualitative distinction between God and man" (a phrase which will be familiar to readers of Barth). Or it is confused with the entertainment of some theory about God, losing the sense that "God is subject and not object" (again a phrase the possibilities of which Barth has developed). When the individual is conscious of himself before the absolute, the choice is no longer a choice between alternatives of good and evil; it is the acceptance of the demand—the freedom in which, instead of hovering between alternatives, you can do no other but will one thing with an undivided will.

The distinction of choice between alternatives, which is essentially an irrational kind of freedom, and the rational freedom when, as we say "I believed that A was the right thing to do so that I had no alternative but to do it," comes home to most of us in considering ethical decisions. But to Kierkegaard this kind of choice is essentially realized not in ethical decisions, but when the individual believes himself to be confronted with an absolute demand in the name of which he must break with the ethical. This is because the ethical to Kierkegaard is a matter not of the individual confronted with an absolute obligation to do right, but of universal laws and codes. And he believes it is essential to Christianity to hold that the individual is above the universal (not the individual as such, but the individual in his relation to God). He examines this in *Fear and Trembling* in connection with the story of the faith of Abraham in believing that he ought to sacrifice Isaac, and puts the question in the form, Can there be a teleological suspension of the ethical?[1] This question, along with his distinction between "ethical duty" and "absolute duty," seemed to me to be based on a radical misunderstanding of ethics. But its influence permeates the whole school both of existential philosophy and dialectical theology. It comes out very clearly in, for instance, Brunner's in many ways impressive book *The Divine Imperative*. Ethics, or at any rate philosophical ethics, is relegated to being a matter of applying universal codes; faith is a matter of obeying the demand of God in concrete decisions. So Kierkegaard writes "I cannot possibly make it clear enough that the Exceptional has nothing whatsoever to do with ethics. . . . The Exceptional has nothing to do with ethically fulfilling what is demanded, but is a particular relation to God."[2] But this means the authority of *conscience* becomes a very ambiguous question and there is a real danger of not taking ethical responsibility sufficiently seriously; in fact such a point of view can be, in the strict and literal sense of the word, *demoralizing*. The mistake seems to me to consist in making ethical decisions a matter simply of applying universal

[1] Cf. *Fear and Trembling*, pp. 100 ff., and especially the footnote on p. 114.
[2] *Journals* 1276.

rules, rather than saying that they are a matter of one's absolute obligation as an individual to seek the best solution in that individual situation in the light of conscience. And the right solution may be something much more complex than just the application of a rule—in fact in really knotty moral problems we often just do not know what we ought to do, and yet we must recognize our responsibility. Hence an ethical decision is itself an act of faith. This sounds rather like the existential "decision," and indeed I believe such decisions cannot always be justified by appealing to objective rules. There is something creative and individual about them. But I believe that there is all the difference between saying such decisions are therefore themselves absolute and self-justifying, and saying that they must be made with a sincere desire to do what is objectively right, that is to say, with a recognition of moral obligation. So I should demur seriously at Kierkegaard's distinction of ethics as concerned with duty and faith as concerned with absolute duty. Duty must be absolute or it is not duty at all. And that the dominant religious philosophy in Germany over recent years should have taught the demand for "a teleological suspension of the ethical" was, to say the least, asking for trouble. We should not, of course, saddle Kierkegaard with the responsibility for abuses of his ideas; nor minimize the profound insight into the story of Abraham's faith which he gives us in *Fear and Trembling*. (Perhaps the most exciting point he makes is that the real triumph of Abraham's faith lay in his courage in accepting the inspiration at the crucial moment that he ought *not* to sacrifice Isaac—is this perhaps after all a re-assertion of the "ethical" on another level?)

My quarrel with Kierkegaard is over his unduly limiting the nature of ethics, rather than with what he has to say about faith. Here I can only learn from him. I am convinced that he is right in taking faith right out of the sphere of the weighing of probabilities (which is part of logic, and can remain within the category of the interesting) and making it a matter of a leap of self-committal in which one's whole personality is bound up. This happens as a response to something unconditional which meets us. But how does the unconditional meet us? Is it not partly, even if in a refracted way, in the obligations of morality?

But Kierkegaard is surely on unassailable ground when he fights against the identification of the demand of God with the working standards of morality generally recognized by society. It would be more honest, he says, to collect all the New Testaments in existence and carry them out into an open place or upon a mountain, and kneel down and ask God to take this book back again; we men are no good at dealing with a thing like this.[1] He writes it down as the

[1] *Journals* 1340.

final stupidity of dons and professors to think that Christianity is perfectible in our human society. Those who think so must look on the New Testament as a rhetorical exaggeration. "Most people really believe that the Christian commandments (e.g. to love one's neighbour as oneself) are intentionally a little too severe—like putting the clock on half an hour to make sure of not being late in the morning."[1] But when we recognize that the demand is this very "impossible possibility," we come to what Kierkegaard calls "the edification of the thought that before God we are always in the wrong."[2] He is too dialectical to believe that the absolute demand of God reveals itself in what has been called "just so guidance." Our decisions are still our own, made in faith and appealing to grace and forgiveness.[3] Nevertheless, we can recognize the impact of the unconditional upon us, for it pulls us up in our restlessness and excitement and shocks us into a moment of absolute stillness. This is described in the wonderful parable of the King's Coachman.[4]

Kierkegaard also lays his finger on another distinctive characteristic of Christian faith, which marks it out from general moral and religious philosophy. The absolute to which faith responds meets us in a historic fact. Here we came back full circle on another level to his first elementary description of faith—that it is an attitude of mind to the historical. He works this out in a masterly way in the *Philosophical Fragments*, where the distinction is drawn between Christ and Socrates. The teaching of Socrates was essentially "indirect communication"; his method supplied people with the occasion through which they could come to see an idea for themselves, and then he himself withdraws, saying he is without authority. Christ, on the other hand, through the forgiveness of sins, restores to people the lost condition of learning truth, and the reception of the teaching is bound up with a personal decision concerning the teacher. Hence "the Moment," the bringing of something eternal into history, matters in Christianity, while it is the *idea* which matters for Socrates. (The idea of "the Moment," *κάιρος*, the crisis which is also a time of fulfilment, has been developed by Barth and also by Tillich.) "It is well known that Christianity is the only historical phenomenon . . . which has offered itself to the individual as the point of departure for his eternal consciousness, has assumed to interest him in another sense than the merely historical, has proposed to base his eternal happiness on his relation to something historical."[5]

That this is the crucial distinction of Christian faith from religious and moral philosophy is of course being increasingly brought out at

[1] *Journals* 762. [2] *Entweder Oder*, p. 295.
[3] See especially *Journals* 1289, 1290.
[4] From *Judge for Yourself*, quoted by Lowrie, pp. 480–481.
[5] *Philosophical Fragments*, p. 18.

the present time. I cannot do more here than call attention to the way in which Kierkegaard, the poet-prophet, saw this at a time when most people were still trying to bring Christian faith within the categories of Hegelian philosophy. When he speaks of the Christian faith as "the Paradox," the "Absurd," it is this intransigeant historic element to which he refers. Here is something which cannot fully be rationalized in any system of philosophy or theology. It is not absurd as expressing logical contradiction—that of course would keep it within the relation of ideas to ideas—but as seeking to indicate the "Moment," the incarnation of the eternal in the finite, which is something which eludes direct expression in rational language.

Kierkegaard also surely speaks to our own time in seeing that the "Historic" with which we are confronted in the Gospel records is not plain history, but the witness of the "contemporary disciple" and asking how this concerns "the case of the disciple at second hand"[1]—a question which the contentions of the form-critics have made a very pertinent one.

But it is time to bring this somewhat rambling paper to a close. I cannot claim to have given anything like an adequate discussion of the issues Kierkegaard raises, but hope to have brought home some idea of his importance to any who may not have realized his decisive influence on recent trends in theology and in German philosophy. Now that his works are beginning to be available in English we can get to know him better. His *Journals*, above all, is a book to have at hand and read slowly and often. He will exasperate as well as fascinate. Sometimes he seems morbid—his sense of a curse hanging over his family and his behaviour over his broken engagement are indeed hard to understand. He certainly had to go through life endowed with a profound natural melancholy, as well as physical and nervous disabilities. But, through his absolute integrity, even this melancholy was somehow distilled into the service of his idea. He could concentrate his whole nature, including his melancholy, his eccentricity, his dangerous consciousness of being a trout among minnows ("the fate of being a genius in a provincial town")[2] into his love of God, so that in the end he came to the singleness of heart of "willing one thing." At the same time the demonic, nihilistic quality of which he was very conscious in his wit became transmuted into a humour which surely may find a humble part in the divine "Absurd." God must perhaps remain completely serious; but if "eternity is too serious a place for laughter, then it seems as though there must be some intermediary state where one is allowed to laugh one's fill. For the man who with great exertion and sacrifice discovers the comic side of things has no real opportunity to laugh in this life; he is far too exhausted and troubled. And in that case some intermediary state may be supposed.

[1] *Philosophical Fragments*, chapter v. [2] *The Point of View*, p. 100.

And presumably the pious pagans would be found there, e.g. Socrates."[1] And again, "Irony is the confine between the aesthetic and the ethical, humour the confine between the ethical and the religious"[2] (a most suggestive remark). In spite of his insistence that "Christianity is suffering" he could say that "humour is also the joy that has overcome the world."[3] And again, "it requires moral courage to grieve; it requires religious courage to rejoice."[4] He was conscious of being called to be a "corrective," and, as he says of Luther, "a corrective made into a norm is *eo ipso* confusing." To treat his ideas as though they were an exclusive philosophy or theology is surely the last thing he would have desired. But that we should read him, perhaps with "sympathetic antipathy" until he makes us ask anew for ourselves in a disturbing way, "What does it mean to be a Christian?"—this at least is Kierkegaardian.

[1] *Journals* 837.
[2] *Unwissenschaftliche Nachschrift*, II, iv, A § 2.
[3] *Journals* 144.
[4] *Journals* 343.

KANT'S CONCEPT OF APPEARANCE—II

D. R. COUSIN, B.A.

§ 6. *Illusion* (contd.).

In an illusion, if what has been said in the earlier part of this section is right, the essential thing is the presence to the mind of some false proposition, which may be affirmed or denied according as we are or are not deceived. But what precisely *is* this false proposition in each case? And, a second question, *on what grounds* do we entertain it?

The consideration of these two questions, I think, brings to light a curious gap in our ordinary language. Let us consider the case of secondary qualities. We agreed that the distinction between real and illusory survives the recognition that these qualities, colours, tastes, smells, and the like, all depend on certain conditions other than the intrinsic nature of the body which we think they characterize. We found the explanation of this in a (false) *belief* in the manifestation of certain characters. Now when we reflect on our other question, what are the grounds of this belief, a problem arises about how this belief comes to be false. What are these grounds? They are the manifestation in the immediate object of perception of just the quality with which this false belief is concerned. But if the quality in question is manifested in the immediate object of perception (and if it were not so manifested, how should we come to think of this particular quality at all?) how can we be wrong to think of it as manifested? Clearly the answer must lie in the *conditions under which* we think of it as manifested. The quality actually is manifested here and now, with all that that expression vaguely implies. We think of it, however, in relation to our various interests, practical and other, as manifested under conditions which may be quite different; I think of how my tie will look at the garden party, or of how it will look *as a rule*. And the fact that the quality is manifested here and now, though it is certainly *evidence for* the proposition that it will be manifested always or usually or under the conditions in which I am specially interested, by no means proves or strongly verifies this proposition.

The gap in our ordinary language to which I referred above may now be pointed out. The phrase "the quality is manifested here and now" has been forced on me by the difficulty of expressing the point precisely in any other way. In ordinary language we do not make qualities the subject of our discourse. We talk about things, and say

that they are purple or that they look purple from here. But neither of these expressions, I think, is precisely appropriate to the situation I have tried to indicate by saying that the quality is manifested here and now. For if I say "the tie is purple," I am naturally understood to mean "the tie is really, i.e. always or usually or under standard conditions, purple," while if I say it looks or seems purple, I am thought to imply that *I entertain the proposition* that it is purple. What I wish to express by the quality's being manifested here and now can only be expressed, if we are to speak of the thing rather than of the quality, with some degree of oxymoron, by saying either that the tie *really looks* purple or that it *is purple here and now*, where the purpose of the qualifying words in each of these phrases is precisely, as Mr. Prichard puts it in a similar context (p. 72), to take back the force of the verb "is" or "looks." What we want is a verb specially designed for the purpose of describing the fact which is the *evidence* for the proposition which I am led to entertain, viz. the actual manifestation here and now of the quality which my proposition attributes to some object. In another context I might suggest the specialization of the verb "to appear" for this function; but since the meaning of this verb is the main subject of this paper and has not yet been fully investigated, I will merely indicate the difficulty and pass on.

§ 7. *Mind-dependence*

It is time now to consider more fully the question mentioned above (p. 184), whether the admission that certain qualities are dependent upon conditions other than the intrinsic nature of the thing which they are taken to characterize does or does not carry with it the admission that these qualities are illusory. Consideration of this question throws light upon an obscure distinction drawn by Kant between appearance and illusion (B 69).

I will assume that the account of illusion given above is substantially correct, i.e. that illusion essentially depends on the entertaining of a false proposition. What is the relation to this doctrine of the notion that certain qualities are dependent on conditions other than the intrinsic nature of the thing characterized?

If illusion is as stated, the question whether certain qualities are illusory or not depends on what propositions are being entertained. Now these propositions may differ in a relevant way, which may perhaps be made clear by means of an illustration. Suppose I believe that X is Y's grandmother. Then if I am wrong about this, it will normally be because X is not Y's grandmother but, say, Y's grandaunt. But there is another kind of mistake which I might conceivably make even if X really was Y's grandmother and that was what I

thought. For as a matter of fact X can only be Y's grandmother if there is a third person, Z, who is X's child and Y's parent. Now I might be unaware of this fact (as I suppose a child might be), and if the question occurred to me I might answer it in the negative, holding that X's being Y's grandmother is independent of the existence of any third person. If I did hold this, clearly I should be making a mistake even if I believed that X was Y's grandmother, not her grand-aunt, and X *was* Y's grandmother. On the other hand, even if my beliefs about the dependence of grandmotherhood upon the intervention of Z are all that they should be, I might quite well go wrong by thinking that X was Y's grandmother when in fact she is Y's grand-aunt. The two sorts of mistake, therefore, are distinct and independent.

Now in the ordinary way, when I say that X is Y's grandmother I say nothing about Z either way, neither that there is nor that there is not such a person. Am I therefore to be accused of committing the mistake of thinking that grandmotherhood does not involve the more fundamental relation of parent and child as between X and Z, Z and Y? This would be scarcely fair. Still more unjustifiable would be the inference that I am wrong in thinking that X is Y's grandmother; for to say this would naturally refer to the kind of mistake which arises when I think that X is Y's grandmother, and in fact she is Y's grand-aunt.

Applying the conception thus illustrated to the question whether qualities dependent on conditions other than the intrinsic nature of the object characterized are necessarily illusory, we may observe certain analogies. It is one thing, to begin with, to think that qualities manifested under certain conditions will be manifested under any or certain other conditions, and another thing to think that the manifestation of these qualities is not dependent upon any conditions at all. And secondly it is one thing to ignore the question whether or not these qualities depend on conditions for their manifestation, and another to raise this question and answer it wrongly. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that there is a good foundation for Kant's distinction between what may be called empirical and transcendental illusion. Empirical illusions are of the sort which ordinary men commonly experience, when the tie looks purple though it is really blue, or the stick bent when it is really straight. Transcendental illusions are peculiar to philosophers, which includes plain men when they stop thinking about particular matters of fact and begin to think about the general nature of things; they consist in thinking that some quality, the manifestation of which is really dependent upon certain conditions, is not so dependent. This sort of mistake commonly occurs when we meet for the first time with the suggestion that colours or tastes or heat and cold are not qualities of bodies

but sensations. This idea is commonly so shocking that we reject it out of hand, thus falling into an error from which philosophical innocence has saved us hitherto. And the error of naïve realism may of course survive a pretty long acquaintance with the arguments for a more complicated view.

Our conclusion then is that qualities are not illusory merely because they are in fact dependent on conditions other than the intrinsic nature of the thing characterized. The term "illusory" without qualification is properly applied only where I entertain (without necessarily believing) the proposition that a certain quality will be manifested under conditions under which not this but some other quality actually is manifested. And I may quite well avoid *this* mistake even in the case of qualities which are dependent upon conditions. There is, however, a type of mistake, called by Kant transcendental illusion, which does arise out of the dependence of certain qualities upon conditions extrinsic to the nature of the thing characterized. This mistake consists in thinking that such qualities belong to things unconditionally. But this latter type of illusion is not committed by the mere fact of omitting from our belief that the tie is purple any explicit reference to the conditions upon which this quality depends.

What might indeed be conceded to the view that conditional qualities are for that reason illusory is this: that there is some inappropriateness in referring to such things as *qualities*, since this term may be understood in such a way as to exclude dependence upon any conditions external to the thing characterized. But this is not a great concession; for the term "quality" in this sense belongs to philosophers' jargon and is not used by ordinary men at all. What the ordinary man says is "The tie is purple" or "The stick is bent." And in using the verb "to be" he surely does not intend to commit himself to the view that the qualities are not dependent ones; otherwise he would hardly be able to think that anyone *is* a grandmother. The verb "to be," in fact, is much vaguer or more ambiguous than philosophers used to think; and it is open to us, when we come to reflect upon the various situations in which it is applied, to put as favourable a construction as we please upon the intentions of those who use it.

Reflection upon these conclusions and the discussions leading up to them suggests the following somewhat more technical remark. In any given situation we may distinguish two different kinds of element, which we may call the factual and the logical elements. Factual elements are illustrated, in the examples we have been discussing, by X, Y, and Z, and the relations of grandmother, grand-aunt, parent and child, by ties, socks, blue, green, purple, sticks, water, bent, straight. What I mean by the *logical* elements of a

situation may be indicated roughly but perhaps for present purposes sufficiently by pointing out that one situation may differ from another in respect of the *number* and *grouping* of its factual elements. For example we may say that the relation of grandparent to grandchild differs from that of parent to child, no matter who the persons concerned may be, in virtue of the fact that the one relationship involves as a matter of fact *three* terms, the grandparent and grandchild and the child's parent, together with the relations of X to Z and of Z to Y, whereas the relation of parent to child involves only these two parties. This is called a difference of logical form. (The important point here is the *difference* of logical form between the two relationships, not the precise analysis of that form. Thus a complete analysis would have to remember that parents go in couples. I neglect this for the sake of simplicity.)

Now we could put the distinction between empirical and transcendental illusion in another way by saying that ordinary illusions are concerned with propositions false in respect of the *factual* elements in a situation the logical form of which may or may not be correctly represented or may not be explicitly taken into account at all, while transcendental illusions occur when we reflect, as we usually do not, upon the *logical form* of some fact and come to entertain a false proposition about this, thinking, e.g., that it involves only two factual elements when really it involves more. This reference to the distinction between logical and factual elements in a situation will help us when we come to attempt to formulate Kant's position in less ambiguous terms.

Before attempting this, however, it will be as well to look back over the conclusions of this and the preceding section. In the course of this somewhat complicated discussion I have tried to show what illusion is, and how it is that Kant can deny it to be his view that the predicates he discusses are illusory. This is because illusion, properly understood, involves the entertaining of a false proposition, and is not constituted merely by the dependence of predicates upon conditions other than the intrinsic nature of the thing they characterize. The suggestion that dependence of this sort does constitute illusion is due to a failure to distinguish causal dependence from the relation to a thing of predicates referred to it in a proposition. By distinguishing causal dependence from illusion I have endeavoured to prepare the way for a suggestion that Kant's doctrine consists of an analysis of the cognitive situation the main feature of which is the view that this situation, commonly indicated by the term "Appear(ance)," turns out on analysis to involve a dependence of the causal sort. That is to say, I have tried to clear the ground for an explanation of "appearance (technical)" which will be given in § 9. Before coming to this, however, it is perhaps worth while to reflect

for a moment on the causes which led Kant to state his position in this misleading way.

§ 8. *Kant's use of "appear(ance)"*

Kant's philosophical position is one which could only be stated in technical terms, i.e. either in terms specially invented or at least specially defined for the purpose or else in terms borrowed from ordinary language but used, with or without explicit acknowledgment of the fact, in ways which diverge from the normal. Since his theory is concerned with the ordinary facts of knowledge it is natural for him to formulate it in ordinary language with the necessary variations in use; though heaven knows his apparatus of purely technical terms is formidable enough.

This being so, we have the more specific question why he came to use the term "appear(ance)." I suggest that in the selection of this term he was influenced, consciously or more probably unconsciously, by the very ambiguities which have been pointed out above (§§ 3 and 4).

In the main, his position concerns our awareness of objects, or the way in which objects Appear to us. Hence the term "appear(ance)" suggests itself naturally enough. But had the term as it exists in ordinary language been uncomplicated by the notion of seeming, it would have been felt to be inappropriate. For Kant's view is that the logical form of the cognitive situation is different from what is suggested by the ordinary way of speaking about knowledge and the ordinary forms in which we state our beliefs about the predicates of objects. These ways of speaking suggest that knowledge is a relation involving simply the mind and its object; and that the relation of the object to its predicates involves no other terms; but Kant's doctrine is that this account is too simple. Knowledge is more complex than that—I shall try to explain this more precisely in a moment—and the predicates we attach to things cannot on reflection be regarded as standing to them in a relation which involves only a quality and the particular in which it is instantiated. All this would have been far from easy to express in terms simply of Appear(ance). But fortunately (or unfortunately) the same word is used also in the sense of "to seem," and seeming is a situation involving all the complexity Kant wants and more also. We might put the matter in this way: what he requires for his theory is the *factual* elements of the situation represented by "Appear(ance)" without its *logical* simplicity, and the *logical* complexity of seeming without the *factual* element of containing a false proposition. It would have been wrong, then, for Kant to adopt wholeheartedly the implications of either of the two distinct uses of the word "appear(ance)," and it does not

seem to me that he does this. On the contrary, it appears to me that there is a significant feature of his way of speaking to which commentators have not paid sufficient attention. In a certain respect Kant's normal language in speaking of appearances is unidiomatic. Mr. Prichard's argument (p. 78) implies that what a thing looks or appears is properly contrasted with what it really is. This seems to me both sound and important, pointing as it does to the distinction between appearance and reality as depending on the truth or falsity of the proposition which in the situation to which these terms refer someone entertains. But Kant does not normally contrast appearances with reality; so far as I can see, he does so chiefly if not only in discussing the misunderstandings of his critics.[1] He contrasts appearances with things in themselves, things *as they appear to us* with things *as they are in themselves*. My present suggestion is that this is not due to mere literary incompetence, but that it expresses Kant's feeling that he is using ordinary terms in what is necessarily an unconventional way. When he speaks of things in themselves, or of things as they are in themselves, he is not merely expressing unidiomatically the same distinction that is ordinarily expressed by the contrast between appearance and reality, or between things as they seem and things as they really are. He is *rejecting* the implications of that way of speaking for the very good reason that this is not what he believes and wants to express.

It is perhaps worth while to add the remark that if his doctrine is sound, and perhaps even if it is not, he was right to reject the view that primary or even secondary qualities are *unreal*. Professor Paton does indeed speak[2] as if the results of scientific and philosophical reflection has been to throw doubt on the reality of such qualities; and perhaps this view has not uncommonly been held. But in the light of the distinctions set out (not for the first time) in the preceding sections it is plain that this way of speaking is mistaken. The illusion involved, at any rate, affects us only in so far as we philosophize about the logical form of our perceptual experiences; so long as we stick to forecasts of their factual content, while we may be mistaken and some experiences may accordingly be illusory, we may also be right and the qualities manifested in our experience accordingly real.

The main conclusion of this section is that Kant was influenced in the selection of the term "appear(ance)" by a more or less conscious realization that the situation to which he wished to refer was that indicated by the term "Appear(ance)," while the logical form which he wished to attribute to it was more like that of the situation indicated by the term "to seem." Perhaps if he had been more clearly conscious of what he was about he would have seen

[1] E.g. A 37–41, B 69–71.

[2] *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, vol. i, pp. 68 ff.

that the choice of such a term would bring more than compensating inconveniences in the shape of misleading suggestions of illusion.

§ 9. *Kant reformulated*

If it is true that the term "appear(ance)" is misleading when used in the statement of Kant's position, can we find another way of formulating it such as to avoid these unwanted suggestions of illusion?

We may begin by considering the nature of the differences between Kant's view and that which seems to be implied by ordinary speech about knowledge and the objects which we know. If Kant's criticism of these is not that they are unreal or illusory, what is it? It is, I think, that as they are used in ordinary language our expressions about knowledge and its objects are *incomplete*, and that if completed in one way (the way associated with Transcendental Realism) they involve not indeed empirical but transcendental illusion; if this illusion is to be avoided at the level of philosophic reflection, we must complete these expressions in the way characteristic of Transcendental Idealism, but it is also avoided at the level of common sense by simply ignoring the whole problem.

How then are ordinary expressions about knowledge and its objects to be completed in order to avoid transcendental illusion? We must complete them, according to Kant, in such a way as to limit our knowledge of objects to their appearances or to objects as they appear, and to restrict the application of certain predicates to appearances or to things as they appear. What does this mean? How else can this doctrine be formulated?

This problem is rendered exceedingly difficult, to me at least, by uncertainty about Kant's real view on a vital matter of logical form. I suspect indeed that his view is not clear and perhaps not consistent. The question is, did Kant hold a sensum theory or not? More precisely, did he analyse the cognitive situation in a way which involves the recognition of three particulars at least—the thing known, T, the knowing mind, M, and S, a sensum or event produced by the interaction of these and conditioning but not identical with M's knowledge of T? Or did he perhaps hold a simpler view, according to which the peculiarity of the cognitive situation would lie not in the presence of an unsuspected constituent S, but merely in the unique character of the relation holding between M and T, a relation which on his view would affect the relation of the object to its predicates?

In what follows I am going to discuss only the sensum theory. I do not by this mean to deny the possibility that the other theory may more correctly represent Kant's view. That is for Kantian experts to decide. If they decide that it does, then I hope they will

provide us with a formulation of his doctrine in terms which we can all understand. My reasons for confining my own discussion to the sensum theory are as follows. (1) I think I am at least partly able to understand this theory, while I do not at present understand the other theory at all. (2) Probably for the reason given in (1), I think the sensum theory more interesting and plausible in itself than the other theory, which I suppose corresponds in some ways with Professor Moore's theory of seeming[1] and with Professor Whitehead's theory of Multiple Inherence. Hence I think the study of Kant would be more profitable if he held the sensum theory than if he held the other.

I will begin by pointing out something which I do *not* mean by the suggestion that Kant's concept of appearance is to be understood in terms of the sensum theory. I do not think that when Kant speaks of appearances he means sensa, though it is probably true that many philosophers have called sensa appearances of the things to which, in Mr. Price's phrase, they belong.

This is certainly a very queer use of the word, and I cannot but suspect it of expressing an extremely confused state of mind. For what is its referential function? And to what situation does it refer? If we think of what sensa are, to call them appearances would suggest that we mean "things which Appear," since we certainly are aware of them. If we think of the phrase "appearances *of things*," we may think of the gerundive noun, meaning "the fact that things Appear to us." This use of language might seem helpful to anyone who wishes to get the sensum theory past us on the blind side, by suggesting that sensa are not coloured or prement particulars but merely our acts of awareness; but it is hardly conducive to a clear understanding of the cognitive situation. It does not seem correct, on the other hand, to call sensa appearances meaning "what things seem to be"; for what a thing seems to be is the content of a proposition which the sensing of a sensum causes us to entertain and not the sensum which elicits this proposition; it is the perhaps non-existent bent stick, not the certainly bent visual sensum. (Is it not indeed nearer the truth to say that things are what sensa seem to be than that sensa are what things seem to be?) If what we mean is that sensa are appearances *produced by* things, is it not exceedingly odd that an intransitive verb should have a passive participial noun? The fact is, I suppose, that the term is thoroughly artificial and can only be understood in relation to a theory of knowledge; if the cognitive situation turns out on investigation to require an instrument (the sensum) unsuspected by ordinary consciousness, then perhaps we may call this instrument an appearance in the sense of a thing *by means of which* other things appear (technical).

[1] As set out in his *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 245, 246.

But whether or not it is possible to make intelligible this use of the term "appearance" in application to sensa, I do not think that this is how Kant, in his most characteristic utterances, actually uses it. My reason can be given quite briefly. It is that sensa are by definition *contrasted* with the thing to which they belong, whereas Kant's view expressly is that there is *only one thing* looked at in different ways—as it is, and as it appears.[1] Thus for him, if he holds the sensum theory, an appearance is not a sensum as owned by a thing, but *a thing considered as the owner of a sensum.* This then is the conception, which I will now try to explain further.

It is clear that if the theory which Kant is stating is a sensum theory, the terms with which we are concerned can only express a part of the complete theory of knowledge. In Mr. Price's language, they are concerned with the nature of the relation of "belonging to" which holds between sensa and the things of which we are conscious by means of them. These terms throw little light on the nature of our *perceptual consciousness* of material things. Further, within the field of "belonging to" there is a distinction between the relations which a sensum has to other sensa belonging to the same object, and the relation which it has to the physical occupant which is its "vertical" cause, if there is such a thing. ("Vertical" causation holds between a physical object and the sensations which it produces in us, and is contrasted with the "horizontal" causation of changes in other objects.) Kant's account of the former of these relations is found, I suppose, in his theory of the Phenomenal Object; his theory of appearances and things in themselves is concerned mainly with the relation of sensa to their vertical cause. If this is correct, Phenomenalists will at once dismiss the whole theory as meaningless, since nothing more can be involved in material-thing-hood than the family of sensa which according to them actually *is* a material thing. I agree with them that once we accept sensa as the starting-point of our theory of perception it is a teasing question why we should ever imagine that anything whatever exists but sensa and the families in which they are related. But it is clear that Kant had not observed this question, and that if he believed in sensa at all he certainly believed also in some non-sensible cause or condition upon which they depend. I do not defend Kant for failing to raise this question, or rather for tacitly solving it in this particular way. I am concerned at present only to formulate his theory in such a way that we can understand it well enough to see whether it is true or false.

Assuming then that there are things whose existence does not depend on our minds, and that our awareness of them would not take place without the coming into existence, through the interaction

[1] Cf. e.g., B xviii, xix, n; B xxvi; and B xxvii.

of these things-in-themselves with our minds, of sensa, what is Kant's doctrine? What does he mean by his distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves, or between things as they appear and things as they are in themselves?

The suggestion I wish to put forward can perhaps best be explained by considering first of all the case of secondary qualities. Kant's position, if he holds the sensum theory, differs from the unreflective attitude of the plain man in being an explicit theory of the *logical form* of the cognitive situation. It differs from naïve realism in holding that this logical form is not adequately described by recognizing a relation of two terms only, T and M, but only by a theory which recognizes the presence also of at least one other constituent, S. Thus it would misrepresent his position to say that in perceptual experience we do not know T, but do know S; his view is that we do know T, and that we are aware of the predicates of T, but that this knowledge is more complex than it seems, and that these predicates are not unconditional.

In this last phrase we have perhaps a clue which will guide us forward. Naïve realism would hold that our statement that this grass is green involves two elements only, the particular which we call "this grass" and the universal or quality which we indicate by "green." And it may be held that if more were involved it would be incorrect to call green a quality. According to the sensum theory, there *is* a quality, which we can hardly indicate by any other word but "green"; but it is not a quality of the grass but of a certain sensum. What then of the grass? Is there nothing that can be said about it? By no means. If I am right in holding that there is a relation of some sort between the grass and the sensum, and the sensum has the quality of being green, then it follows as a mere matter of logic that there is a certain relation between the grass and green, though this is not the same as the relation between the sensum and its quality. If the relation between sensum and T were not unique, the existence of this relation between T and green might not be important. But as the relation of S to T *is* supposed unique, so that the sensum has just this relation to no other thing T′, but only to T, it *is* important and enables us to describe T uniquely, or know it by description as this green grass.

What general name could we give to this sort of relation of T to green, the relation which logically follows from T's relation to S which has the quality green? An analogy with family relationships will help us again. Where X is the grandmother of Y, as we have seen, this is because there exists a third person, Z, to whom X has the relation "parent of" and Y the relation "child of." Relations such as "grandmother of" are called by Mr. Russell "relative products," because they correspond with the *product* or conjunction of

two propositions each of which involves a relation. Since the relation we are here discussing similarly corresponds with the logical product or conjunction of two propositions, it seems possible that a similar description would be applicable. But we cannot call it a relative product; for here only one of the propositions conjoined involves a relation, while the other involves a quality. I suggest, not without a shudder, the term "relato-qualitative product."

If all this is right, then, Kant's criticism of naïve realism, if he holds the sensum theory, might be formulated as follows: "We do not know the qualities of things, but only their relato-qualitative products"; or alternatively, "What we take to be qualities of the objects we know are not qualities but relato-qualitative products."

Now of course Kant's main concern is not with secondary qualities, but with spatio-temporal predicates. We need not here inquire what account should be given in terms of the sensum theory of the greater objectivity which in Kant's opinion belongs to the primary as compared with the secondary qualities. (It seems certain that his theory is confused by a failure to distinguish clearly between the relations which sensa have to other sensa in the same field—relations which are certainly "given" but equally certainly relative to the percipient—and those spatio-temporal relations which are identical for all percipients and thus constitute the physical world. These latter relations, it seems, can only be apprehended, if apprehended is the word, by thought. Perhaps if we have regard to the uniqueness of the spatio-temporal system constituting the physical world we may see reason to hold that Kant should have attributed our knowledge of Space and Time as infinite wholes to the Ideal of Reason rather than to the forms of intuition.) However that may be, we have to formulate Kant's general doctrine about the spatio-temporal predicates.

Here there is a difficulty which prevents our at once including them under the formula which has been suggested above for the case of the secondary qualities. Statements about secondary qualities might be regarded from the point of view of philosophical analysis as being concerned with relato-qualitative products, since they depend upon a relation of T to S and a sensible quality of S. But it is not equally clear that if we were to represent Kant's position about primary qualities by a conjunction of the proposition that things have a certain relation to sensa with the proposition that sensa are spatio-temporal it would be correct to say that corresponding to this conjunction of propositions there is a relato-qualitative product. For it is not clear to me that what we indicate by the expression "S is spatio-temporal" is a *quality* of S, in the sense to which we are here restricting the term "quality." What *is* meant by saying, if we do say, that sensa are spatio-temporal? It

seems clear that such an expression would cover more than one kind of proposition about sensa, referring to their extensive magnitudes as well as to their mutual relation of side-by-sideness and succession. To work out the varieties of predicate applicable to things which would arise from the conjunction of the relation of things to sensa with propositions of these various sorts about sensa themselves would certainly overload a discussion which is already far too long, even if I were able to carry out the necessary analysis. Enough may have been said, however, to indicate the general lines of the solution which I suggest might be given to our problem. The essence of Kant's position, if he holds the sensum theory, is that a reflective account of our knowledge of things must always take account of the fact that we only know them by description as the things which stand in a certain relation to sensa which have such and such qualities and relations. If we defined "predicate" in a wide sense so as to cover qualities and relations to particular or general terms, and in general anything that a term could be said to be or be related to, we might say that the two propositions the conjunction of which corresponds to any statement of ordinary language are according to Kant (1) a proposition asserting a relation of T to S, and (2) a proposition asserting a *predicate* of S. Corresponding to this conjunction of propositions there would be what we might call, at the risk of some confusion with the quite different notion of a "predicative function" in Russell's logic, a *relato-predicative product.*

Summing up the suggestion we are discussing, I submit the view that according to Kant spatio-temporal propositions about things, and, *a fortiori*, propositions about the secondary qualities of things, indicate relato-predicative products mediated by sensa with their qualities and relations.

With this formulation I will leave to Kantian experts two questions: (1) whether a formulation of Kant's doctrine on some such lines as these is not more illuminating than the misleading formulation in terms of appear(ance); (2) whether the basis of this new formulation should be the sensum theory as outlined above, or rather a simpler theory on the lines of Moore's theory of seeming or Whitehead's of Multiple Inherence, according to which the relativity of our knowledge of things should be not to sensa but to the cognitive relation itself.

WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY: *ACTUAL ENTITIES*

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It is generally known that Descartes analysed the Universe into three main substances. In the first place there was thinking substance exemplified by private human minds. In the second place there was material substance or "matter," the stuff of which the physical world was made. And in the third place there was infinite substance called by us "God," the creator and sustainer of the first two types of substance, and therefore of the entire Cosmos.

Descartes made clear what he meant by substance. He defined the term in these words:

> For when I think that a stone is a substance, or a thing capable of existing of itself, and that I am likewise a substance, although I conceive that I am a thinking and non-extended thing, and that the stone on the contrary is extended and unconscious, there being thus the greatest diversity between the two concepts—yet these two ideas seem to have this in common that they represent substances. . . .[1]

Again:

> By the name God, I understand a substance infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which I myself, and every other thing that exists, if any such there be, were created. . . .[2]

Whitehead rejects the analysis of the world into types of substances as defined by Descartes. Put bluntly, his chief reason for denying that the ultimate entities of the world are substances is that there is literally nothing that "requires nought but itself in order to exist." Not even God, he says, is so self-contained and self-sufficient that He is independent of everything else. On the contrary, all actual entities, including God, need other beings as constituents of their existence. An actual entity is not an unchanging something called substance with "accidents" or qualities which undergo certain adventures of change, whilst it remains identically the same, but is essentially a "process," and has as components of its own being a multiplicity of other entities.

The temporal and spatial world, then, does not consist of a number of substances of the three types enumerated by Descartes, but of a plurality of "processes." These are the ultimate entities of the temporal world, and they are called by Whitehead "occasions"

[1] Descartes, *Meditations III.* [2] *Ibid.*

or "actual entities." "Occasions" or "actual entities" are not the only things in the Universe. We shall see in a later article that there is a class of entities called "eternal objects," without which there could be no Universe. And there is also God, who though non-temporal, is an actual being. But "occasions" or "actual entities" compose the Universe of existence in space and time, and it is therefore important first of all to understand what these entities are, and how they are to be conceived. We can then proceed with a study of other aspects of reality.

Actual Entities

"Actual entities" or "actual occasions," according to the Organic Philosophy, are the real things of which the world is made. They are atomic and individual in their nature, and are sometimes called "drops of experience." They are not unchanging substances but "processes." An actual entity is a process of growth from phase to phase ending in a definite achievement. The process is a way of bringing various elements into a real unity, and this is accomplished by a genuine creative synthesis. Diverse elements, which before were apart, are, by the growing integrating activity, which dominates the process of becoming, brought into a novel and satisfying unity. This character of growth from phase to phase is called "concrescence," and the achieved result of the process a "concretion." A concretion is a specific mode in which many diverse elements have been brought together to function as constituents of a new unified whole or individual.

You may wish me to point out an actual entity to you, so that you may see it with your eyes. I am afraid I cannot do that because they are too microscopic for the eyes to see, and in addition are as a rule, swiftly transitory. The table at which I am writing, and the lamp which enables me to see, are not actual entities in the sense of the Organic Philosophy. Neither is the dog at my feet, or the walnut tree in my garden, whose leaves are now dropping. They certainly are composed of actual entities in great number, but it is better to regard them as "societies" of actual entities with varying degrees of complex order, than actual occasions. Indeed, an actual entity or "occasion" in the physical world is much more like a vibration than a table or lamp, dog or tree. In the realm of conscious life an actual occasion is the passing experience of a pleasure or pain, the experience of an emotion, such as anger or fear, or an aesthetic thrill of delight evoked by the contemplation of a beautiful object. All these examples are "occasions" or units of experience, and it will be seen later that they synthesize the wider world from which they arise in a specific and unique unity.

I said that what we commonly call a "thing" must be regarded as a "society" of actual entities rather than itself an actual entity, a society enjoying a certain type of ordered relationship. Consider a molecule, which is by no means swiftly transitory, but something enduring for a very long time. If we perform an imaginary or ideal experiment upon this molecule we shall discover that it is a society of occasions enjoying a definite type of order. The way to perform this ideal experiment is as follows. Think of the molecule as existing for one minute only. This is a mere fraction of its life's history, but if we are to get at the notion of an occasion as one of a society, which *is* the molecule, we must start our experiment with some such fraction. Next think of the molecule as enduring for half a minute. This will be a still smaller fraction of its life's history. Continue the imaginative experiment by thinking of thinner and thinner temporal slices of the existence of the molecule—second, half a second, a quarter of a second, and so on. This process of diminishing the time period can be carried on indefinitely. Now each of these temporal slices in the life history of a molecule are "events" which in their totality constitute the molecule. An event is a series or group of actual occasions, so that an actual entity or actual occasion is a limiting type of event. It is to be noted that each occasion has a definite quantum of time associated with it, and also a quantum of space. It will also be clear that as we proceed down the scale of temporal division the content of the molecule will become progressively simpler. The molecule through one minute of its existence will have a richer and more complex essence than through a second, and its content through a second of its life, will be fuller than that characterizing half a second. And so on. The molecule considered as an enduring object lasting for thousands of years must be regarded as composed of a great multiplicity of actual entities or occasions. There would be no molecule if there were not this successive stream of occasions.

The next thing to note is that this stream or society of actual entities, which constitute the molecule, enjoys a certain "order." In the example we have been considering it is an order of succession, the later following upon the earlier, so that they are linked together in this special way. Not all societies of occasions have the same order, although they all admit of *some* order. What, however, we call enduring objects are characterized by a succession of occasions, which Whitehead calls "personal" order. In this type of order there is a transition of one occasion to another throughout the series.

Each of these occasions is an "actual entity," and, according to the Organic Philosophy, "units of experience." Each must be regarded as a monadic creature, and thought of as a mode of synthesizing the world in a unique way. An actual entity is said

to "house" the entire world in one unit of feeling. The world is thus to be regarded as pluralizing itself in a number of actual entities, expressing itself in each occasion from a unique perspective.

I will now try to give a more detailed description of an actual entity, indicating the manner in which they come into being, and how they form "societies," exemplified by the ordinary "things" of common experience.

Detailed Description

The ultimate and most general notion employed by Whitehead in his description of the Universe is "Creativity." This concept stands for the ultimate activity which expresses or pluralizes itself into an interlocked system of modes. These modes are the actual entities of which the world is made. In any one of these actual entities the Universe is synthesized in a unique way. That is to say, an actual entity (like the Monads of Leibniz) mirrors the whole world from its special perspective, or point of view.

How does an actual entity come into being? Clearly it cannot arise from nothing. As a matter of fact an actual entity "emerges," but it emerges from a world in which there are already numerous other occasions that have emerged earlier. If there were not already other occasions which had already come into being, it would not be possible for a "novel" actual entity to arise, and for this reason, a novel actual entity needs other occasions as the "material" of its own becoming.

An actual occasion, then, emerges from the world because there are other occasions which can be synthesized in a novel way. And this novel synthesis of the old into a new unit of experience, is the birth of a new actual entity. The novel synthesis enables the world to be mirrored from an entirely new standpoint, and the reflection of the world from this new standpoint *is* the new actual entity. It is a new individual or, in the language of Whitehead, a new atomic creation.

It is at this point necessary to say that the new synthesis is not only or merely a new synthesis of settled actual entities in the world. In the birth of a new actual entity, another class of entities enters into the synthesis. This is the class of entities called ideal forms, or "eternal objects." These entities will be fully discussed and explained in another place. It will suffice to say now that "eternal objects" are the entities in the Universe, which perform the important function of providing forms of definiteness to the actual entities. They are pure potentials or eternal "patterns," and they alone allow actual entities to have any character, or "whatness," as Bradley would say.

Let us then follow the birth of a new actual entity, in order that we may understand its nature. Return for a moment in thought to the life history of the molecule we discussed on an earlier page. We may take "the molecule existing for one-tenth of a second" as an event consisting of certain occasions which make up the life history of the enduring object we commonly call a molecule. Any one of these occasions is an "actual entity" as defined by the Organic Philosophy. Regard this actual entity in its process of becoming, and note how it becomes and what constituents it makes use of in its genesis. In the first place it must have *other* actual entities in order that it may bring certain of their aspects together into a novel synthesis. We may call these other occasions ABC. They are already antecedent achievements in the settled world, and may be regarded as matter of fact. Now, in the birth of a new actual entity, which we will call "N," certain aspects of ABC (and indeed of all other settled actual entities as well) are seized by the presiding creative activity and integrated into a novel synthesis, a new concretion. This new concretion—"N," viz: "one of the occasions of the event which is the molecule existing for one-tenth of a second," is a new creature. It did not exist before the new synthesis. It emerged as the process of growth or synthesis took place. The birth of a novel actual entity is thus brought about by the seizing of other occasions belonging to the settled past, and the welding of certain of their aspects into a new unity. This novel unity is to be thought of as a unique mode, in which the whole Universe is in varying degrees enpressed—a unit of feeling, fully determined as to its character and essence.

The means whereby other actual occasions can be brought together into an entirely novel unity is through the functioning of eternal objects. It is they that relate one occasion to another, thus permitting, or rather effecting, a new synthesis. This relating function of eternal objects is vital to the whole theory of actual entities, and will come up for notice again.

So far we see that what is meant by an actual entity is a specific mode of synthesis of other occasions. This, however, is not all. Besides synthesizing other settled occasions of the world, a novel actual entity in its process of concrescence synthesizes also a selection of eternal objects. These eternal objects are forms of definiteness of one kind or another, such as a specific colour, sound, shape or feeling. In the completed novel actual entity certain eternal objects, as well as other settled occasions, will be comprised in a novel unity. Indeed, just as we said the whole world of actual occasions is in some degree included in the birth of a new actual entity, so we can likewise say that the whole realm of eternal objects is included in some degree. This, however, is a matter that can only be adequately dealt with later.

The main thing to notice at this stage of our description, is that an actual entity is not an unchanging thing or substance, but essentially a "process." We have called it a mode of synthesis, which is meant to indicate what we may call its fluid character. The essential nature of an actual entity consists in its process of becoming. Indeed, we may say that a description of *how* it becomes, is a description of *what* it verily is. We can only truly know an actual entity by understanding its genesis. To follow in thought its phases of concrescence in growth until it reaches its culmination in fulfilment, is to apprehend its true and ultimate character as a process.

The Analysis of an Actual Entity

An actual entity has two sides. On the one side it is a mode of creation bringing together the Universe in a unit of experience by its own creative act. On the other side it is an actual emergent creature, a fully definite and novel achievement. It must not be supposed, however, that there are two entities, creativity and the creature. There is only one self-creating actual entity which can be regarded from two points of view.

In analysing an actual entity the most important thing we discover about it is that it is a "subject." By the term "subject" is meant an entity which has *immediate* experience, a private life, as it were, of its own. We are fully aware that human beings and animals have an inner privacy of experience. We are doubtful about this in regard to plants and trees, and in the realm of inorganic nature, the domain of protons and electrons, we find it difficult to conceive that they should have the privacy of immediate experience. The Organic Philosophy, however, applies the notion of the subjectivity of experience throughout nature. It does not think there is any point at which we can say there is a hiatus between higher grade organisms and lower grade ones. This, however, does not mean that at every grade there is "conscious" experience. But it does mean that there is "experience" in the broadest sense of the term. The Organic Philosophy holds that "conscious" experience is comparatively rare in the cosmic epoch which now prevails. It is a form of experience attaching to high grade organisms only, and only appears where there is considerable complexity in a society of actual entities. "Experience," however, is a privilege enjoyed by all actual entities, however low their grade may be, although in very primitive and simple occasions in the realm of inorganic nature the immediacy and privacy that experience implies, may reach such a low ebb as to be almost negligible. Nevertheless, experience in some degree is a universal character of all actual entities, and is existentially

prior to consciousness. Consciousness implies experience, but experience does not involve consciousness.

The term "subject" applied to an actual entity is therefore to be understood as meaning that there is a central factor which *has* experience. Of course an actual entity cannot be merely an abstract subject. It must experience "something" and what it experiences will be "objects." Consequently an actual entity in its complete nature will be a subject experiencing objects. These objects will be its own experiences, so that an actual entity in its fullness must be regarded as a subject experiencing, *and* the experiences which it owns. Sometimes Whitehead calls an actual entity a "superfect," a term intended to embrace the dual aspects of experiencing, and the experiences enjoyed. In the latest account of his philosophy[1] Whitehead speaks of the subject as having "concern" for the object, and says that this "concern" places the object as a component in the experience of the subject. "An affective tone is provoked in the subject by the object, and is directed back to the object its source." The organic philosophy unequivocably regards the subject-object relation as the fundamental structure of experience.

What is the origin of the subject? Whitehead's reply to this question is that the subject *emerges* from the world, and should more accurately be named a "superfect" rather than a "subject." He explains the matter in this way. "The word 'object' means an entity which is a potentiality for being a component in feeling, and the word 'subject' means the entity constituted by the process of feeling and including this process. The feeler is the unity emergent from its own feelings; and feelings are the details of the process intermediary between this unity and its many data. The data are the potentials for feeling; that is to say they are objects. The process is the elimination of indeterminateness of feeling from the unity of the subjective experience."

An actual entity as a subject is to be thought of as presiding over its own becoming. We have already seen that an actual entity is essentially a process. The subject is that which controls and directs the process. The process, of course, reaches completion in a definite achievement, in something that really "becomes" and this something which becomes is a "superfect," which, when analysed, is seen to consist of the subject and its "feelings." This superfect is the novel synthetic unity, achieved by the creative process, a new mode in which the world is housed, a fresh expression of the Universe from a unique perspective. We see, therefore, that an actual entity to be truly regarded, must be understood in its twofold aspect of self-directing process and outcome of the process.

The world of actual entities or occasions is thus a world of subjects,

[1] Lecture.

and the experiences of subjects. The Organic Philosophy maintains that apart from the experiences of subjects there is bare nothingness. The general creative action of the Universe is the process by which the Universe is continually being pluralized into units of experience. When these novel actual entities have fully "become," they add themselves to the already existing multiplicity, which is the Universe, regarded as "many" in distinction from its other aspect of being, also "one."

Sufficient has been said to make clear the subjective side of an actual entity. It is now necessary to expound in further detail what was said above in regard to its "objective" side. This objective aspect, it will be remembered, is made up of the "experiences" of the subject. What, we may ask, are these experiences, and whence do they come? The answer is that they are experiences of *other* actual entities in the already settled world. Aspects of these other actual entities are definitely seized by the creative activity of the subject and synthesized into a new unity of experience. It is these aspects of other actual entities that constitute the objective side of any given actual entity. *They* are the experiences of the subject. Consideration of the nature of such experiences takes us straight to the doctrine of "Prehensions" in the Organic Philosophy, which is fundamental.

The Doctrine of Prehensions

In the first place let us recall what we have already learnt, namely: that an actual entity is a process of achievement. It is a concrescence or growth of elements advancing from phase to phase until the "end," which is the controlling and directing factor in the whole process has been attained. The achieved end is the "satisfaction," which is to be thought of as an emergent creature fully definite and limited: "definite" because it *is* the world in that synthesis, and "limited" because of the limitations which the elements have mutually imposed on each other in the integrated process. Now the doctrine of Prehensions, or the doctrine that other settled actual entities or occasions enter into the constitution of a novel actual entity, is based upon the theory that what is called the "satisfaction" of an actual entity is the "stuff" which constitutes the objective side of a new actual entity. It is the "datum" which a new subject can use for building up a new actual entity. When a subject makes use of a number of these "satisfactions" or achievements in its work of creating a novel actual entity, the satisfactions are called the "data" for the creative activity. The reason for the theory that achieved "satisfactions" are the elements or constituents of all actual entities that arise, is grounded on the postulate that every actual entity in its

aspect of "satisfaction" is a potential for a new act of becoming. According to the Organic Philosophy everythlng that is actual is also a potential for a new synthesis. This doctrine is called "the real potentiality of actual entities," to distinguish it from the notion of abstract potentiality. Consequently, actual entities enter into the internal constitution of each other, and the general result is a world system of interlocked modes.

With these preliminary remarks we can proceed with a description of the doctrine of prehensions, which shows how aspects of other settled occasions in the world enter into and form the objective side—the *experiences* of novel actual entities. But before doing so it is well carefully to note that the term "satisfaction" is the notion of an entity as *concrete* abstracted from the process of concrescence. It is the "outcome" separated from the process. But the actual entity in its completeness, is at once process *and* outcome, so that whenever we are considering the "satisfaction" or "outcome" only, we are dealing with an abstraction.

It is, then, the satisfactions or outcomes of the various concrescent processes which provide "data" for the emergence of a new occasion, or actual entity. These data are, as it were, material offered for a new synthesis, whereby a new unity of experience may appear. When other occasions or actual entities play the role of contributing to the birth of new entities by offering themselves as "data," they are said to "objectify" themselves for the new entities.

To say that settled and achieved actual entities objectify themselves is only another way of saying that they are efficient causes, so that when later we employ the terms "data" and "objectifications" the reader will not go far wrong if he translates these terms into the phrase "functioning as causes." But it must not be forgotten that the "data" are always presented to a presiding subject for acceptance, or rejection, either partly or wholly, according to the "end," which is the goal of the self-creating process.

In the doctrine of Prehensions, it is important first of all to understand the view adopted by the Organic Philosophy in regard to the notion of causality. According to Whitehead both efficient causation and final causation must be accepted in the interpretation of nature. Efficient causation is the theory that past events determine subsequent events, as when a match applied to inflammable material is followed by a conflagration. Final causation, on the other hand, is the theory that the "end" or purpose of a process plays a conspicuous part in bringing about a certain result, as when the "idea" of a future satisfaction, such as the enjoyment of a pension, controls and guides the selection of means for the achievement of the desired end. We must regard an actual entity as exemplifying both kinds of causation. On the one hand efficient causation is

exemplified in the objectification of settled actual entities as "data." Here we observe the past operating and producing effects. When constituents are "given" to the synthesizing activity for unification, we have efficient causation. Efficient causation is the potentiality of achieved actual occasions playing a part in the formation of new entities.

On the other hand, final causation is the *self-creative* process of becoming of an actual entity, a concrescence of diverse elements into an entirely new unit of experience, a process moving towards an end, though not necessary a "conscious" end.

The key to the understanding of the basic doctrine of the Organic Philosophy, namely: that other actual entities enter into and form constituents of the real internal constitution of novel actual entities, is therefore to be found in the doctrine of prehensions. "Data," as already explained, are those aspects of other entities that are used by the synthesizing activity in the creation of the new entity. In the language of Whitehead they are the entities seized or "prehended" by the creative activity as "material" for its formative work. Consequently the word "prehension" means a datum prehended by the substrate activity present in the emergence of every actual entity. We must, however, supplement this statement by an addition. Not only are other actual entities prehended, but the class of entities called "eternal objects" are also prehended and synthesized in a new occasion or unit of experience. These, then, can also be "data." When reflecting on the nature of prehension, it is necessary to remember that the term applies both to objectified actual entities, and to those eternal objects that are likewise, in the given circumstances, "data."

We are seeking to arrive at an understanding of the "experiences" or "feelings" of an actual entity, those elements which in an earlier place were said to constitute the "objective" aspect of its nature. Now these experiences are its "prehensions." When an actual entity is analysed it is found to consist of a concrescence of prehensions which have originated in its process of "becoming." There are two species of prehensions, positive and negative, but for the moment we may ignore the negative species, and concentrate on the positive species.

Positive prehensions are said to be "feelings." The term "feeling" does not, however, necessarily imply consciousness, but it does imply the logically prior concept of "experience." By "feeling" is to be understood a mode of transition effecting a concrescence; it is essentially an "operation." It is the term used for the basic generic operation of passing from the objectivity of the data presented, to the subjective immediacy of the actual entity, from publicity to privacy. This passage of public data into subjective immediacy

expresses the activity whereby a novel actual entity effects its concretion of other things. Whitehead wishes us to understand that "feeling" looked at from another point of view is analogous to *perception* as described by Descartes in the words: "Let it be so, still it is at least quite certain that it seems to me that I see light, that I hear noise, and that I feel heat. That cannot be false; properly speaking it is what is in me called feeling. . . ." Seeing then that prehensions are defined by Whitehead as "feelings," we are not surprised to find that sometimes he calls an actual entity "an act of perceptivity." This is in keeping with his theory of the nature of prehensions. In non-mental actual entities, however, acts of perceptivity will, of course, be "blind," that is, without consciousness, but they will, notwithstanding, be perceptions in the broad sense of that term, seeing they are verily "drops of experience."

A prehension then is an operation. When one actual entity prehends another, we can analyse the operation, (1) as the objectification of the latter entity as one of the "data" for the former, (2) the clothing of the datum with a subjective form of feeling, (3) the absorption of the datum thus clothed into the immediacy of subjective satisfaction. If it is an eternal object that is prehended, then the eternal object will be the datum prehended, clothed with feeling, and absorbed into subjective satisfaction.

What has been stated above applies to Positive Prehensions. But a word must here be said of their opposite—Negative Prehensions. Negative Prehensions, as the words imply, indicate that certain "possible" prehensions are declined by the process of concrescence. The data offered are ignored as irrelevant for the process: they are, as it were, held off, kept at a distance, and rendered inoperative. They are not, therefore, absorbed into feeling. Here, however, an interesting point emerges. Although negative prehensions are not integrated in a process of concrescence, yet they have a real effect upon the outcome or "satisfaction" of the actual entity, i.e. the concretion. Perhaps an illustration will be the best way of making this point clear. Just as the refusal by an individual to love things worthy of being loved, or to see the truth of a situation, even though it stares him in the face, affects his character and his general "tone," so negative prehensions determine in part the emotional tone of the "satisfaction" of the actual entity. What is omitted is not negligible, either in the life of man or in the constitution of less complex entities.

It should by this time be apparent that actual entities and eternal objects are the two most important classes of entities that constitute our world. It is true there are other entities, but actual entities and eternal objects are the *fundamenta*. Actual entities, when analysed, are discovered to consist of prehensions, and pre-

hensions are the basic operations by which the public data of the settled achieved occasions of the world are absorbed into the immediate subjective feeling of a novel actual entity. The analysis of an actual entity into prehensions, or feelings, indicates the foundation principle of the Organic Philosophy, namely: that the entities that constitute nature are processes and are not describable in terms of the morphology of "Stuff." It may surprise us that Whitehead boldly attributes "feeling" throughout the actual world. That he does so, however, there can be no doubt. Indeed, he claims that this doctrine is based upon the results of scientific observation. He says:

> In those physical entities that can be best observed, it is feeling that survives as a known element constitutive of the "formal" existence of such entities. Also when we observe the causal nexus, devoid of interplay with sense-presentation, the influx of feeling with vague qualitative and "vector" definition is what we find. The dominance of the *scalar* physical quantity, inertia, in the Newtonian physics, obscured the recognition of the truth, that all fundamental physical quantities are *vector*, and not *scalar*.

Physicists will be interested in this passage when considering the philosophy of their science. When it is said that in physics the causal characteristics of nature observed are in reality "feelings" with vague qualitative and vector definition, Whitehead is only saying in other words that the causal characteristics are prehensions having specific but varying subjective forms. This conclusion enables him to say that Physics is the science investigating the spatio-temporal and quantitative character of simple physical feelings, and that the actual entities of the world are bound together in a nexus of these feelings. The term "vector" means "any directed quantity." Consequently the statement that the ultimate physical quantities are feelings bearing a vector character, means, I suppose, that they have been transmitted from another source. In the language of the Organic Philosophy they are "objectifications" of other settled actual entities or occasions in the world. Whitehead explains that if we translate his metaphysical language into the language of Physics, it will read something as follows: What is called a "simple physical feeling" is equivalent to an act of causation. What is named the "datum" for an act of prehension, is the equivalent in physics to "cause." We have already seen that a prehension can also be called an act of perception because it is an "experience" in the broad sense of this expression. If, therefore, we regard a prehension as an act of perception, then "cause" is the object of perception, and the subject of the physical feeling is the perceiver.[1]

[1] Whitehead explains the ideas of cause and effect in this way. "A simple physical feeling entertained in one subject is a feeling for which the initial datum is another single actual entity. . . . A simple physical feeling is an act of causation. The actual entity, which is the initial datum, is the 'cause,'

The Inorganic World: Causation

We may pause for a moment in order to try to see how this metaphysic of "feelings" can be applied to the inorganic world with which physics is concerned.

In the first place it must be understood that what in physical science we call "effects" are novel actual entities which come into being in the manner we have described in the section on "Prehensions." They are verily "begotten" by the general creativity. In the second place in the transaction which we name "cause and effect," there is a process of transference effecting a partial identification of cause and effect. Whitehead labours to make this point clear, and this is what I understand him to say: the cause's own feeling is "re-enacted" for the effect as *subject*, and because the same feeling enjoyed by the cause is also enjoyed by the effect as subject, there is partial identification of cause and effect. The subject of the new effect acquires the feeling which the cause enjoyed, and in the re-enactment or transference the feeling suffers no loss in regard to its original subjectivity in the cause. "Cause and effect" is thus a process of transference, a "passing on" and by means of a fresh synthesis a becoming of something novel. In the science of Physics this is known as Vector transmission. Regarded more deeply, it is the cumulation and growth of the Universe in its creative advance.

But at this step we must be careful to qualify the statement just made that effects are *re-enactments* of the feelings of causes. Effects are, it is true, reproductive of many actual occasions of the past. But an effect is not undiluted or indiscriminate reproduction. The effect is a *novel* entity, and in order to be new it must not merely reproduce the totalities of feelings of past occasions. Consequently a selection is made: only those feelings of the past relevant to the novel synthesis are chosen, the rest being dismissed by negative prehensions. They are so dismissed because they do not comply with certain categorial demands. This qualification of the statement that effects are the re-enactment of feelings enjoyed by causes is impor-

the simple physical feeling is the 'effect,' and the subject entertaining the simple physical feeling is the actual entity 'conditioned' by the effect. To avoid excessive detail we can without error call the conditioned actual entity the 'effect.' "

Note: Since the simple physical feeling is the feeling of the actual entity which is the "cause," and because a cause's feeling cannot, as a feeling, be abstracted from its own subject, the subject of the cause (*a*) enters into the new effect (*b*). That is to say the feeling from the cause (*a*) acquires the subjectivity of the new effect (*b*) without loss of its own original subjectivity in the cause. The passage of the cause into the effect is the cumulative character of time.

tant. It means that causation when strictly analysed is the transfer of a feeling, and not of a total concretion or satisfaction.

The Organic Philosophy thus extends the concept of "feeling" *defined as the experience of immediacy* to embrace the whole of Nature. In the inorganic world, however, the two higher phases present in living organisms, namely: the "supplemental" phase, and the "mental" phase, are either lost or negligible. By the "supplemental" phase is meant the stage of concrescence or growth of an actual entity, in which contrasts *latent* in the datum are synthesized by the prehending subject into a real unity. The components in the datum which *qua* dative, are diverse, are by the "supplementary" feeling brought together into a *unity* of varied contrasts. The essence of this phase is said to be the self-adjustment of the subject in the presence of the physical data: it is the phase in which "the graduated emotional intensity of the subject is progressively constituting itself by reference to the data felt by it." "Supplementary" feeling is said to be emotional, because it is what the self-constituting subject *feels* in the process of appropriating the objective data.

Inorganic nature lacks this phase of supplementary feeling. Still more does it lack "conscious" feeling, which, strictly speaking, is only a further development of supplementary feeling. It is because these two higher phases of concrescence are missing in inorganic nature, that the actual entities of which physical nature is composed differ in a marked degree from those which compose the realm of life. The inorganic occasions are merely what their causal past allows them to be. There is no sign of "originativeness," which is so characteristic of living things. As Whitehead put it—"so far as we can see inorganic entities are vehicles for receiving, for storing in a napkin, and for restoring without loss or gain." Thus in the inorganic realm, although through causal efficacy the past is lifted into the present, there is no transformation of the vague indefinite differentiations latent in past occasions into contrasts in the present, and consequently there is an absence of emotional intensity on the part of the subject.

Actual Entities as Self-Creative

We have seen that the analysis of an actual entity discloses its constituents to be prehensions, otherwise named feelings. Every prehension has a subjective character, as well as an objective one. But it is to be noted that the subject prehending in any given prehension is always one and the same subject as that of the actual entity, of which the prehension is a component. In the emergence of a new actual entity from the settled world we are witnessing a self-creating process. The subject of the emerging novel entity presides

over its own self-creation, and in doing so, "reproduces" itself as the prehending subject in the various prehensions which are the constituents of the actual entity as a definite whole. Consequently, although every constituent prehension consists of (*a*) the "subject" prehending, (*b*) the "datum," which is prehended, and (*c*) a "subjective form," expressing *how* the subject prehends its datum, a prehension is only a subordinate element of an actual entity. It is not itself a complete entity. The reason for it being what it is, and for it possessing the subjective form that characterizes it, resides in the actual entity of which it is a component. As a component it presupposes the complete actual entity. It is the actual entity as self-creative, concentrating its aim on effecting further integrations as steps leading to its final satisfaction, that determines what conceptual feeling derivative from eternal objects is to be admitted or rejected, as well as the subjective forms of prehensions. For this reason, prehensions, although they reproduce the character of an actual entity—subject, datum, subjective form, emotion and purpose, are not themselves actual entities, but only components.

The notion of an actual entity as self-creative is fundamental. In order to understand this clearly we must refer once again to the two aspects of an actual entity as a "process" and a "concretion." As a process we conceive the entity as a growth from phase to phase, effecting various integrations. As a concretion, we conceive it as a unit of experience in which the world is synthesized in a unique unity. The realization of the "end" of the concrescent process is, as we have learnt, the "satisfaction," the definite achieved result of the concrescent process. The subject presides over the process, but perishes on attaining the end or "satisfaction." It perishes because it is the "final cause," and when the satisfaction has been attained there is no further need for the subject as final cause. A fully determined concretion has been achieved. The subject presiding over the concrescence of its own constituent prehensions or feelings may be aptly thought of as the "idea" of the completed unity of feeling which is to issue from the process of becoming. It is, as it were, the "envisagement" of the satisfaction to which the process is directed. When we probe deeper and inquire from whence this "idea" springs, Whitehead answers that it springs from the primordial nature of God. If we further ask why it is necessary to introduce the concept of God to explain the emergence of the subject of an actual entity, the answer is that the metaphysic we are expounding demands an ultimate non-temporal Being as the ground and source of the initial phase of becoming of every actual entity. "An actual entity in the temporal world," says Whitehead, "is to be conceived as originated by physical experience, with the process

of completion motivated by consequent conceptual experience initially derived from God." God is conceived as the principle of concretion, the principle whereby the appropriate and relevant outcome of every situation which arises in the world is initiated.

We have said that the subject or final cause of an actual entity perishes on the attainment by the actual entity of its "satisfaction." But, although the subject perishes, the satisfaction, or what has been achieved, remains. This aspect of an actual entity is what we commonly call "matter of fact," and does not pass away. On the contrary it enjoys what Whitehead calls "objective immortality." By this he means that actual entities in respect of their satisfactions are "potentials" for the making of new actual entities. They are the "data" which are prehended and synthesized by the new creatures which arise in the creative advance of the world. In the process creative of a novel actual entity, the many public settled occasions of the world—the "satisfactions"—which are as such potentials for the becoming of a new creature, are seized and absorbed into private immediacy guided and regulated by the "idea" of satisfaction, which is the goal of the process.

Although, then, the subjects of actual entities perish on attaining their ends, their achievements survive as "matter of fact," and in thus surviving and being potentials for further acts of becoming, they exercise determination on the general creativity. That is to say, Creativity cannot behave as if there were nothing but its own irrepressible urge. It has brought into existence *creatures*, a multiplicity of actual entities, which are themselves potentials for the emergence of new occasions. Consequently, the protean Creativity in its further advance is partly determined and canalized by its own offspring. The past exercises a controlling hand on the present and future, demanding some degree of conformation. Herein we see the germ of "order" in nature.

The Two Types of Feeling in Actual Entities

So far in the description of the genesis of novel actual entities, the main emphasis has been on the fact that they arise from data which are settled actual entities, otherwise called "satisfactions," and in respect of which the self-creating subjects have perished on the achievement of their ends. But this is not the whole story. A novel entity arising from its world, not only synthesizes other actual entities in its process of concrescence, but also a relevant selection of eternal objects. It will be remembered that eternal objects are forms of definiteness. It is because of the inclusion of eternal objects in the process of concrescent growth that new emergent occasions, or actual entities, are able to possess a character. Eternal objects

determine *how* prehensions occur: that is to say they express the manner in which a subject prehends its various data.

Now the "howness" of acts of prehension is of the utmost significance for the understanding of any given actual entity, for it is through an insight into the "how" of its process of concrescence that we learn "what" the actual entity is.

According to the Organic Philosophy, an actual entity in its ultimate analysis is a "becoming." Consequently, if we know "how" it becomes, we have knowledge of "what" it is. The "howness" of its becoming is therefore the essence of an actual entity. It is the role of eternal objects to determine this "howness" of prehensions. By their ingression into the creative process they function as determinants of definiteness of the data prehended, and also as determinants of definiteness in the subjective form of the completed creature—the "satisfaction."

In the becoming of an actual entity, there are therefore two types of entities entering into the novel synthesis, (1) other actual entities, (2) eternal objects. The organic philosophy calls prehensions, whose data involve other actual entities, "physical prehensions," and prehensions of eternal objects "conceptual prehensions." Every actual entity, therefore, is a unit of experience achieved through a synthesis of a set of physical and conceptual prehensions. We have already learnt that another name for positive prehensions is "feelings," so that every actual entity may be said to "house" two distinct types of feeling, physical and conceptual, in a state of unity. Its physical feelings will be derived from other actual entities functioning as "data," and its conceptual feelings from eternal objects functioning as forms of definiteness. In consequence of these two types of feelings being present, every actual entity is said to have a physical pole and a "mental" pole. It should be noted that the term "mental" does not necessarily mean "consciousness," but is the name applied to conceptual feeling, or the prehension of eternal objects.

The Sociality of Actual Entities

A striking feature of an actual entity is its comprehensive inclusiveness. It is a unique synthesis of all other entities in the Universe, whether other occasions, or eternal objects, or God. The concrescence of an actual entity is nothing less than an act of grading the various elements of the whole Universe in accordance with their relevance as contributors to its requirements, and bringing them together into the unity of one fully determined and concrete fact. In the completed "satisfaction" all indeterminations have been eliminated: potentiality has definitely passed into actuality. This grading and synthesis of all other elements in the Universe by the self-creative

process of an individual concrescence, indicates an important fact about an actual entity. It discloses its nature as one that is essentially "social." In order to "become" an actual entity needs in some measure the co-operation of all the other entities in the Universe; indeed it requires not only their co-operation but a selection of their real aspects as constituents of its own internal nature. An actual entity is far from being a substance as Descartes used the term "which requires nothing but itself in order to exist." On the contrary, it requires commerce with the whole cosmos. The need of an actual entity for the cosmic society of occasions is stated in an illuminating passage in one of Whitehead's books as follows:[1]

> An event has contemporaries—This means that an event mirrors within itself the modes of its contemporaries as a display of immediate achievement. An event has a past. This means that an event mirrors within itself the modes of its predecessors as memories which are fused into its own present. An event has a future. This means that an event mirrors within itself such aspects as the future throws back into the present, or in other words, as the present has determined concerning the future. Thus an event has anticipation:
>
> "The prophetic soul
> Of the wide world dreaming of things to come."

Thus every actual entity is in its nature fundamentally social. It cannot be torn out of its context, yet within its context it possesses the same reality as the whole which it synthesizes, for it is a unique unification of the totality of Modalities from one special point of view.

Actual Entities and Value

The Organic Philosophy asserts that "value" is inherent in everything that is actual, because in the last resort the essence of an actual entity is interest in its own existence. It is concerned to secure immediacy of experience with that grade of depth and intensity that is appropriate for its status in the Universe. This self-interest is an emotional tone of self-valuation, and constitutes the innermost nature of every actual entity. It is, therefore, impossible to separate value from existence, for there is no existence without self-valuation. From the point of view of Philosophy, therefore, actuality may be regarded as the enjoyment or experience of value.

The Process of Concrescence, Not a Temporal Process

One final matter of interest and importance must be mentioned, namely: the doctrine that the process of concrescence of an actual entity is not a process which takes place in time. It is true that

[1] *Science of the Modern World*, p. 102.

in the self-creation of an actual entity, the "outcome" of the process has temporal extension, but Whitehead shows that the act of "becoming" is not itself a temporal advance, which can be divided into earlier and later acts. It will be remembered that the outcome of the genetic process is a unit of experience called the "concrete satisfaction." The "satisfaction" is only one aspect of an actual entity. It is the achievement in abstraction from the process of achieving. It is true that on attaining the concrete satisfaction, the subject of an actual entity perishes, but this does not mean that in considering the complete nature of an actual entity we can ignore the subject. An actual entity is a genetic process which consists of a presiding subject as well as the "outcome" of the concrescence. Consequently, in considering the full nature of an actual entity, we must on no account ignore the self-creating subject.

If we concentrate our attention exclusively on the achieved "satisfaction" we can certainly say that it is divisible into earlier and later prehensions, and therefore has temporal extension. But in so doing we are ignoring the subjective aspect of an actual entity, which cannot be treated in this way, for the subjective aim of an actual entity, which determines the form of each prehension, and which is the subject operating as *causa sui* is not divisible at all, and is therefore not extensive. Questions of earlier and later are therefore irrelevant in regard to the subject, though they are relevant to the concrete satisfaction. It follows that the process of concrescence is not a temporal process. Time, however—and space also—are clearly features of the "satisfaction", and we must therefore say that although the process of concrescence is not itself a temporal process, it nevertheless "begets" a quantum of time, and also a quantum of space. That is to say an actual entity considered from the point of view of its "satisfaction"—as a settled and determined achievement—is temporally and spatially characterized.

It is not an easy matter to think of a process of becoming as one transcending time. Whitehead goes into the whole question fully, and this is the substance of what he says on the matter.

There are two ways of dividing the concrete satisfaction of an actual entity into its component feelings, (1) "genetically" and (2) "co-ordinately." Genetic division is division of the concrescence into its various phases of growth, whereas co-ordinate division is the division of the concrete achievement. The genetic aspect of an actual entity is its progressive integration of other occasions, and eternal objects into a unity of experience as a synthesis of contrasts. This genetic advance from phase to phase is transcendent, both of time and space. It is a creative process which brings into being time and space, but is not itself temporal or spatial. Physical time and physical space make their appearance only when the "co-ordinate"

analysis of the concrete satisfaction is made. This means that the actual entity in its process of concrescence "begets" a quantum of time and a quantum of space, which can be regarded as characterizing the satisfaction. But the genetic process itself cannot be a temporal or spatial one, because each phase in the process presupposes the *whole* quantum which is to be actualized. Consequently we must not regard the concrescence of an actual entity as a succession of phases in physical time. If we ask, what is this quantum of space-time presupposed by the process of concrescence of an actual entity? Whitehead replies "it is the standpoint in the extensive continuum which is consonant with the subjective aim in its original derivation." Every actual entity must find its niche in the morphological scheme of extension which underlies the world, and which expresses the solidarity of all possible standpoints throughout the whole process of the world. The region of space-time presupposed in the concrescence of an actual entity is, then, its "niche" in the general scheme of extension.

It is only in regard to this "region" characterizing the "satisfaction" of an actual entity that division into earlier and later prehensions, and smaller spatial parts, is possible. What is called "co-ordinate" divisibility of the concrete satisfaction of an actual entity is merely the satisfaction viewed in its relationships to this divisible region. It is unquestionably possible to divide the region, but that is not to divide the actual entity regarded as an individual consisting of *process* as well as satisfaction. The subjective unity of the genetic aspect of an actual entity does not admit of division.

Thus we see that it is only the "physical" pole of an actual entity which is divisible. The concrescence itself—that which is called the "mental" pole—is an indivisible subject. Physical time then is a feature of the growth of actual entities, but not the growth itself. In the language of Whitehead it "expresses the reflection of genetic divisibility into co-ordinate divisibility."

Summary

I have tried to expound Whitehead's doctrine of Creativity and of actual entities. Nothing remains but to give a brief summary of what has been said in the foregoing notes.

Creativity is the ultimate activity and principle of novelty in the Universe.

The world is said to consist of "actual entities," not substances. An actual entity is also called an "actual occasion." It is essentially a genetic process, having two sides, (1) the process of "becoming," and (2) the outcome of the process named the "satisfaction." The satisfaction is the fully determined achievement abstracted from the

process. On attaining satisfaction the actual entity viewed as a self-creating subject loses its "final" causation, and as a *subject* perishes, but the "satisfaction" remains as a potential constituent for the emergence of a new actual entity. This is its "efficient" causation. The potentiality of the satisfaction for a new creation is called its "objective immortality": in this capacity it functions as an "object" for the self-creation of another actual entity. In virtue of the satisfaction being a settled fact, it conditions the transcendent creativity. The essence of an actual entity is its concrescence of other occasions, eternal objects and God. It synthesizes from a unique standpoint all the other entities in the Universe, and is, in fact, the Universe enjoying a specific mode of experience. An actual entity is an atomic unit. "Eternal objects" are forms of definiteness. God is the principle of concretion.

Analysis of an actual entity discloses it to consist of a plurality of "prehensions," also called "feelings." A feeling is the generic operation of passing from the publicity of objectified data presented for concrescence to subjective immediacy. In every prehension there is (*a*) a "subject" prehending, (*b*) a "datum" which is prehended, and (*c*) a "subjective form," expressing *how* the subject prehends its datum. That is to say a prehension reproduces the character of an actual entity. It is not, however, a full actual entity, but only a component. Feelings derived from actual occasions are termed "physical" and feelings derived from eternal objects are termed "conceptual." Every actual entity has a physical pole and a mental pole.

Value is inherent in everything that is actual.

The process of concrescence of an actual entity is not a temporal one, the subjective unity of the genetic process not being divisible into earlier and later phases of growth. The process, however, when completed begets a quantum of space-time, which characterizes the satisfaction, and which represents the niche in the extensive continuum occupied by the actual entity in question. If the satisfaction be considered in abstraction from the genetic process it is divisible when viewed in its relationships to this begotten region of space-time.

DISCUSSION

HEGEL'S DIALECTIC IN HISTORICAL PHILOSOPHY

The following is a reply from the Hegelian standpoint to Dr. Wisdom's paper in *Philosophy*, July 1940, entitled "Hegel's Dialectic in Historical Philosophy." He discusses Hegel's doctrine of the correlation between the logical order of the dominant categories of the Logic and the temporal order of the systems that form the history of philosophy. Dr. Wisdom (1) considers that, if we accept this doctrine, we must restrict a genuine philosophy to one which discusses a new truth (p. 243), the rediscovery of a truth not being considered as a contribution to philosophical knowledge; he objects that the temporal order in certain cases, e.g. with Heraclitus and Parmenides, does not correspond with the logical order, and that the Logic has no category corresponding to Greek systems preceding Parmenides or to Indian Philosophy (p. 266). (2) He urges that since, according to Hegel, the latest philosophy in time is the result of all the systems that have preceded it, and is the truest, the existence of post-Hegelian philosophy is logically impossible.

Dr. Wisdom's paper is mainly concerned with the difficulty of finding a rational necessity in accordance with Hegelian principles for post-Hegelian philosophy. He suggests that there was no pre-Hegelian counterpart to Hegel's Philosophies of Nature and of Spirit, and he thinks that while previous philosophical systems correspond to categories in the first two divisions of the Logic, Hegel's own system was the historical counterpart of the final categories of the Logic. Hence Dr. Wisdom concludes that in attempting Philosophies of Nature and Spirit Hegel violated his own doctrine that no philosophy oversteps its own time; these works should at best be regarded only as forecasts, as attempts to foresee the unforseeable, and hence Hegel's philosophy must be assessed at most by his Logic alone. In support of this, Dr. Wisdom suggests that there is a broad distinction between pre-Hegelian and post-Hegelian philosophy, since the former seeks principles of being, and the latter principles of constitution; principles of constitution come under Philosophy of Nature or of Spirit, and hence post-Hegelian philosophy would correspond to the last two members of the Hegelian triad of philosophy, while Hegel's contribution should be confined to the Logic.

While Dr. Wisdom's thesis is ingenious and Hegelian in Spirit, it may be doubted whether he does justice to Hegel or to modern philosophy. We may first consider the general question of the correlation between the history of philosophy and the course of the Logic. This correlation does rest on an identity, for thought which is dialectically unfolded in the Logic is also expressed piecemeal in the systems of philosophy; it is the driving force of dialectic which compels successive thinkers to advance on their predecessors; in this way Heraclitus transcends Parmenides, and Aristotle claims to transcend previous Greek philosophy. But identity with Hegel involves difference, and while the pure thought of the Logic is expressed in the history of philosophy, allowance must be made for the spatio-temporal medium of history; a philosophical system for Hegel is the most perfect realization of Reason, but it is also a phenomenon which takes place in Nature, and hence there will be a difference between Logic and history of philosophy; there is a correspondence between the chief philo-

sophical systems and a certain stage of the Logic and there is a general logical advance in the history of philosophy; but this advance is not continuous, and if we consider the difference between pure thought and nature in which history is placed, we will see that it could not be continuous; since philosophers are separated by time and space and surrounded by many contingent circumstances which are absent in the pure thought of the Logic, there will be retrogression and apparent repetition in the general advance of historical philosophy. In his History of philosophy Hegel does not attempt to apply in detail the doctrine of correlation, and in the passage in which the doctrine is stated (*Encycl.* § 13) he says that "to the historian of philosophy it belongs to point out how far the gradual evolution of his theme coincides with or swerves from the dialectical unfolding of the Logical Idea." Indeed, a conspicuous advance such as that made by Heraclitus or Parmenides is rare in the history of philosophy, and it is rare also for a particular philosopher to seize on a category in such a comprehensive way as Spinoza did with substance; a philosopher often swerves from or distorts a category, dwelling on unessential details or failing to grasp the essential factors through which an advance in thought should be made; thus Leucippus' atoms and void are a confused expression of the category of being-for-self, and Schelling's Absolute is an abstraction which swerves from Hegel's concrete Idea. The repetition which we may expect on Hegelian principles in history of philosophy is an instance of the repetition of Nature as compared with the union of unity and essential difference in pure thought; as in the world of Nature we have a multiplicity of species and genera with hybrids which are hard to classify, so in the historical systems we have dividing lines slurred over and a variety which appears to add nothing positive to the universal of thought; this is to be expected, for Nature is the expression of Reason in which particularity and multiplicity are emphasized.

It is clear, then, that the Hegelian will not press correlation between logical and historical in support of Dr. Wisdom's conclusions. It is, perhaps, however, worth pointing out in answer to Dr. Wisdom that correlation does in fact hold between Parmenides and Heraclitus on the one hand, and the categories of being and becoming on the other; although Heraclitus was older than Parmenides, he was contemporary with him and he was aware of and rejected the Eleatic principle of pure being; this is shown by Parmenides' reference to "the foolish crowds for whom to be and not to be are the same though distinct and for whom the path of everything turns back on itself." Parmenides is here clearly speaking of Heraclitus who explicitly united being and not-being in becoming, thus transcending Parmenides. Further, it may be urged that the Ionic philosophers who identify the Absolute with particular material determinations or an indeterminate substrate stand at the portals of philosophy, preparing the way for the first pure thought and may be rightly placed at the beginning of the history of philosophy. With regard to Indian philosophy, this, as mainly religious, lacks the form of necessity and reasoned argument which philosophy strictly requires (*Encycl.* § 2), but in spite of this Hegel is able to find a logical correlate for it in the category of Nothing (*Encycl.* § 87).

We must, accordingly, consider Dr. Wisdom's main point that since the latest philosophy in time is the result of all the systems that have preceded it and is the truest, then the existence of post-Hegelian philosophy is logically impossible (p. 252).

Dr. Wisdom appears to dispute this proposition on two grounds: (*a*) He appeals to Hegel's own doctrine that no philosopher oversteps his time as showing that Hegelianism cannot be the final philosophy; (*b*) post-Hegelian philosophy does exist; while it is distinct from Hegelian and properly con-

cerned with Nature or Mind, Hegel's philosophy according to Dr. Wisdom must be confined to his Logic.

(*a*) Dr Wisdom (p. 246) correctly explains Hegel's remark that no philosophy ever oversteps its time, for "at any given time a philosopher would not in general have a complete comprehension of the truth he was contributing, for to do so would be to recognize its aspect of falsity and to transcend his own discovery to the next." He points out that Hegel himself was in this position of overstepping his own time, as he believed himself to be the discoverer of Absolute Truth.

Is, then, Hegel an exception to the rule that no philosopher oversteps his time, or is Hegel hoist with his own petard, as Dr. Wisdom thinks? If we consider the rule with the explanation just given of it, we will see that it means that no philosopher can overstep his time, if he puts forward some finite principle as ultimate; for, so far as he regards it as ultimate, he cannot transcend it. Hegel's point was that previous philosophers were in this position, since their metaphysic correlated with some stage of the Logic or particular category below the Absolute Idea; hence the pre-Hegelian could not transcend his time, for to see a limit is to be beyond it. On the other hand, the rule does not apply to Hegel, for his principle was no particular finite category, but the Idea or Reason itself which overcomes all opposition and reconciles it with itself.

(*b*) Dr. Wisdom proceeds to apply the rule that no philosophy transcends its time by (i) limiting Hegel to his Logic, and (ii) assigning to post-Hegelian philosophy the spheres of philosophies of Nature and Mind. The argument seems convincing in neither part.

(i) It is hard to see why Hegel's contribution to philosophy should be confined to the Logic; if it is so limited, then, of course, he has no right to the other two members of the triad of philosophy. Against such a mutilation of Hegelianism a protest must be made, for Hegel's philosophy has a right to be judged as a whole. The Logic, while complete in itself as the dialectic of the Idea as it is in itself or of thought in its universality, is still incomplete without philosophy of Nature in which the Idea goes out of itself and takes on the form of unreason in space and time and returns to itself in Philosophy of Mind; in Absolute Mind the Idea has come to its home in the mind of the philosopher who thinks it. In this way the system of pure thought which constitutes the Absolute Idea in the Logic shows itself to be the foundation of both nature and mind, so that no further progress is possible or necessary. Dr. Wisdom does not seem to question the deduction of philosophy of Nature from Logic, and it may be sufficient to note that Logic Nature and Mind are related as Universal, Particular and Singular; if we accept the concrete universal in the subjective Logic (*Encycl.* § 163), it is hard to refuse the transition from thought in its universality in Logic to Philosophy of Nature where thought was taken on particularity and Philosophy of Mind where thought is realized in the singular thinking subject. Hence for the Hegelian Hegel's principle of the Idea or Thought or Reason is the last word in philosophy, for thought cannot go beyond the Idea, and the Idea manifests itself both in Nature and in Mind; there is no question now of transcending some particular principle of thought, for Hegel's philosophy is absolute idealism. The Hegelian would similarly reject any attempt to confine Hegel to the Logic or its final categories by an appeal to the doctrine of the correlation of philosophical systems with some stage of the Logic; since the Idea develops itself throughout the Logic and Nature and Mind are legitimate domains of the Idea, Logic, Philosophies of Nature and of Mind constitute the unbroken circle of Hegel's metaphysic.

(ii) What, then, are we to say of post-Hegelian philosophy? Dr. Wisdom would hand over to it Philosophy of Nature and of Mind, having destroyed Hegel's works of these titles. It is doubtless true, as Dr. Wisdom points out, that the latter are inferior to Hegel's Logic, and it is also true that post-Hegelian philosophers have generally been mainly interested in principles of the constitution of Nature or of Mind. It does not, however, follow that post-Hegelians should be restricted to Philosophy of Nature or of Mind. It should be noted that Hegel correlates philosophical systems with a certain stage in the Logic and not with Philosophy of Nature or Mind; this is because for Hegel philosophy is the science of the Absolute which is the universal basis of everything; hence, if post-Hegelian metaphysics merely describes the constitution of the actual and the different forms of nature and mind Hegel makes no provision for it in Philosophy. The Hegelian, accordingly, will regard post-Hegelian philosophy as concerned with what is thought as ultimate principle of being and will correlate it with some stage of the Logic, though its chief concern may be to deduce Nature or Mind from this principle and to display the constitution of Nature or Mind. We may, for example, see in Bergson the identification of the Absolute with a Universal Life and we will correlate this with the category of Life in the last part of the Logic. Again, Bradley's Absolute, the Universal Experience in which thought, will, and feeling are harmoniously merged together may be indifferently called subject or object and is not either, and it shows a swerving from Hegel's Absolute Idea. Bradley's form of idealism tends to converge with the monism which holds that mind and matter are composed of the same stuff which is neutral, i.e. neither mind nor matter. This may, perhaps, also be said of Alexander's ultimate being which shows itself to be not merely space-time but to involve Mind, Spiritual Values, and Deity.

While the Hegelian will urge that modern philosophy must be connected with the Absolute, he may well agree with Dr. Wisdom, that its main logical justification will lie in the contribution which it may make to the Philosophies of Nature and Mind; we have already admitted that these members of Hegel's *Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences* are inferior to the Logic, and they do require revision. We may point out that Hegel makes provision for the continuance of his philosophy in Absolute Mind, where the philosopher retraces the course of the Logic and proceeds into Philosophy of Nature and of Mind; the Hegelian will eternally repeat the dialectic of the Logic, and he will eternally see the return of Reason to itself from its irrational stages in Nature till it reaches Absolute Mind. The dialectic of the Logic and the general relation of Logic Nature, and Mind, as *a priori*, will remain the same for all generations of Hegelians; but the various forms of Nature and Mind cannot be regarded as wholly *a priori*, and Philosophy of Nature and of Mind will in part reflect the empirical sciences of the time. We may quote Hegel's view of the debt of Philosophy to the Sciences (*Encycl.* § 12): "the empirical sciences are able to meet philosophy with materials prepared for it in the shape of general uniformities, i.e. laws and classifications of the phenomena; the reception into philosophy of these scientific materials, now that thought has removed their immediacy and made them cease to be mere data, forms at the same time a development of thought out of itself. Philosophy, then, owes its development to the empirical sciences; in return it gives their contents what is so vital to them, the freedom of thought, gives them in short an *a priori* character; these contents are now warranted necessary." What Hegel states here of the relation of philosophy to the empirical sciences does not seem to apply to the Logic, except so far as the progress of science may have originally suggested to philosophy concepts of pure thought, such as

quantity, matter and form, substance, reciprocity; but it is clear that in Philosophy of Nature and of Mind, philosophy cannot complete its task till the sciences have done their work, though the general scheme of these philosophies will still repeat on a different level the course of the dialectic in the Logic from objectivity to Absolute Idea. As Hegel says (*Philosophy of Right*, Preface): "Philosophy, as the thought of the world, does not appear until reality has completed its formative process and made itself ready. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, one form of life has become old, and by means of grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but only known. The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering."

We suggest, accordingly, that the Hegelian will regard the Logic and Hegel's general scheme of Logic, Nature, and Mind, as eternally true, while recognizing that the two latter members of the Absolute triad must be rewritten from time to time by reference to the science of the day. The owl of Minerva must take its flight again, and a new edition of the *Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences* must be written which will incorporate valuable material from present-day science and the speculations of modern philosophy. The common charge, endorsed by Dr. Wisdom, that Hegel's Philosophy is out of touch with reality, will then no longer be a reproach, and it will eternally renew its claim to the title of the Universal Philosophy.

F. LA T. GODFREY.

ART WITHOUT FORM?

IF the subject is of sufficient interest I should like to consider some of the questions raised by Miss Wodehouse, in the April number, about my paper in January.

I quite accept her introductory summary and illustration of my suggestion. As to her questions: (1) Could an ideographic symbolism remain arbitrary and conventional? Would not its signs acquire all the rich associations of meaning our words have? Would not its accidence and syntax correspond with objective relations in a way that would soon seem natural? I agree that the ideograms would have a power of suggesting the emotions usually accompanying the thing signified; e.g. the sign for death would suggest the emotion of fear or sorrow. My point is that the resultant beauty would consist entirely in the nature of what was signified *or* suggested and not (as most aesthetic theories have held) in any fusion of the sensible sign with what it signified or suggested.

(2) Why should not the sensible nature of the ideogram fuse with what is signified as, in most great poetry, the heard or imagined vocal sounds do? Is my argument, that the beauty of print does not fuse in this way with poetry, fair, since type is variable and acquires no fixed association? This I think is really the same question as (1) and would have to be answered in the same way. My contention was that symbols such as 3, ?, " ", though constant, have not, however neat their calligraphy, the kind of sensuous beauty vocal sounds have, which is capable of such fusion. Though I attach no meaning to them, the sound ailinon seems to me to have more of this fusible beauty than brekekekex has, but I do not find this difference among symbols. Now, however, I am not so sure of this answer. I had perhaps not allowed enough for the fact that since by supposition my ideographers would be deaf or

dumb, the ideograms would, apart from gesture, be their only means of communication or expression; would, in fact, be their "language," as "natural" to them as our speech is to us, and therefore perhaps "naturally" fusible. They would think in ideograms. So perhaps ideograms of which they did not know the meaning would (by some analogy with those whose meanings they know) have the same kind of fusible aesthetic quality as ailinon. If we were further to suppose them blind, and therefore insensible to gesture and bound to read their ideograms by touch, conjecture of their experience fails.

(3) This criticism I do not follow. It was precisely my contention that in appreciating poetry, whether read or heard, the imagined or actual sounds *do* fuse with the meaning.

(4) I agree that I carelessly once used the word "form" both for Hegel's *Vorstellung einer Sache* and for his *Poetische Ansdruck*. In conformity with my title and the answer I have just given to (1) I should have kept it to the latter. The former would be Bradley's "substance."

E. F. Carritt.

(*The discussion on this topic is closed.*)

NEW BOOKS

The Analysis of Knowledge. By LEDGER WOOD. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1940. Pp. 263. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

This book is a comprehensive account of the chief problems of epistemology. Whether the reader agrees with it or not, he must admit that it is a very able and interesting work, on the whole clearly written and agreeable to read for any person interested in these rather academic problems of philosophy. I have no hesitation in recommending it cordially to students of philosophy.

In spirit, if not in style, the book is akin to the work of the positivists except that it does not lay the great stress on linguistic questions which the members of the latter school usually do. Perhaps one might not altogether inadequately express the fundamental epistemological view put forward by the formula:—knowledge = sensory content (sense-data or images) + successful outward reference (the wording is mine, not the author's). This outward reference is called "intent" and he agrees with many other writers in regarding it as the essential feature of all states we can term mental. The difficulty that this is, according to him at least, not present in pleasure and pain is avoided by regarding pleasure and pain as qualities of sensations, emotions, etc., and not primary ingredients of consciousness (p. 15). But he will not admit a soul distinct from the experiential process, and in fact finds such a view meaningless (p. 250). Further he suggests that "intent" may prove to be just the "inner sense of motor discharge" (p. 16). But there is surely a confusion here; since it is at least possible that everything mental in us has some bodily correlate, intent might be the correlate of certain incipient movements, but, whatever its physical correlate is, this tells us nothing as to its quality as an experience, and it is quite clear to introspection that intent is qualitatively different from any sensation of movement just as it is quite clear that a sound is different from any smell. The author also objects to the splitting up of consciousness into act and content (p. 20), but his assertion on the next page that "they are distinguishable but inseparable aspects of the one conscious process" is perhaps no more than most upholders of the distinction wish to maintain. However for him the act certainly tends to be swallowed up in the content, and it is to the latter that the intentional reference is attributed.

The nature of the outward reference is not specified any too clearly. The chief thing said about it by way of description is that it is the giving of a meaning to something by making it stand for something else. The author thinks that his "referential" view of knowledge has the merits of making clear the relation between sense-content and physical object in perception which has hitherto never been clarified, explaining intelligibly how we can cognize the past in memory and removing the difficulties relating to the possibility of thinking of non-existent objects, for we can clearly direct our intentions to what does not exist. (But is there not a vicious circle here? For the use of sense-content to stand for a non-existent object presupposes and does not explain our ability to think of the latter? Nor is it at all clear how he would distinguish error, imagination and useful fiction.) The view naturally fits in well with a representative theory of perception, but he refuses to commit

himself on the general question of physical objects, and he insists that what has often been called the sense-datum is a mere abstraction and declines to treat it as a kind of additional thing. Memory he regards as having the same epistemological structure as perception, the image in the one functioning as does the sense-datum in the other. This seems to me a mistake: for (1) in perception we only arrive at our belief that the physical object perceived has a certain character through cognizing the sense-content which it produces in us, while in memory on the other hand the image seems to be formed in accordance with a knowledge of the object not derived from the image; (2) we are clearly aware of the memory-image and the fact remembered as distinct, while the corresponding distinction between sense-datum and material object is not based on immediate experience but on theory; (3) while we cannot perceive without sense-data we can remember either without images or at any rate with images which are only verbal and therefore not at all like the object remembered. The very general proposition that there is in both cases sense-content and "intent" referring it to something beyond itself I am prepared to admit, but it may be doubted whether this is saying very much. A referential theory of knowledge would not fit introspection if the latter is strictly knowledge of the very thing which knows, but the author maintains that all introspection is really memory. He concludes paradoxically that it is "no more immediate, intuitive or infallible than is any other form of cognition" (p. 102). He, however, distinguishes from introspection "*inspection*," which apprehends sense content as such without considering either its reference to the external world or its place in the stream of consciousness, but even this though immediate is not infallible. He does not explain how his referential theory of knowledge can be applied to inspection, yet if it cannot be applied his attempt "to discern a single structural pattern underlying every type of cognitive situation" (p. 5) breaks down.

With perception, memory, introspection and inspection we have exhausted "primary cognition." Turning to non-primary cognition, the author deals first with the knowledge of other minds. This he bases mainly on analogy but also on empathy. To the objection that an argument from analogy based on a single instance, myself, is weak he replies that it is really based on a great number of instances, namely, all my different observed psychoses and their bodily concomitants (p. 120). The author's theory of conceptual knowledge is a sustained attempt to dispense with the objective universal whether *ante rem* or *in re*. "The concept is *not* objective in the sense of having a universal as its literal object. It *is*, however, objective in so far as it means or intends a multiplicity of particulars, qualitatively or structurally similar. If this definition of objectivity be adopted, then evidently all concepts are objective, in so far as they intend or point to objects beyond themselves—even though these objects are sometimes suppositious and hypothetical" (p. 143). A class is only a unity for him in the sense that the mind chooses to refer to all its members together, but this unity of reference is normally based on a relation of observed phenomenal qualitative similarity, which is in its turn based on a "quantitative or structural identity between the objects" (p. 133). What the difference is between the admission of this structural identity and the admission of objective universals, which he expressly refuses to make, is not in the least clear to me. You and I do not have the same concept literally; where they are what we call identical, the identity is an identity of reference (p. 135). A special chapter is devoted to "categories," i.e. the most general concepts, which he regards as essentially pragmatic, not capable of being strictly true or false but only more or less adequate to the content of experience, which suggests them but does not determine any one single set of categories which

must be used (pp. 150–2). Propositions asserting negation, possibility and impossibility are asserted to be propositions about propositions, but *what* a proposition is the author unfortunately does not explain. He contends that that the similarity on which concepts of relation depend is a similarity not between two atomic relations but between two relational situations, the analysis of which into relations and terms is due to a linguistic fallacy that lies at the basis of the controversy between the advocates of external and internal relations (p. 171).

His theory of *a priori* knowledge is postulational. His account of this and criticism of other theories is interesting, especially his discussion of self-refuting propositions (pp. 193–203), but is open to my mind to the following very serious criticisms (*a*) He thinks that the self-evidence theory finds the criterion of truth in some empirical quality of our ideas, while it is really a claim directly to intuit something non-empirical, at least the relation of entailment. (*b*) He omits to consider the possibility, which is surely the one envisaged by the holders of the coherence theory, that, while no proposition is self-refuting in itself, the fundamental *a priori* propositions can be justified as the presuppositions of all other knowledge, which is a legitimate argument since in that case the only alternative to admitting their truth is the factually if not logically, impossible one of absolute scepticism. I think that this was also at the botton of Kant's transcendental method, since he means by "experience" empirical knowledge. (*c*) Further the postulational theory would at the most not explain all *a priori* knowledge, for even if it explains the ultimate premisses and presuppositions of a system it could not explain how we can deduce anything from them. Even if the ultimate postulates are arbitrary it cannot be a question of arbitrary choice whether, granting these postulates, p follows or not—p. If it were, anything could be deduced from anything. The postulational theory is extended by the author to ethics in a separate chapter.

The last chapter of the book discusses very briefly the theory of truth and gives the criteria for determining whether a proposition is meaningful. The discovery that internal consistency ca n belong to two different and even mutually inconsistent formal systems is regarded as sufficient by itself to refute the coherence theory, and the theory that truth or its criterion is an intrinsic property of certain propositions is rejected on the same ground as the self-evidence theory of *a priori* propositions. A form of the correspondence theory is accepted (pp. 239–41), not only as a definition but as a criterion of truth, though the two are not clearly distinguished. The recognition of correspondence is usually effected, it is held, by means of a feeling of familiarity. In the last pages of the book the author puts forward criteria of meaningfulness with the intention of widening those of the positivist. His fundamental point seems to be that "a concept in order to possess empirical meaning need not actually be exemplified in experience . . ., but it must be resolvable into concepts and operations which are exemplified or exemplifiable" (p. 244), but he slides back into positivism without excuse when he adds as a necessary condition of meaningfulness that "the total propositional meaning conveyed by the complex of concepts must be such that the verification or falsification is possible" (p. 246).

A. C. Ewing.

The Real and the Negative. By B. K. Mallik. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1940. Pp. 539. Price 21s.)

Mr. Mallik's book claims to expound a new "doctrine of categories" and to apply it to the problems of religious experience and social life. Constructive metaphysics are so little in fashion that he is bound to meet much initial prejudice and his work would have to be very clear and very convincing indeed to overcome it.

The first six chapters show how in the course of history philosophers have been led to the present sceptical *impasse.* The rest of Part I claims to build up, by a purely logical argument resting on a new analysis of the Law of Contradiction, a complete philosophical system, in which all the old oppositions (mind and matter, particular and universal, static and dynamic, etc.) are explained and overcome. Part II applies the conclusions of Part I to a resolution of the problems of religious experience and social organization.

Summary of the argument would be impossible, but the main outline of its logical basis may be indicated as follows: "A cannot be A and not-A." A and not-A oppose each other and A is real. But to oppose each other A and not-A must exist, in some sense of "exist" other than "being real." So A and not-A are *possible.* So we have two worlds, existence (in which A occurs) and possibility (in which A and not-A both occur). The next stage is to examine the structure of the world of possibility. A and not-A can oppose each other only if they co-exist simultaneously. Moreover, they must be related to each other, and the only possible relations between contraries are conflict and harmony. Since conflict and harmony cannot simultaneously characterize the relations between contraries, harmony and conflict must be alternating phases in a temporal succession. Both require further analysis. Harmony must mean joint contribution to a common end and conflict the pursuit of incompatible ends or a common end in incompatible ways. Besides being in mutual relation A and not-A must each be differentiated into a plurality of A's and a plurality of not-A's. These in their turn are successively in harmony and in conflict, both internally and as groups. The result for religion is that God and Satan are reinstated as equal and mutually necessary, that they are differentiated into many Gods and many Satans, that each particular embodiment of God lives on terms of alternating conflict and harmony with an embodiment of Satan. The result for social ethics is that each self must give up the attempt, to achieve contrary ends either internally or externally and live a life of ascetic self-abnegation of all objects of desire whose attainment would bring conflict.

The difficulties in the argument may be divided into three sets, those arising internally in the logic of the argument, those arising externally from the logical presuppositions on which the argument rests, and those arising from the style of presentation. A brief review can only cite one or two points, under each head, which have caused difficulty to the reviewer.

Under the first head, Mr. Mallik seems open to at least three main lines of criticism. His analysis of the law of contradiction never makes clear what he means by "not-A." He says this is the contrary and not the contradictory. But much of the time he speaks of "the Negative" as "threatening" and "opposing" the positive. What is the negative of "dog"? Sometimes it seems to be a force essentially opposed to dog, an "anti-dog." Sometimes (on page 202, for example) it is "other-than-dog," for instance, "horse" or "camel." The difficulty is that the contradictory is essentially indeterminate, whereas the contrary is essentially positive and not negative. The second difficulty is the occurrence, at various stages, of dogmas which seem to spring *ex nihilo*

and certainly not from his analysis of the Principle of Contradiction (for example, that harmony and conflict must alternate in a temporal succession, that opposites must pursue a common end or that positive and negative must both be differentiated into similars). The third difficulty is that the whole *logical* analysis is an analysis of the structure of the *possible*. Yet, with religion and ethics, there is a transition to the actual, which is therefore illegitimate. It would seem to follow from Mr. Mallik's argument that, since harmony and conflict are due to the mutual relations of A and not-A and since A and not-A can never both be *actual* (but only both possible) neither harmony nor conflict, God nor Satan, war nor peace, can ever be actual.

The second set of difficulties arise over the fundamental presuppositions of Mr. Mallik's logic. It is a logic of substance and attributes. Though he knows that it is difficult to say that existence is a predicate, his whole system rests on the assumption that it is. His "two worlds," the treatment of statements of possibility as if they were about a "universe of possibility," a world with inhabitants and a "structure," all presuppose a type of analysis of modal sentences which most philosophers would say is no longer tenable and which was first exposed by Kant.

The third problem is that of Mr. Mallik's style, which is very metaphorical and obscure. It is also very repetitious, yet in such a way that the reader is never sure whether the same point is being made in another way or whether something extra has slipped in. With the metaphors and obscurities also the reader feels in almost every sentence that a clear analysis of the sentence might alter its apparent contribution to the argument.

The whole work challenges comparison with Hegel and McTaggart, as no other authors have claimed to do what Mr. Mallik has tried to achieve. Both of them would no doubt think they had failed if the world did not accept as conclusive the logic of their arguments. Yet the most violent non-Hegelian would allow that Hegel's incidental observations on particular problems shed frequent illumination both on the problems themselves and also on Hegel's own quasi-religious attitude to the universe. Professor Broad has also shown us that one who completely rejects McTaggart's conclusions can still find much philosophic interest in clearing up and criticizing the processes of his dialectic. Much of this is true of Mr. Mallik. The revelation of his ethico-religious attitude and his incidental observations are interesting on their own account, and if assumptions or obscurities do invalidate or weaken his arguments they are philosophic assumptions and obscurities and their working out should give any philosopher, who is not too completely out of sympathy with Mr. Mallik's aims and methods, much real philosophic exercise.

J. D. Mabbott.

Hume's Theory of the External World. By H. H. Price. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Humphrey Milford. 1940. Pp. 231. Price 15s. net.)

Professor Price's volume, with its plea that Hume, even though he may be held to have made mistakes, should be treated with that charity readily meted out to others like Kant (and, may it be added, Plato, Aristotle, and several more?), is a notable expression of that change which has recently been occurring in the interpretation of Hume—a change away from the view that the latter was mainly concerned with causality, or that he was so sceptical and destructive as to deserve slight consideration, or at most only a refutation, or that his empiricism showed its bankruptcy as a philosophical method. Although recognizing that some of Hume's most important dis-

cussions are bound up with the special topic which he has selected, Professor Price confines himself practically to one chapter of Hume's *Treatise*, that labelled "On Scepticism with regard to the Senses" in the fourth part of Book One; he draws attention to the instructiveness of this chapter; and undertakes the task of showing, even though Hume himself for certain reasons was driven to a sceptical conclusion, how the main ideas could on empirical lines be developed into a comparatively consistent doctrine when once allowance has been made for the limitations under which Hume did his pioneering work. That Professor Price should attempt the task is not altogether surprising in view of certain detectable affinities between Hume's doctrine at this point and his own earlier work, *Perception*; and it may be said at once that the result is interesting and profitable to the philosophical student.

After some preliminary but important remarks about certain features of Hume's general theory, Professor Price comes to a consideration of the assertion that "we may well ask, *what causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?* But 'tis in vain to ask *whether there be body or not?* That is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings. The subject then of our present inquiry is concerning the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of body." Hume is interpreted as raising here an important issue in regard to what is now called philosophical analysis, and is criticized for conceiving the problem too much in psychological terms. The question then takes the form: what characteristics of sensory experience lead to or generate the belief in an external world? In his answer Hume drew attention to the *interruptedness* of that sensory experience, the importance of this being stressed by Professor Price, for philosophers before and since have tended to neglect it; the other characteristics which Hume recognized were *constancy* and *coherency*, and these formed a basis for an operation of the mind, called by Hume "feigning" and by Professor Price "imaginative supplementation," by which the gaps in sensory experience are bridged or interrupted sensory series are filled in and given completeness. These various characteristics require much elucidation in order that the obscurities and defects of Hume's exposition may be met; having done this, Professor Price proceeds to formulate the alternative theories possible on Hume's foundations; they are two in number, (1) the *As-if* theory, (2) the *Expressive* theory. It is the former which is discussed at greatest length, yet Professor Price thinks that Hume would have preferred the second. It is also not the least interesting and valuable feature of the discussion that it elucidates very effectively the relation of such Humean theories to different philosophies that have been or are held. The *As-if* theory argues that actual sense-impressions are *as-if* such and such groups of unsensed sensibilia existed; the existence of the latter are accepted. The *Expressive* theory interprets material-object sentences as not being statements at all, but as giving expression to certain mental processes, namely activities of the imagination such as extrapolation and synthesis, when confronted with gaps in sensory experience; or as being rules for supplementing and co-ordinating sense-data and as being not true or false, this question being vain. The meaning and nature of co-ordination have to be explicated. But sense-data, in order to be co-ordinated, must first be turned into *sensibilia*. Professor Price tries to remove the difficulty in holding that every actual sense-datum is also a sensibile; and then by the conception of sensibilia as forming systems of families of sensibilia and with the help of the Principle of Selectivity to explain how co-ordination is effected, sense-data can be regarded as fragmentary and occasional slices or selections of continuing and perspectivally ordered series of sensibilia, and the co-ordinative scheme can be applied to sense-data as they occur.

A few remarks, general and somewhat short and dogmatic it is to be feared, may be added. Hume refers to the "vulgar" belief, but his point seems to be, not that he is going to justify that belief, as some philosophers to-day would hold the task of philosophy to be, but simply that any philosophical theory of an external world must accommodate itself to the fact that the vulgar have this belief and have not formed it by any of the arguments or even notions propounded by philosophers. Now, according to Hume in Book Three of the *Treatise*, section seven, "the operation of the mind which forms the belief of any matter of fact seems hitherto to have been one of the greatest mysteries of philosophy." It seems therefore that Hume is concerned with *believing*. Professor Price would make his problem much more logical than it probably is. The assertion accordingly with which Hume starts seems capable of a simple straightforward interpretation. The question whether there be body or not has presuppositions which on Hume's principles and even on any philosophy render it incapable of being answered; the only question to be raised and capable of discussion is one about our *believing* that bodies exist; for the former question suggests the possibility of getting beyond or outside the range of belief and the operations of the human mind. Hume's discussion is admittedly obscure; and there may always be a reservation as to Hume's purpose. Nevertheless Hume's treatment of the problem, as well as the conceiving of the problem, are influenced by assumptions about the "fleeting" and "internal" nature of sensa. Professor Price shows that Hume need not have accepted the subjectivity or organically conditioned character of sensa; he does not show convincingly in what sense, if any, they need be accepted as "fleeting" or what makes a sensum one and distinct. Hence arises the difficulty about sensibilia which Professor Price requires, but which Hume could not and would not admit—a fact which determines the trend of his argument and conclusion. One may wonder whether Hume was wrong or how much of Hume Professor Price has surrendered, and how the problem is to be conceived if sensa are not initially regarded as internal (nor as external) nor as fleeting.

B. M. Laing.

The Philosophy of George Santayana. Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp. Vol. II in "The Library of Living Philosophers." (Evanston and Chicago. North Western University. 1940. Pp. xvi + 698. Price $4.00.)

Dr. F. C. S. Schiller once complained of "the curious etiquette which apparently taboos the asking of questions about a philosopher's meaning while he is alive." This series is designed to break through this taboo with the collaboration of the philosophers concerned. The volume opens with a "General Confession," by Professor Santayana of the main considerations which have led him to his philosophical position. Then follows a series of essays of varying degrees of criticism and appreciation, and finally some 100 pages in which Santayana answers his critics in an *Apologia pro Mente Sua*. Amongst them, these essays thrash out some of the problems concerning Santayana's very elusive combination of materialism with a kind of Platonic realism. Some are slightly tedious; and many of them, being written from the presuppositions of a pragmatic type of thought which is alien to Santayana, do not seem to get close enough to what he is saying really to come to grips with him. Perhaps the most original is the essay by Mr. Charles Hartshorne in which a careful criticism of Santayana's Realm of Essence leads to the development of a very interesting view of the metaphysical problem of the

relation of possibility to actuality. But the reader's treat comes with Mr. Bertrand Russell's essay—a brilliant and acute piece of criticism.

To attempt to comment on any of the questions raised by these critics would demand yet another essay on Mr. Santayana—a task for which this reviewer claims no special competence, even did war-time exigencies of space for reviews admit of it. But the reading of these essays has sent me back to my notes and memories of Santayana's philosophical books, to *The Last Puritan*, and to his *Egotism in German Philosophy* (which has recently appeared in a new edition), and served to reinforce the impression I formerly gained. This is of a somewhat irresponsible egotism in Santayana's own treatment of types of mind with which he is temperamentally unsympathetic. I find that Mr. Santayana rather disarmingly goes some of the way towards acknowledging this in his *Apologia* (p. 543): "I plead guilty to having treated Plato (and all other philosophers) somewhat cavalierly, not at all from disrespect or quarrelsomeness or lack of delight in their speculations . . . but because I have studied very little except for pleasure, and have made my authors a quarry or touchstone for my own thoughts." But not only in his treatment of Plato, but also still more of the American Puritans, and Kant and the German Idealists, we find an exaggeration of half-truths which is bad enough in the case of national propaganda, but is surely unworthy of a thinker like Mr. Santayana.

My own feeling is that the epitome of Santayana's work was given in a letter not quoted in the present volume, in which William James, writing in 1900 to Professor Palmer of Harvard, expressed his "admiring antipathy."[1]

"It is refreshing to see such a representative of moribund Latinity rise up and administer such reproof to us barbarians in the hour of our triumph. . . . Give me Walt Whitman and Browning ten times over, much as the perverse ugliness of the latter at times irritates me, and much as I have enjoyed Santayana's attack. The barbarians are in the line of mental growth, and those who do insist that the ideal and the real are dynamically continuous are those by whom the world is to be saved. But I am nevertheless delighted that the other view, always existing in the world, should at last have found so splendidly impertinent an expression amongst ourselves."

DOROTHY M. EMMET.

Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi. Auspiciis Academiae Britannicae Adiuvantibus Instituto Warburgiano Londinensi Unitisque [*sic*] Academiis. Edidit RAYMUNDUS KLIBANSKY.

Plato Latinus. Edidit RAYMUNDUS KLIBANSKY. Volumen I. *Meno*. Interprete HENRICO ARISTIPPO. Edidit VICTOR KORDEUTER. Recognovit et Praefatione Instruxit CARLOTTA LABOWSKY. (In Aedibus Instituti Warburgiani Londonii. MCMXL. Pp. xxii + 92. Price 12s.)

With this attractive quarto, elegantly and accurately printed at Bruges, the *Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi*, which will be indispensable to all students of mediæval Platonism, makes its bow to the learned world. Its contents may be stated in the words of the relative folder: "This first edition of the mediæval translation of Plato's *Meno* is provided with a *Preface* which gives an outline of the life and cultural background of the translator . . . and sketches the method used by him in his translation. It also contains a discussion of the various MSS. and their relations. The *Text* is accompanied by a Latin as well as a Greek apparatus which aims at determining the place

[1] *The Thought and Character of William James*, vol. ii, p. 319.

of the Latin version within the Greek MSS. tradition. An *Appendix* contains two unedited mediæval *Summaria* of the *Meno*. The full Greek-Latin and Latin-Greek index, the *first complete index* to this dialogue, throws light on the vocabulary of the mediæval translator and on the philosophical terminology of the twelfth century."

Five MSS. of Aristippus' translation—barbarous with a barbarity which makes some of the thirteenth-century translators look like stylists—have been found and used. The best is Oxon. C.C.C. 243, written in A.D. 1423. The other four all go back to a doctored hyparchetype, but are not wholly without value for determining the text. Dr. Kordeuter has often resorted to conjectural emendation and almost always, as it seems to me, with success.[1] In one matter, however, a practice has been adopted that many will regret: "Quamquam lacunarum, quae in textu Latino inveniuntur, non nullas iam in Aristippi exemplari Graeco fuisse verisimile est, tamen eas e Graeco supplemus eis locis, quibus sententia intelligi non possit, nisi lectori hoc modo succurratur" (p. xix f.). Thus at 88 b 2, where *ἐπιστήμη*, following *μὴ*, was obviously missing in Aristippus' Greek MS. (or, less probably,[2] eluded his eye), Dr. Kordeuter writes "haud <scientia>" in the text. If the modern reader has to be helped in this way, surely brackets of another kind might have been used.

For a statement of the principles followed in regard to the orthography of the Latin text and the method of the relative apparatus criticus the reader is politely but exasperatingly referred to the prefaces in Dr. Klibansky's editions of the *Opera Omnia* of Nicholas of Cusa and the *Opera Latina* of Eckhart. The punctuation is on German lines: a peculiarly distressing example of the comma thrust in as a wedge between a defining relative and its antecedent will be found at p. 31, 5.

I have been able to make a partial comparison of Dr. Kordeuter's collations of the Latin MSS. with a careful transcript of O and collation of L and C made a good many years ago by my friend and former pupil, Rev. Wm. C. Bigwood, B.D., Keith, which he has kindly lent me. The comparison shows general agreement between the collators, but also divergences.

The provision of the short Greek apparatus is a kind deed for which classical scholars will be grateful. It seems, however, to have been put together rather hastily. I have noted several misreports of Burnet's statements, and Croiset's corrections of Burnet's (i.e. Král's) reports of the readings of W have been ignored. However, it is made plain that Aristippus' Greek MS. was different from any MS. hitherto collated, while showing some affinity with Bekker's *Σ* and *Y* (i.e. Y). It appears to have had two readings conjectured by modern scholars—Buttmann's *ῥᾷόν* 94 e 6 (though *διαφερόντως* 99 c 2 is rendered by *differentius*) and, as Dr. Maas points out (p. 45), Casaubon's *σεῖος* 99 d 9. I may perhaps say that Mr. Bigwood, who saw the latter possibility, left the matter open at the time, as the assumption that Aristippus read *σεῖος* did not seem to him to account altogether satisfactorily for the alternative readings in O, which he deciphered as *terminos* and *cios*.

The indices, compiled by Sig. Minio-Paluello, are very useful. *Scius* (10, 21) is wanting, and it is wrongly said that *εἰ . . . μή* in 27, 31 is rendered by *sin*.

W. L. Lorimer.

[1] But *quadrupedale* for *quarta*, p. 24, 23 (83 c 5 Burnet) is a glaring immendation. An obvious correction has been missed at 98 b 5 (*ὧν οἶδα*), where *ne* in *que nescio* is mere scribal iteration. At 70 c 2 *cuilibet* (Bigwood) is preferable to the editor's *cui*.

[2] Not so much because Aristippus as a translator might be expected to pay more attention to the text than a copyist as because it is a question of a single translator against the copyists of his Greek MS. and an indefinite number of its ancestors.

Science Since 1500: A Short History of Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology. By H. T. Pledge, B.A. (London: H.M. Stationery Office. 1939. Pp. 357, with Plates, Diagrams, and Maps. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

The history of science enjoys the distinction, rare in these days, of not being a greatly overworked subject: a new treatment of it therefore at once claims attention and is fairly secure from the charge of redundancy. Mr. Pledge's book is "aimed primarily at the 'specialist in other subjects,' the scholarship candidate, the university student, the research worker," and we may particularize by saying that it should not be without interest for the philosopher. "Brevity," the author tells us, "has been secured by suppressing biography and the human sciences, sociology, anthropology, psychology, economics." This is regrettable from one point of view, while from another it is perhaps the reverse. It is indeed a plausible contention that to try to write a history of science since 1500 is a mistake—that there is, in fact, no history of science, but only histories of the sciences. Herein lies one of the great difficulties of Mr. Pledge's task, for any attempt to treat the subject chronologically must of necessity result in a series of short sections dealing respectively with physics, chemistry, physiology, and the rest, between which there is little if any connection; and then another similar series for the next century or whatever unit period is chosen; and so on, until in the latest period the beginnings of interrelations appear. There is no escape from this difficulty, for it belongs to the nature of the subject. That the book before us lacks the unity and coherence which one instinctively looks for in such a work is therefore not a defect of the treatment but a necessity inherent in the task essayed.

Nevertheless the book does succeed in raising before the mind's eye a picture of continuous progress. It presents us with a pageant in which, despite the heterogeneous character of the figures represented, we see an unbroken succession rising at an ever-increasing rate to a crescendo of impressiveness. It is not a pre-ordained progress towards a definite goal, but it is certainly a progress, in which the later stages have not so much superseded as absorbed the earlier. It must be admitted that this result has been in part achieved by the suppression of efforts which led nowhere, but even when allowance is made for this we are left with the consciousness of a definite continuity belonging to the subject itself. To succeed in bringing this so vividly before us is no mean achievement, and whatever defects of detail may characterize Mr. Pledge's work, his method of dealing with his subject is at least fundamentally sound. One cannot but be impressed, too, by the extent of reading and erudition displayed. On the many diverse sciences whose history he traces he writes with a knowledge and familiarity which few can claim and few are able to appraise with confidence. The present reviewer can only say that on those subjects with which he has some acquaintance Mr. Pledge writes with understanding, and it is a fair presumption that he is equally trustworthy in the remainder.

This having been said, we shall not be misunderstood if the greater part of this review is devoted to matters in which we feel that improvement is possible. That the book is worthy of improvement is, after all, the outstanding thing about it.

The historian must of necessity adopt a particular point of view. Theoretically, any consistently held viewpoint is permissible, but in practice two only present themselves for serious consideration: we may watch the course of history from a point outside the stream of time and portray the sequence of events *sub specie aeternitatis*; or we may remain at the present moment. The

former is the ideal, but is possible only to the very few. Mr. Pledge has chosen the latter. With that, of course, we can have no quarrel; it is the commoner and by far the easier from which the author can give a true account and the reader follow him with understanding. We may fairly ask, however, that the historian who adopts it shall not forget that he has done so, and shall, so far as in him lies, allow for the effects of perspective. The astronomer must perforce observe the universe from the position of the earth, but he must not represent the Moon as larger than the Sun because from that viewpoint it happens to eclipse the Sun. Our perception is of angular dimensions, but our description must be in terms of linear dimensions.

Mr. Pledge has too often failed to make the correction. This failure exhibits itself under two aspects. First, present ideas are frequently presented as final and rejected ideas are classified as false. For that there is no justification. The corpuscular theory of light would, according to this treatment, have been finally interred by the historian of forty years ago, but its spirit was very much abroad in 1940. The second aspect is the undue emphasis on the modern simply because it is modern. It is no defect, of course, that more space is given to recent than to ancient work: that must necessarily be so, because there is so much more of it. But that fact provides less rather than greater justification for stressing upstart theories whose spurs have yet to be won. A single example must suffice. There is no mention of Lockyer's dissociation hypothesis, but Milne's "kinematical relativity" claims one three-hundredth part of the book. Without attempting in the slightest degree to forecast what future may lie in store for Milne's views, it is a simple fact that during the eight years of their existence they have added nothing to our knowledge and have in no measure directed or inspired those who have made additions thereto. Lockyer's theory, on the other hand, led directly to those researches which have established modern conceptions of ionization. It has an unchallengeable place in the history of science, of which the accident that in its original form it has already been discarded is powerless to rob it.

Another feature in which we feel that Mr. Pledge's book falls short of what we might fairly expect is its high degree of unintelligibility. It is true that it is designed not for the general public but for the specialist, but it is the specialist in other subjects who is invited to read it, and he is likely to wonder at times if it is not really addressed to Macaulay's schoolboy. One too often has the feeling that he is expected to know all science, and is being told merely the dates on which the various discoveries were made. There is throughout the book an air of familiar conversation between the all-knowing. One reads, for instance, that "Mendel's was thus no new activity within monastic gardens" long before Mendel appears or is due to be mentioned, and the present reviewer, at least, when he reads that "the obvious common point (between hormones and vitamins) is of course that, like catalysts and enzymes, they act in very small quantities," feels with a sense of shame that if the opposite had been stated he would not have risen from his seat in protest. It is true that considerations of space alone would prevent an explanation of all the ideas whose history is traced, but, to mention only one point, there are many terms (e.g. photosynthesis) which could have been briefly defined with very great gain to the understanding and very little lengthening of the book. This dearth of definition is not merely an inconvenience but a definite blemish, for the language of science is an important part of its history. Scientific terms did not exist in the dictionary before science required them. They stand for facts or ideas whose discovery is as important as anything about them, and nothing that can be said about photosynthesis is more vital to the history of science than the fact itself.

A history of science is not a textbook of science, but it should give us some clue to what is unfolding itself.

Finally, there is the question of omissions. Where the subject is so great and space so small it is a sorry task complaining that all has not been said, and of the special departments of science which fail to find a place we will mention only one—low-temperature research. We mention this because, apart altogether from personal prejudices and preoccupations, there can be no doubt that it is destined to be a major field of scientific activity, and one in which what has already been done, outstandingly important as it is, is almost certainly the prelude to developments of fundamental and revolutionary significance. But in speaking of omissions we have in mind not so much the landmarks of science itself as those events in its history which, while perhaps intrinsically of secondary importance, have nevertheless exercised an immeasurable influence on the course of history in general and the history of ideas in particular. Speaking of the intentional neglect of the "human sciences," Mr. Pledge writes: "To balance this, the story itself has been thrown against a background of the human and economic factors in successive periods rather than against the more intellectual and philosophical backgrounds which have mainly interested writers of previous general works." That is all very well, but there are limits to one's liberty to ignore important aspects of a movement by "throwing it against" a background which obscures them. A history of the Reformation which ignored the existing state of the Christian Church on the ground that the treatment was thrown against the background of the operations of the ductless glands would have some difficulty in defending its title: reformation of what? And a history of science which ignores the influence of science on knowledge in general meets with a similar difficulty. To take two examples: the discovery by Halley that comets were periodic and were not necessarily connected with the death of princes had an incalculable effect on the history of superstition, and the discovery by Adams and Leverrier of the planet Neptune by mathematical calculation had scarcely less influence on belief in the "reign of law." Not only are these effects ignored, but the discoveries themselves are not even mentioned. We are not without sympathy with the effort to give economic and material factors their due emphasis, but it is, after all, ideas that make history, and the profoundest influences of history are in the generation of new ideas.

But, when all is said, Mr. Pledge has given us a book of great value, and one for which there was great need. Space forbids us to mention its special characteristics of detail, but there are several novel features which reveal the seriousness with which the author has approached his task. We are indebted to him for a noteworthy addition to scientific literature and one to which we shall often refer. We may add a warning against judging the book, either qualitatively or quantitatively, by the price. It is a miracle of cheapness.

HERBERT DINGLE.

A Mathematician's Apology. By G. H. HARDY. (London: Cambridge University Press. 1940. Pp. vii + 93. Price 3s. 6d.)

The author of this little book is known to his professional colleagues throughout the world as one of the most eminent of living English pure mathematicians. To his many friends he is known as a man of strongly marked and highly original personality, which expresses itself very characteristically in his conversation. During the most anxious period of the dreadful summer of 1940 he spent some time in looking back, from the early evening of his

life, on his own professional activities and in writing down his reflections on the nature and value of his subject and on his own attitude towards it. He took the manuscript somewhat diffidently to the University Press, thinking that they might perhaps consent to publish it as a pamphlet if he undertook to bear the expense. Mr. Roberts of the Press knows a good thing when he sees it, and he jumped at the opportunity to publish a fascinating and agreably written little book. I hope, and have good reason to believe, that his reward will be something more than a deferred annuity payable in the Kingdom of Heaven.

Professor Hardy distinguishes two questions: (1) What are the motives which lead certain persons to devote themselves to mathematics? And (2) What is the value of their activities?.

Professor Hardy's answer to his first question is as follows. The main motives which lead anyone of first-rate abilities to devote himself to any kind of research are intellectual curiosity, pleasure and pride in the successful exercise of his technical skill, and the desire for favourable recognition of his work by competent contemporaries and successors. An eminent mathematician has a particularly good chance of satisfying all these desires. Moreover, great mathematical gifts are so rarely accompanied by comparable ability in any other department that anyone who possesses them is under little temptation to aim at any alternative kind of achievement

In this connection there are two small points in Professor Hardy's argument which a captious reader might be inclined to criticize. (i) In his attempt to show that mathematical fame tends to be more enduring than, e.g. political fame, he does not sufficiently distinguish between continued admiration for a theorem in fact discovered by X and continued admiration for X as discoverer of that theorem. What he shows is that a first-rate mathematical theorem is likely to be recognized and admired as such by experts for an indefinitely long period. But surely it must depend on many highly contingent circumstances whether the name of its discoverer remains associated with it. Who of us, in admiring some theorem discovered by some Babylonian mathematician, is in a position to admire its discoverer for discovering it? No doubt there is a satisfaction in knowing that what is in fact one's work will continue to call forth admiration even though its admirers will cease to associate it with oneself. But that satisfaction might be enjoyed by many politicians and civil servants whose names will be unknown within a hundred years. (ii) Professor Hardy insists, probably with truth, that supreme achievement in mathematics is possible only at a comparatively early age. The only relevant instance which he gives is that of Newton. To produce, as he does, a list of persons who did supreme creative work in mathematics and then died young—e.g. Galois, Abel, Ramanujan and Riemann—is surely irrelevant. I suppose that the suppressed premiss is that the work which they did before their early deaths was so stupendously great that it is incredible that they should have equalled it if they had lived.

The discussion of the intrinsic value of mathematics is somewhat rambling, but the gist of it is as follows. A mathematical theorem is a pattern of ideas. (We are not told what special kind of ideas are the constituents of specifically methematical patterns.) If a theorem is to be non-trivial, it must have two characteristics, viz. beauty and seriousness. These are not independent, for the beauty depends to a considerable extent on the seriousness. Before attempting to analyse these characteristics Professor Hardy illustrates them by contrasting chess problems, which are genuine bits of mathematics but are essentially trivial and not particularly beautiful, with two very simple theorems which are both serious and beautiful. The examples which he takes

are the proof that there is no greatest prime-number and the proof that there is no rational fraction whose square is equal to 2. These examples seem to me to be very happily chosen for his purpose; they are easy enough for any sane person to follow, and they are quite obviously weighty and beautiful. I think it would have been an advantage if Professor Hardy had distinguished more sharply between the proposition proved in a mathematical theorem and the reasoning by which it is established. In these two examples I should be inclined to feel that the beauty resides mainly in the reasoning and the seriousness mainly in the conclusion; but, no doubt, in more complicated examples each part would have a considerable share in both properties.

The seriousness of a theorem is said to depend on the significance of the ideas which it connects. This is said to depend in turn on a certain kind of generality and a certain kind of depth. A mathematical idea is general, in the sense required, if "it is a constituent in many mathematical constructs" and "is used in the proof of theorems of many different kinds." Professor Hardy does not profess to be able to give a satisfactory definition of "depth." From what he says I infer that the following statement would be a first approximation to what he has in mind. One theorem connecting certain ideas is "deeper" than another which connects the same ideas, if the former *cannot*, and the latter *can*, be proved without appealing to other ideas which are more complex or more general or more subtle. Mathematical beauty is said to depend on a combination of a high degree of unexpectedness with inevitability and economy. (I should suppose that the unexpectedness is in the conclusion, and the inevitability and economy in the proof.)

The value of mathematical activity of a high order is that it creates, or, to speak more strictly, disengages and reveals ideal patterns which have a high degree of beauty and significance, derived from the depth and the generality of their constituent ideas. It is thus essentially a form of artistic creation, which has the unique advantage that its materials are timeless concepts and not perishable sounds or pigments. He who demands some extrinsic justification for it betrays himself as a philistine; he who attempts to comply with such a demand is a disguised enemy or an uncomprehending friend.

The latter part of the book is devoted to showing that the parts of mathematics which are admirable for their beauty and seriousness are almost completely devoid of both utility and disutility. Here "utility" is taken to mean conduciveness to general safety, comfort, and happiness; and disutility is taken to mean its contrary opposite. The only parts of mathematics which can have appreciable utility or disutility are those which are applicable to the solution of practical problems of engineering, navigation, chemistry, physics, economics, etc. Now, Professor Hardy maintains, those parts of mathematics which have important practical applications are all intrinsically dull and trivial; whilst those which have great beauty and seriousness are without application to technical problems. This rule, he points out, is true of "applied" mathematics as well as "pure" mathematics. Applied mathematics is that part of the subject which is concerned with the formal structure of the actual physical world. Some of this is highly beautiful and serious, and its only defect is its limitation to that tiny region of the domain of formal possibilities which is exemplified by the actual world. But the beautiful and serious part of it is of no importance whatever to the technician.

I think that Professor Hardy is in the main right in these conclusions, but I also think that a very natural irritation with the aggressive philistinism of such a work as Professor Hogben's *Mathematics for the Million* leads him to exaggerate his case. Contemporary Communist writers bear a marked family

likeness to the more bumptious and ignorant of the early nineteenth-century Benthamites, and the present reviewer in reading Professor Hogben's pronouncements on mathematics was constantly reminded of the famous Scottish utilitarian who described poetry as "the prodooction of a rude age." But this legitimate annoyance with self-satisfied ignorance and insensitiveness must not be allowed to cloud one's judgment. Surely it would be difficult to deny that Newton's theory of gravitation, Laplace's and Hamilton's reduction of the laws of dynamics to the Principle of Least Action, and Maxwell's theory of the electro-magnetic field are intrinsically beautiful and serious bits of mathematics. And surely they have had extremely important technical applications, both for good and for ill.

C. D. Broad.

An Introduction to Hegel. By G. R. G. Mure. (Oxford: Humphrey Milford, at the Clarendon Press. 1940. Pp. xx + 180. Price 10s. 6d.)

It would seem that the days are gone when Hegel and the Hegelians could complain of not being understood, for here is another book that is thoroughly Hegelian in idiom, giving Hegel's own specific point of view rather than some Anglo-Hegelian version of it. The author has no intention of making any contribution to his subject; his concern is simply to expound Hegel correctly.

Unfortunately no attempt is made to explain the unique form of language used. As an introduction, the book would not introduce Hegel to a student that did not already know his philosophy fairly well. The author does not explain why he regards existing expositions of Hegel as unsatisfactory. In what way, for instance, does his book supersede the long introduction given by Professor Stace in his *The Philosophy of Hegel*, an exposition that is as intelligible to the beginner as we are ever likely to find in this sphere?

J. O. Wisdom.

David Hume: The Man and His Science of Man. Actualités Scientifiqus et Industriells, 860. By F. H. Heinemann. (Paris: Hermann et Cie. 1940. Pp. 67.)

This small essay has two parts. The first, by means of letters, some hitherto unpublished, and aided by psychoanalytic theory, the employment of which gives to it what novelty it possesses and endows the letters in question with an importance no one would otherwise assign to them, seeks to reveal Hume not as the ingenuous character of tradition but as a complicated personality suffering from internal conflict due to disappointments and frustrations demanding not only compensation but over-compensation. The conclusion drawn is that Hume's life was a *mixed* one, such as he affirmed in the *Enquiry* to be the most suitable to the human race. The second part deals with the idea of a science of man, in the discussion of which interesting points, left, however, undeveloped and indefinite, about Leibniz in relation to Hume are introduced, but the possibility of which, curiously enough, is made to rest on Hobbes and the sources of English philosophy, not on Hume, whose importance lies rather in his demand for a science of man and in the fact that he doubts statements which have been too easily taken for granted than in any great revelation about the nature of man. There is no attempt to elucidate what Hume had in mind when he declared that human nature enters into science as an important determinant and that a science of man

comprehends almost all other sciences. One must confess that on the whole the essay produces a sense of ineffectiveness. The significance of the first part for the second is not brought out, and the second seems not very much about Hume at all. The psychoanalytic treatment of the first part tends to ignore in assessing Hume's behaviour the historical character of the period and to put out of focus the occurrences said to affect Hume and his philosophy, for, apart from the meagre paternal inheritance which the author asserts to have been a *shock* (why?), the disappointments and frustrations were subsequent to the formulation of that philosophy. It might also be noted that even four years prior to the joke about a bishopric of which the author makes use Hume had made jocular reference to himself and the See of Lambeth. But jokes are notoriously significant!

B. M. LAING.

The Idea of the Soul in Western Philosophy and Science. By WILLIAM ELLIS, Ph.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1940. Pp. 314. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

This illuminating survey, unusually attractively written and addressed to "the ordinary educated man," should closely interest all readers of this Journal; the historical and speculative aspects of the problem, and particularly the influence of modern scientific ideas, are alike competently and lucidly discussed. One inescapable defect of even the best textbooks seems to be the over-emphasis on the contrasts between successive schools; Dr. Ellis, on the contrary, clearly traces the continuity underlying rival hypotheses, the result being a well-balanced analysis of both ancient and current issues. "The unifying thread," he contends, "is the evolution of the Greek idea of the soul"; and he adds the timely reminder that "the psyche came long before psychology."

Greek thought, he continues, culminated in Platonism, "the richest of all elements" in our spiritual heritage; Aristotle, on the other hand, contributed "little but verbal subtlety," while "the history of science has shown that Plato's faith was right and Aristotle's common sense hopelessly at fault." Controversial though this may be, the insistence on the Platonic strain in medieval theology is amply justified, although to call it "nothing but a peculiarly modified form of Platonism" may savour of exaggeration.[1]

The essential point, however, is to eschew what the author calls the typically Aristotelian "self-contradictory dualism of material and immaterial," which has persisted, in various guises, throughout later speculation. It follows that "dualistic epiphenomenalism" is "absurd"; but the antithesis between Vitalism and Mechanism is more stubborn and involves the relations between the mechanical and the teleological. "Our perceptions and mental life really determine our physical actions," although "*some* forms of conscious behaviour have already been reduced to mechanistic terms"; but extreme Behaviourism is "very crude" and, in the end, self-refuting. Equally inadequate is Driesch's "monstrous supernatural apparatus of Entelechies." "Supernatural," I fear, raises its own difficulties; it hardly seems fair to accuse vitalists of equating this term to "vital."

The author's own aim is a logically consistent "biological mechanism" which must be validated experimentally, and transcend the "concept of reflex tropism" in the case of the higher vertebrates; all organic activity, further, is "a complex continuum, not a series of unrelated situations"; it

[1] Contrast Belloc's description: "Marriage of Catholicism with Aristotelian wisdom." *The Crisis of our Civilization*, 89; cf. 105.

must, therefore, "be considered as an integrated pattern." But after these indisputable prolegomena the argument admittedly approaches the tautological, since "biological mechanism is simply the scientific theory that the exploration of the physico-chemical constitution of the living organism will reveal nothing that is not physico-chemical," not even any effects themselves due to some non-physico-chemical Psyche; and once again vitalists are indicted with a "supernatural chemistry." Now Dr. Ellis has himself stressed the crucial point—the unquestionable influence of "mental life" on "physical actions"; and while this involves the physico-chemical, the restriction just maintained eludes the essential issue. In the next place, must we not ask—To what is integration itself due? If solely to the physico-chemical, then this of itself integrates the cerebral processes inseparable from human consciousness in its highest forms. But this conclusion is similarly evaded, since "biological mechanism makes no attempt to explain the nature of experience."

Integration, still further, operates throughout Nature; possibly within the electron, as it does in every familiar machine; so that while Mechanism quite rightly insists on this universality, Vitalism retorts by repeating the question —Can it be exclusively physico-chemical? just as a Martian, ignorant of the actual origins of the *Queen Elizabeth*, might question its self-integration, which we know to be an impossibility. But Dr. Ellis seems to ignore this crucial difficulty, although he recognizes some kind of "purpose" in Nature; "teleology cannot be differentially exemplified by living things." This, however, simply transforms, without solving, the problem of integration, which now becomes—Is purpose, or even purposiveness, actually dissociable from a relatively high level of mentality, so that it too becomes purely physico-chemical?

The discussion of consciousness, again, seems somewhat inconsistent. The "concept of consciousness," as contrasted with the "concept of life," is "essentially metaphysical." It certainly has important metaphysical aspects; but in other respects, except for that extreme Behaviourism which the author eschews, the two concepts are equally scientific and indispensable. "Consciousness is an invariable accompaniment of animal life and absent in the inorganic world." Quite so; but while there is nothing "metaphysical" about this, it makes it very hard to appreciate the conclusion advanced that "all Nature is a psychical being," in the sense that "physico-chemical sensitivity pervades the material universe" and is, still further, identical with "animal sensitivity." The result appears to be an almost fatal dilemma. For if "animal sensitivity" involves consciousness, then it is *not* present in the inorganic realm; while if, on the other hand, this sensitivity excludes consciousness, the most important living processes are completely outside Nature, so that the original issue confronting biological mechanism remains unsolved, and to infer that "matter is 'instantaneous' mind," in any literal sense, appears a *non sequitur*.

There can, in any case, be no question as to the unusually high ability shown in what would seem to be the writer's first work. Few scientists are equally competent to discuss the philosophic aspects of their own research; and his further contributions to our common field ought to arouse the deepest interest.

J. E. Turner.

Boethius: Some Aspects of his Times and Work. By Helen M. Barrett, M.A (London: Cambridge University Press. 1940. Pp. ix + 179. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

On the wrapper of this book Boethius is justly described as "a man who should not be forgotten." Although not himself a philosopher of the first

rank, he was one of the principal channels through which the tradition of Greek philosophy was transmitted to the Latin world of the Middle Ages. His definitions of "eternity" and of "person" became classical and served as the starting-points of much later thought on the problems associated with those words. Lastly, his most famous book, the *Consolatio Philosophiae*—like Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, the precious memorial of an undeserved imprisonment—has brought to many generations of readers, and among them to some very great men, the instruction and comfort which the author, in his hour of need, had sought and found in the wisdom of Plato and of the Stoics.

Miss Barrett has written an excellent account for general readers of the man and his works. Like others before her, she is especially concerned to find an explanation of the fact that Boethius, though the author of treatises on Christian dogmatic theology, makes (as was already in the twelfth century noted by John of Salisbury) no explicit reference to Christianity in the book wherein one would expect to find the expression of his most serious religious convictions. Miss Barrett thinks that such an explanation is to be found in the supposition that it was his deliberate intention to propound in the *Consolatio* a theodicy such as could be afforded by natural reason apart from revelation. It seems to me more probable that, while sincere in his profession of Christianity and well acquainted with its doctrines, he, like not a few learned Christians in other ages, depended for inspiration and support in his personal life less upon Christian teaching than upon that of the ancient Greek and Latin masters to the study of whom he had from his youth up chiefly devoted himself. Yet it may be said with truth that in his "golden volume, not unworthy of the leisure of a Plato or a Tully" (as Gibbon called it) he presents a conception of the God whose ways he seeks to justify to man, as the divine creator and providential governor of the universe, entirely consistent with that of Christian theism.

CLEMENT C. J. WEBB.

Preface to an Educational Philosophy. By I. B. BERKSON. (New York: Columbia University Press; London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1940. Pp. xiv + 250. Price 2 dollars 50; 16s. 6d.)

This book shows frequent and manifest marks of its American origin. The authorities quoted are nearly all American, and the problems dealt with are those which are said to be hotly discussed in American educational circles. This does not mean that the book lacks interest or importance to British readers. Indeed, America's educational problems to-day will in all probability be England's to-morrow. For the war has shaken us up, and after it is over there is likely to be in this country an educational New Deal. The truth is that education is in a far more fluid state in America than in England. They have there far less tradition than we have here and are far more prone to regard their systems and their methods as tentative and experimental. They challenge things which we accept without question as part of the eternal order. Hence the importance of this book; for it treats of the very foundation of educational theory and practice.

Dr. Berkson begins by referring to the two poles of thought and endeavour towards one or the other of which educators in the United States tend to gravitate. First there are the "traditionalists," who hold that the duty of the school is to transmit the social heritage from the past. Then there are the "progressives" who maintain that the school must adapt itself to changes in the social environment, and should even help in shaping future events. The

creed of the traditionalists has recently been trenchantly put forward by Dr. R. M. Hutchins, President of the University of Chicago, who is quoted in this book as boldly asserting that "education should be everywhere the same," and that "the heart of every course of study will be, if rightly understood, the same at any time, in any place, under any political, social, or economic conditions."

This, to the progressives, is an untenable position, for it falsely assumes that we can by a process of rigid reasoning deduce an educational programme from metaphysics. They themselves, on the contrary, regard every educational theory or principle as merely an hypothesis. It affords a working plan which is to be judged entirely by results—a plan to be modified, or even rejected, in the light of practical experience.

It is pertinent to inquire to which of these two schools Dr. Berkson belongs. With certain important reservations he belongs to both. For the two theories, as he interprets them, are by no means incompatible. Education must preserve the culture of the past, so far as it is worth preserving. That gives it stability. It must also meet the needs of the present social system, and must prepare for future changes in that system—even help to bring about those changes. That gives it adaptability. He believes in a philosophy of education, but believes that it can be derived, not from metaphysics but from the humbler philosophic disciplines of ethics and politics. And since ethics and politics are mainly concerned with human welfare, education must be to a large extent experimental.

The author definitely takes the democratic standpoint; he outlines a humanistic way of life which he regards as constituting the essence of democracy. He is highly critical of the loose definitions of democracy which have gained currency in England and America. He challenges Lord Bryce's contention that democracy is "neither more nor less than the rule of the majority," pointing out that a majority of the citizens in Germany support, or at least did support, Nazism. He also has something to say about the rights of minorities.

Dr. Berkson sums up by stating that "In the School of Tomorrow the keynote will be intelligent social co-operation; emphasis will be laid on economic welfare, on critical intelligence, and on social change." He then proceeds to give "ten New Controlling Ideas for American Education." And although the claim that they are all new cannot be justified, they do give a very clear and definite outline of what we mean by educating for democracy.

P. B. Ballard.

Psychology and Psychotherapy. By William Brown, D.M.(Oxon.), D.Sc. (Lond.), F.R.C.P. Fourth edition. (London: Edward Arnold & Co. 1940. Pp. viii + 260. Price 12s. 6d.)

To the fourth edition of his already well-known book Dr. William Brown has added two new chapters, on "Sublimation" and on "The Problems of Later Life." The book is designed to appeal to the intelligent general reader rather than to the specialist; though it is irreproachable in its philosophical and scientific method, it covers a great deal of rather various ground associated with his very wide subject, and so does not always hang well together as a coherent whole.

One of the qualities of Dr. Brown's eclectic approach is his interest in psychological treatment by hypnosis and suggestion, methods whose value is liable to be obscured by the immense strides which have been made along analytical lines. It is fairly certain that war conditions will bring about a

revival of the technique of treatment by suggestion and other short methods, such as abreaction and hypno-analysis.

The chapters which the present reviewer particularly appreciates are those on Freud's Theory of the Unconscious, on the Relation of Mind to Brain, and on Sublimation; these are philosophically valuable, and contribute to the clarification of thought and the closer apprehension of reality. In particular, the distinction on p. 144 between Sublimation and Idealization cannot be too clearly stressed, holding as it does an important key to the woes and confusions of civilized man at the present time.

Other chapters are empirical in their significance, informative or personally helpful. That on the Psycho-Neuroses of War (with an appendix of case-notes) is of topical value, but the chapter on the Psychology of Peace and War is on the whole disappointing in relation to our present need.

B. D. HENDY.

The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza: A Study in the History and Logic of Ideas, By D. BIDNEY, Ph.D. (New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1940. Pp. xv + 454. Price 22s. 6d.)

This is a welcome addition to Spinoza literature. It contains a detailed study of the psychological and ethical views of Spinoza, with a number of interesting historical comparisons, showing their relation not only to earlier but also to contemporary views.

An adequate discussion of Dr. Bidney's substantial volume would require more space and time than I can dispose of. A few brief comments must suffice, and the fact that these are critical in character must not be regarded as evidence of any lack of appreciation of the value of the work as a whole.

My main complaint is that Dr. Bidney, in spite of his obvious regard for Spinoza, is somewhat too ready to detect inconsistencies in his views. Generally speaking, it is a sound heuristic principle to assume as long as possible that an author of competence is consistent, and to have recourse to the charge of inconsistency only as a last resort. A too facile readiness to recognize inconsistencies may easily betray a critic into misconceptions of his subject in consequence of insufficient effort to grapple with the problems concerned. Let an example or two illustrate my meaning. The term "cause" was frequently used in Spinoza's days, and still is frequently used, in the sense of part-cause, or condition, as distinguished from the whole cause. In Spinoza's philosophy, indeed, no finite cause can be the whole cause. Consequently there is no inconsistency involved in asserting sometimes, for example, that our feelings are determined by our character, and sometimes that they are determined by the nature of the objects. Both are factors, and there may be many other factors involved, so that there is no reason why one of them should not be stressed in one context, another in another. Similarly there is no inconsistency in asserting that the same mental characteristic may induce one kind of feeling or attitude on one occasion, a different, maybe an opposite one, on another occasion. It depends on the nature of the other factors operating on the two occasions. Again, Spinoza is not really inconsistent when he rejects final causes and yet allows, indeed preaches, the pursuit of ideals. In the pursuit of an ideal, Spinoza insists, an existing idea exercises *efficient* causality on the agent entertaining it. This is not a case of final causality in the sense in which Spinoza rejected it. The Aristotelian-Scholastic final cause was something outside the human mind, something immanent in natural

objects and determining their progress towards its as yet unrealized self. This Spinoza rejected. But the human pursuit of an ideal is the *efficient* causality of an idea actually existing in the agent's mind. To regard it as a *final* cause is the result of a confusion in the use of the term "ideal," which is sometimes conceived as the *idea* and sometimes as the *ideatum*. But the *idea* is real even though the *ideatum* is not; and the effectiveness of the idea is a case of *efficient*, not of *final*, causality.

Some of Dr. Bidney's historical explanations seem rather far-fetched. For instance, he describes Spinoza's conception of virtue as power, as a syllogistic conclusion from the Baconian dictum: "Knowledge is power," and the Socratic or Platonic dictum: "Virtue is knowledge." This is ingenious; but the explanation may be much simpler. The suggestion probably came to Spinoza from a fairly common use of the term "virtue." In familiar phrases like "the virtues of gems" or "the virtues of herbs," the term "virtue" clearly means "power."

Lastly, I must demur against Dr. Bidney's description of Spinoza's psychology as "mechanistic." As against Professor Spearman's assertion that a scientific psychology based on the explicit recognition of mental laws did not make its appearance till the eighteenth century, Dr. Bidney is quite right in maintaining that Spinoza initiated such a psychology in the seventeenth century. But a psychology based on laws is not "mechanistic." Hobbes had a mechanistic psychology, but then he was a materialist. Spinoza was neither a materialist nor a mechanist. And Dr. Bidney's phrase "spiritual mechanism" is really a contradiction in terms.

A. Wolf.

Books received also:—

Verrina. *The German Mentality*. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1941. Pp. 257. 10s. 6d.

A. H. Rees. *The Faith in England*. ("Signposts" series.) London: Dacre Press. 1941. Pp. 188. 1s.

C. Thurston. *The Structure of Art*. U.S.A.: Chicago University Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1941. Pp. 190. 15s.

DeWitt H. Parker. *Experience and Substance: an Essay in Metaphysics*. Ann Arbor, U.S.A.: University of Michigan Press. 1941. Pp. x + 371. 3 dollars.

Sir Jogendra Singh. *Sikh Ceremonies*. Bombay: International Press. 1941. Pp. xx + 96. 2s. 8d.

L. Belton. *Can We Still Believe in Man?* London: Lindsey Press. 1941. Pp. 50. 1s.

J. Masaryk. *The Immortal Soul in Danger*. London: Lindsey Press. 1941. Pp. 38. 1s.

Two Years of German Oppression in Czechoslovakia. London: Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1941. Pp. 151. 7s. 6d. and 10s. 6d.

S. Wadia. *Preparation for Citizenship*. Bombay: International Book House 1941. Pp. xii + 72. 1s.

R. Klibansky. *Leibniz's Unknown Correspondence with English Scholars and Men of Letters*. London: The Warburg Institute. 1941. Pp. 17.

F. Znaniecki. *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge*. New York: Columbia University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1940. Pp. 212. 2 dollars 50; 16s. 6d.

J. Huxley. *The Uniqueness of Man*. London: Chatto & Windus. 1941. Pp. xiii + 300. 10s. 6d.

IN MEMORIAM

G. DAWES HICKS, F.B.A.

By the death of Professor G. Dawes Hicks, on February 16th, at the age of seventy-eight, philosophers have lost a typical philosopher of the older generation. Philosophy was the absorbing interest of his life, an interest that he was happily able to maintain until the very end. From his sick-bed he continued to act as sub-editor of the *Hibbert Journal* and was engaged in writing his famous "Philosophical Survey" for that *Journal* when death came, rather suddenly at the end. His mind seemed not to fail at all; he read omnivorously and argued clearly despite a growing weariness of body and often considerable pain. After his retirement he lived altogether at Cambridge, to which he was deeply attached. He took a keen interest in the new movements in philosophy, and it was one of his griefs that Cambridge philosophers did not care to visit him. No doubt the fault was not all on their side; Hicks was essentially a lonely man with a few strong and deep attachments. On more than one occasion during his later years Hicks told the present writer that the men to whom he owed most were T. H. Huxley and Robert Adamson. He loved to read aloud portions of T. H. Huxley's letters, and to recall his excitement at hearing Huxley lecture in his youth. The influence of Robert Adamson upon his life and thought was profound. In his early days he studied under Wundt and Hering. Later, when he came to live in Cambridge, he formed a friendship with James Ward.

Hicks was essentially a scholar and thinker; his knowledge was extraordinarily wide and thorough; his powers of criticism acute. He was in no sense a maker of systems; his gifts did not lie in the direction of speculative metaphysics and his chief work was done in the region of theory of knowledge and philosophy of religion. He was a member of the Unitarian Communion, and had been in the ministry, at Unity Church, Islington, from 1897 to 1903. In his Hibbert Lectures he expounded the grounds of his theistic faith. At one time he professed himself a "Neo-Kantian"—a name that has surely covered a variety of theories at various times. To his own views he gave the name "Critical Realism," the adjective "critical" being used in a Kantian sense. He constantly inveighed against the habit of treating the knowing subject as an object among other objects; he insisted upon a threefold distinction between the activity of apprehension, the content apprehended, and the apprehended object. He strove again and again to make clear that by "the content apprehended" we were not to suppose he meant any *tertium quid* standing between the mind and its object. Perhaps the best way to understand his contention is to recall the scholastic distinction between *id quod concipitur* and *id quo concipitur*.

It matters little whether anyone accepts the doctrine of Critical Realism. What is important is that no one could fail to be stimulated in thinking critically who reads the numerous papers (mainly contributed to the *Aristotelian Society*) he wrote on this and allied topics. His mind was so acute, his knowledge so considerable, and his patience in detail so great, that to discuss with him was always to learn something worth while. There are not many of whom this can be said. The strongest impression, from this point of view, that Hicks made upon the present writer (who was not his student) was of his whole-hearted devotion to philosophical thinking, his passionate desire to promote the cause of philosophical studies, and his fine intellectual integrity. He was incapable of the arts of a showman or of adopting any devices designed to draw attention to himself.

L. Susan Stebbing.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

Dear Sir,

Please allow me some remarks on the review of Kierkegaard's "Journals" and "Fear and Trembling," which appeared in *Philosophy*, July 1939.

There are two fundamental dangers in the interpretation of Kierkegaard, one of them regarding method, the other one regarding the contents themselves. In trying to understand his philosophy the possibility suggests itself of interpreting his extreme position by means of biography and of explaining his doctrines by relating them to the facts of his life and his character. But Kierkegaard demands that people should face the contents of his teaching in themselves, not relatively to the facts of his life. If the interpreter does not want to face this philosophy personally, it is certainly his task to open the door to other people by explaining its claim. The other danger is in some ways connected with the first one: the knowledge of Kierkegaard's poetical talent leads the interpreter to deal with him as a poet, to appreciate him aesthetically. But to do this is to mistake the significance of his work totally. For Kierkegaard's aim is to communicate reality; the terrible anxiety of "sin," the "fear and trembling" are peculiar to the severity of the "existential" thinker, not to the unreal poet (see, e.g., *Der Augenblick* (Jena, 1923), pp. 91–93: the poet is most dangerous, because he leads away from reality).

Kierkegaard's aim is to interpret Christianity in the radical form of Paul. The Tertullian saying: "credo quia absurdum" adequately expresses his tendency to a belief in another world radically different from this one. But there is another important point to be noticed: Kierkegaard lives in the nineteenth century, at the end of an epoch of growing rationalism and "enlightenment," and of destruction of religious belief. He does not close his eyes to these facts. He places himself in his century, deals with its problems in existential seriousness. Therefore, it is true, the meaning of Christianity in his eyes is the same as in Paul's, but his attitude to it must be different: he cannot possibly have unquestionable belief (especially since he knows the real meaning of this word); he cannot naïvely "jump"; he must proceed by reflection. So as the real problem the question arises: how can the finite subject (the individual, soul) find a way to the "totally different," the infinite, God? How can the individual, who is "not in the truth," in the "error," "acquire the truth," i.e. find existential belief, not *Weltanschauung*? (see *Philosophical Fragments*, London—New York, 1936).

To begin with, Kierkegaard is forced to criticize the contemporary opinion (Hege in philosophy, the State church in religion) that the way to the absolute is not through the concrete individual, but through something general (the church as institution, the "spirit" (Hegel)). Only the single concrete individual in his loneliness can find his way to God, can realize belief. For there is no "mediation" of the contrast between God and the individual in general spirit, because this contrast is not surmountable at all. The contemporary opinion (suggested by Hegel) was that nobody must remain at the stage of belief, everybody must "go further." The reason for the possibility of this opinion is, Kierkegaard says, that nobody knows what belief really means (see especially *Der Begriff der Angst* (Jena, 1912), Introduction). Belief in Kierkegaard's meaning demands that the concrete human being should live in it, not "go further": for living in belief means a permanent struggle "in the Paradox." Kierkegaard's own reflection belongs directly to this struggle, it is existential thinking; it is dialectical thinking, which always breaks again at the Paradox. But it is just this breaking which is important. "Going further" is impossible; the "system" claims to do so, but it does—less. (See *Fear and Trembling*, Epilogue.)

The peculiar problem of Kierkegaard's life (and, he maintains, of human life altogether) is the "jump" into belief; after which people speak "in the truth," in "authority." Kierkegaard says all over again that he himself has not this authority. But nevertheless without doubt Kierkegaard speaks in his later works from the basis of belief, after the "jump." He has here overcome the dialectic, the positive believer speaks. And that is highly important for the interpreter: he is obliged to see these two sides simultaneously if he wants to understand the real Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard is neither a positive theologian in unquestionable belief, nor a reflecting thinker who eventually breaks at the contradictions of his thinking, unable to reach that point which he aims at. And Kierkegaard is certainly not "morbid."

Kierkegaard is the thinker of the nineteenth century (besides Nietzsche perhaps), who against the abstractions of idealism and the materialism of positivism strove for the existential reality in its efforts for transcendence; and he had enough critical ability and intellectual sincerity to see the difficulty of the problem and to avoid "solutions" which perhaps would have made him famous and fashionable but which would not have faced the problems with which he struggled.

I am,

Your obedient servant,

EMIL FACKENHEIM.

ABERDEEN,
August 1939.

INSTITUTE NOTES

Owing to conditions in London, we have not been able to hold lectures during the past winter, but efforts are being made to arrange occasional lectures on important subjects during the summer. In the meantime, the Council appeals for the loyal support of all who believe that philosophy has an important function to perform in this extremely critical age.

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